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Armed Forces: Chain of Command

My Lords, I join other noble Lords in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, for initiating this debate. I start by declaring an interest as a recent commanding officer of a Territorial Army regiment. During my command a larger proportion of us went abroad to operational theatres than at any time since 1945. So I hope that the commanding officer’s perspective might be helpful, as, indeed, might be that of the reservist, who can perhaps bring a civil/military balance. The essence of the problem we are discussing is the erosion of the commanding officer’s authority over his   regiment or battalion, and also, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, mentioned, commanding officers’ real concerns that they are not supported by the chain of command, which I can confirm first hand. One obvious case, but it is only one of several, is that of Trooper Williams of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, with which regiment mine has a close relationship and with whose commanding officer at the time, Lieutenant Colonel Hankinson, I have discussed the case. He was, I may say, the finest of commanding officers, having been selected from another regiment to come into the Royal Tank Regiment and whose calibre has been recognised in his subsequent promotion. A number of other cases are pending, and we must take the lessons from the case of Trooper Williams, which is now concluded, and use them to avoid similar problems in the future. I hope that that is what today’s most welcome debate might help to achieve. What formerly happened when a soldier committed a potential breach of the rules of engagement was   that his commanding officer investigated the matter with the benefit of all relevant witnesses, investigations by the Royal Military Police, and, if required, the Special Investigations Branch, and the legal advice he required. He made the decision as to the soldier’s guilt, or lack of it, because he was trained and experienced to do so, and because he was the best placed man to do so, knowing the particular operational and environmental circumstances of the alleged offence. Provided the soldier in question did not appeal, the commanding officer’s decision was final. What happened in the Trooper Williams case was that, the above procedures having been properly followed, some faceless bureaucrat in the military justice system, with huge authority but no responsibility, was able to re-open the case and persuade the Army Board to refer it to the Attorney-General. Trooper Williams, the soldier in the line of fire, believed that he could not be tried twice for the same offence. He had, in his eyes, been tried by his commanding officer. To re-open the case with no new evidence undermined not only the authority of the commanding officer but also the justice of the system and the confidence of our soldiers in it. Trooper Williams’s rules of engagement were clear. There was no question in his mind that the lives of his military police colleague and himself were threatened. He was clear that he was absolutely entitled, indeed obliged, to fire. So he did. He was entirely within his rights—not only his rights but his duty. The Army Act required his commanding officer to investigate, which he did, thoroughly, taking into account advice from the Army Legal Branch. He concluded that Trooper Williams had acted properly and in good faith. End of story. Who would have the arrogance to question him? But, as we all know, the case was re-opened, and a terrible injustice was done. The British commanding officer is the unbiased but informed judge of his soldier, who well understands him to be entirely dispassionate and impartial. If anyone should question that impartiality, perhaps I may be permitted to quote from the speech of Colonel Tim Collins of the Royal Irish Regiment, who, like Lieutenant Colonel Hankinson, briefed his entire regiment shortly before going into action, whose words give the essence of the message being given to all our soldiers. Among other things, he said:"““It is a big step to take another human life. It is not to be done lightly””." He also said:"““You will be shunned unless your conduct is of the highest””." This matter is about judgment, training and experience. I do not think anyone would seriously question that British commanding officers, like their soldiers, are among the best trained in the world. I can say that senior officers of other armies cannot comprehend why we should not trust our commanding officers, each of whom, after all, we already entrust with the lives of several hundred men. To challenge them represents a wholly unwarranted interference in a well tried military process. Interference of this kind arises out of a politically correct view that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. It parallels the political commissars of the Soviet Army who did not bat an eyelid at arranging for a young officer who showed unusual leadership flair to be shot for a trumped-up political misdemeanour. It is wearing down the fighting spirit of our soldiers by eroding their trust and sapping their morale, and it is damaging our Army. Our enemies must be enjoying it. Imagine going to war with the idea in the back of your mind that you run the risk of being tried for murder for doing your duty. Trooper Williams was eventually exonerated, having spent 18 months with a murder charge hanging over him. But if he had not been exonerated, it is us, the chain of command, right up to the top of government, who have put this 18 year-old soldier in the position in which he made his lethal decision. We have armed him, trained him and sent him on operations. We must take responsibility.