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Armed Forces: Chain of Command

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, for introducing this   important debate. I wish to address a wider point covered by his Motion, leaving other noble Lords to concentrate on the more immediate concerns of us all. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review acknowledged that the system of service law was essential to operational effectiveness, its fundamental purpose being to foster and promote the discipline and self-control required in an effective fighting force. The right to command—and respect for command—in upholding that discipline are thus of great importance. They are the two sides of the same coin. Right to command is underwritten by statute. The Armed Forces discipline Acts state, for example, that it is an offence to disobey a lawful command. A commander at every level expects obedience, and a positive reaction from the subordinate, to his or her lawful order or instruction. While the right to command is underwritten in statute, the flip side of the coin—respect for command—relies on a very different approach. Indeed, if the command is to be respected, it is self-evident that the giver of that command must himself be respected. Without that, the commanded will not respond, as they must, without hesitation. It is the   interaction between the two—the commanded and the commander—that must be build upon to achieve the cohesion and professional competence required for modern warfare and peace-keeping. For centuries it was ordered, again in statute, that all commanders had disciplinary powers; this aligning of command with discipline being essential to operational effectiveness. If a subordinate transgressed, he or she could be dealt with at the level of command appropriate to the alleged offence: minor misdemeanours at a junior level; the more serious crimes by court martial, ordered usually by a two-star officer in the chain of command. Outcomes were also formally reviewed by the chain of command. The introduction of the Human Rights Act in 1998, and the renewed obligation for the Armed Forces to abide in particular by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, have accelerated changes in service disciplinary procedures. Courts martial, for example, are no longer convened by the chain of command. The use of uniformed judge advocates in Royal Navy courts martial has ended. For the human rights advocate this more correctly accords with the independent and impartial tribunal of Article 6. But—a very big ““but”” in my mind—there is a growing risk that because senior commanders no longer convene courts martial nor review findings, and junior commanders have had their disciplinary powers circumscribed, these commanders must appear to some to be no longer trusted to act impartially. It is not a very big step to thinking that if authority—in the shape of Parliament—appears not to trust commanders to administer discipline fairly, doubts could surface in different fields about a commander’s competence, not only in the field of discipline. Each step taken to alter the long-standing Armed Forces disciplinary procedures may erode confidence in, and hence respect for, commanders at every level. The Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have taken numerous steps to respond to the perceived needs of the Human Rights Act and the convention. They have worked hard to adjust their procedures to fit this new regime. I should have liked a more robust resistance by governments to the changes that have been accepted—changes that may have an insidious impact on the effectiveness and well-being of the Armed Forces. The disciplinary responsibilities of the chain of command have been weakened. When the Human Rights Act was in your Lordships’ House I tried to get some relief for the Armed Forces, and supported an amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway on Report. On a comparable amendment on Third Reading, I said that,"““we are in danger of allowing it””—" the Bill—"““to undermine the essential ethos, military discipline and responsibility of commanding officers within our Armed Forces””.—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col. 762.]" [The House observed a two-minute silence.] In responding to the debate, the then Lord Chancellor said:"““I urge your Lordships to be of the view that the convention is a flexible instrument. It poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces””.—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col. 768.]" Practical experience since then does not support that   assertion. Flexibility there has not been. The effectiveness of the Armed Forces disciplinary and command structures is being affected. It is a slow-burning fuse. We must beware lest it sparks an explosion of insubordination. The House will have the opportunity to consider these complex issues when it debates the new Armed Forces Bill during this Session. Perhaps the flexibility of human rights legislation, avowed so earnestly by the then Lord Chancellor, will be revealed for the benefit of the Armed Forces of the Crown. I hope so, but your Lordships should not hold your breath.