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Armed Forces: Chain of Command

My Lords, like all those who have spoken before me, I thank the noble Lord, Lord   Campbell of Alloway, for securing this important debate, in which I found myself nodding in agreement with so much of what has been said. I come at the case from the position of a former principal personnel officer, as Adjutant-General responsible for both disciplinary and legal matters in the Army. I begin with a cautionary tale, which echoes concerns referenced by my noble and gallant friends Lord Bramall and Lord Guthrie. One day, my opposite numbers in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and I were told that, in future, we would have to include industrial tribunals in our service disciplinary chains. When we asked where that direction had come from, and whether they were to come before or after Her Majesty the Queen—who was the final point of appeal—we were told that such questions were irrelevant because the Bill making such a requirement law had emanated from Brussels, and had already had its First Reading in another place. France, Germany and other NATO allies had sought and been granted dispensation for their Armed Forces, but the United Kingdom had not. On seeing the Bill, the director of Army Legal Services told me that it was potentially disastrous for the Army’s operational chain of command. It allowed employees to   take their employers to industrial tribunal if ordered into a place of danger. Carried to logical, or illogical, conclusion, that meant that company commanders could take their commanding officers to industrial tribunal if ordered into an attack. What nonsense. No wonder our allies sought dispensation for their Armed Forces, as we subsequently did. I mention that to indicate why the Armed Forces become nervous whenever there is a suspicion that the integrity of their chain of command is under threat from people who do not understand the requirements of organisations that are required to operate in war as well as peace. That has been creeping up on us for some time. I should like to focus on the word ““integrity””, because it is at the heart of the case. Leadership is central to any operational organisation—especially the Armed Forces—that may be required to go to war. Central to the exercise of leadership is a chain of command, based on two key words—responsibility and accountability. Central to leadership itself is the word ““trust””. Every individual in the chain must have trust in its links, that they will get a fair deal from their commanders at all levels. Central to that trust is confidence in the integrity of Ministers, officials, commanders and staffs, which they have to earn. The chain is not merely a conduit for the passage of orders, but the means by which commanders exercise their levels of responsibility downwards and their accountability upwards. It links Ministers and chiefs of staff with individual soldiers, sailors and airmen, and is used for all purposes—operational, disciplinary, personnel management, logistics and so on. It is simple, clear and visible. It has stood the twin tests of time and war. Sadly, such clearly defined chains of command are becoming increasingly rare as Ministers and officials, lacking practical experience of either service in the Armed Forces or the exercise of operational leadership, are seduced by the cult of managerialism. A former Home Secretary claimed that while he was responsible for policy, he was not responsible for its operation. As commander of the brigade in Belfast, I could not have separated my responsibility and accountability for operations from policy. It is axiomatic that Armed Forces must act within the law, and it is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to ensure that they do so. That does not mean only the law of the land, but the law of armed conflict, service law and human rights legislation, subject of course to change. To ensure that that happens, chains of command must bear both operational and legal authority, with checks and balances to ensure that different levels are not abused. There has always been a difference between legal authority in peacetime and on active service. When in-between conditions applied in Northern Ireland, soldiers were helped to understand the rule of law by the issue of a yellow card that spelt out what could and could not be done. Unfortunately, the same practice has not been applied to post-Cold War situations such as those in Iraq, and our servicemen are now faced with an almost impossible situation. Allegedly they are not at war, despite constant attack, and yet the Prime Minister asserts that the nation is at war with both drugs and terrorism. Servicemen acting in bad faith should expect to be disciplined; servicemen acting in good faith should expect to be supported by the chain of command that put them in a position in which they had to act. What I find most uncomfortable about much of what has been said in this debate is that it discloses that all is not well with the trust that members of the Armed Forces, and particularly commanding officers, ought to have in the support that they will receive from their chain of command. I am disturbed to hear criticism of the lack of support for such as Trooper Williams from members of the Army Legal Services, who are there to help and not to hinder. As a former director of public relations for the Army, I am disturbed to learn that that post, responsible for both advising and protecting people, like him, who come into the public eye, has been dispensed with. The Government demand a great deal of our overstretched Armed Forces, setting them tasks that they continue to perform supremely well, to the envy of other nations. We owe it to them not to make those any more difficult. I hope that Ministers and officials will   resist any temptation to interfere with the integrity of their chain of command, so central to their performance, whether by failing to seek dispensation from inappropriate legislation, or attempting to substitute managerialist techniques for the exercise of operational leadership.