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Proceeding contribution from Tobias Ellwood (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 18 October 2005. It occurred during Debate on bill on Identity Cards Bill.


Identity Cards Bill

This debate is not simply about ID cards: it is about the relationship between the citizen and the state and the borderline between what civil liberties we are willing to concede in order to live in a fairer, safe and secure world. The Bill’s aims are commendable—they include tackling ID fraud, benefit fraud, illegal immigration and terrorism—but as we learn more about the detail of the costs, the British nation is becoming increasingly sceptical. I wonder whether we would be having this debate if the Government were a little more transparent about some of the costs that are likely to be incurred. My hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) quoted the report from the London School of Economics. Other estimates of the total cost of the project range from £3 billion all the way up to £10 billion. I wonder whether we will get value for money if we spend that much. It has been said that the police support the project. If they knew that they had £10 billion to spend on helping with matters to do with security and benefit fraud, would they spend it in this fashion? For example, Bournemouth is crying out for an improved CCTV system. We could easily spend that money on projects that are worth while and beneficial to the nation instead of a system which has no exact final cost. In America, where they do not have ID cards yet, extra money after 9/11 has been invested in homeland security and strengthening its borders. The costs of current database systems have spiralled. The NHS database went from £6.2 billion up to £20 billion. The probation service database went from £85 million to £120 million, and was then scrapped. The air traffic control system went from £350 million to £630 million. Why would the database for ID cards be any different? What guarantees can the Government give that they are not going to repeat those mistakes? Another issue is that of the performance of the IT. The Passport Agency, the Child Support Agency and the Criminal Records Bureau have all had IT problems with their databases. Again, why should the ID cards database be any different? Lots of questions have been asked today about the cost. How much would it cost to replace the card? How much has already been spent on the project to date? I asked those questions of the Minister in Committee. Is there an upper limit to how much the Government are willing to spend before they say that the costs have spiralled out of control, as in the case of previous databases? In order to prevent a terrorist from using a stolen ID card, or a thief from making a false benefit claim, some form of verification process—a contraption such as an iris scanner—will be required to determine that the person holding the card is the person they say they are. We will then get that apparatus right across Britain, including at all our airports. Who will meet the cost for those additional bits of equipment? Having debated this on Second Reading, in Committee and today, I believe that the Bill is flawed. It is open-ended and dangerous in that it does not have a clear timetable, it is based on technology that does not work and uses questionable or unknown costings, and it is increasingly without the support of the people.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
437 c784-5 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Disclosure of information Biometrics Crime prevention Applications Costs Fraud Fees and charges Immigration controls Identity cards National identity register Proof of identity Passports Registration
Legislation
Identity Cards Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk