Proceeding contribution from Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Friday, 9 December 2005. It occurred during Debate on select committee report on BBC Royal Charter.
BBC Royal Charter
My Lords, I too wish to add my thanks to our chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Fowler. Your Lordships’ House is full of people who are rather experienced at taking the chair. The Select Committee was a class act and it was a speedy act; that is to say, we came on the scene rather late in the day. A great deal was already in the public domain in the way of proposals for charter renewal or alternatives to charter renewal at the point when the Select Committee began its inquiry. The issues were of course complex. Looking at the range of positions taken, I find remarkable the high degree of agreement there nevertheless was about the objectives. We did not dispute any of the widely held objectives. We thought throughout that the quality of the BBC, including the accuracy of its reporting, must be preserved; that accountability to the licence fee payer must be strong, indeed stronger; that independence from government and from commercial interests must be secured and maintained; that the corporate strength of the BBC must not be used to undermine commercial broadcasters or small, independent producers. Moreover, we were well aware, although not all of us were techno-wonks, that these objectives would have to be met through the period of digital transition and beyond. As the House has heard, we concluded that these objectives would not be best achieved by implementing the proposals set out in the March 2005 Green Paper, Review of the BBC’s Royal Charter. A strong BBC, independent of government. We did not of course disagree with the idea of a strong BBC independent of government; it was the assumption that the renewal of a Royal Charter was the highway to that objective that we came to query. I shall comment today only on the relative roles of governance and regulation. Other noble Lords have said a great deal on other aspects of these matters. I do not underestimate the importance of strong management or the thought that strong management also includes strong financial disciplines. Broadly speaking, we thought of governance as particular to institutions, where those with responsibility for governance are charged with holding those who manage to account. For an institution as large and as influential as the BBC, governance is a very large task, commensurate with its complexity. We noted that the BBC had already taken steps to strengthen the role of the governors, indeed to change the name, and to consolidate their independence from management. We noted also the Government’s proposal, but we thought that more could be done. In particular, we thought that the governors or the trust or the board, whatever it comes to be called, had to take greater responsibility for ensuring not only the BBC’s independence from government, but the standards of its work. That may seem obvious, but we were all too well aware that the Hutton report centred on allegations of BBC inaccuracy, to which the then governors had responded by defending the BBC’s independence, but without taking steps to check the accuracy of the disputed matter. Their focus was always on independence and not on accuracy. We concluded that measures for securing accuracy, including the prompt correction of mistakes that inevitably occur in reporting, need not in any way compromise independence. We have put forward various proposals for strengthening governance so as to combine independence and accuracy. They are hardly novel. Central to what we recommend is that the BBC bind itself to the same standards of process and conduct as have been introduced elsewhere in public life, and that these be central to its governance and through its governance to its management. I give two illustrations. We propose that the selection panel that appoints the Chairman and board members of the BBC have a majority of non-political members and be chaired by a non-political member who is not a civil servant; that it work to the Nolan principles which are ordinarily understood and respected now; and that it recommend a short list of one to the Prime Minister. That number is important. Secondly, we recommend that the BBC seek to ensure that the Nolan principles for conduct in public life are strictly observed within the BBC. Those responsible for BBC programming should stand down from making a programme or a report wherever they have a direct, financial conflict of interest. They should be required publicly to declare their relevant interests. A website would make that easy. They should have the same standards for recognising conflict of interest—namely, that an interest would reasonably be perceived as influencing their reporting and programme making—as the rest of us are required to observe in public life. These are nowadays the routine disciplines of public life. We saw no case for thinking that influential programme makers, managers or journalists should continue to be exempt from them, least of all in the BBC. Complaints about the BBC are another matter. At present, the responsibility for adjudicating complaints is divided a little awkwardly between Ofcom and the BBC. This needs clarification. As in other areas of life, it is entirely reasonable to provide a way of appealing those complaints that are not resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant to a more independent body. The choice of Ofcom is simply to avoid the needless multiplication of regulators. It is essentially a minor adjudicative matter. However, we concluded that ensuring the accuracy of the BBC’s reporting is and must remain a central governance issue, and not become a regulatory issue. Regulators cannot ensure accuracy and they cannot monitor output for accuracy on a day-to-day basis. Ofcom will not become Reuters. Even a marriage of Ofcom and Reuters could not carry the task. More broadly, quality is a governance issue and not a regulatory issue, because regulators cannot ensure quality or monitor quality on a day-to-day basis. The distinction is that complaints affect individuals—it is part of consumer protection to provide a complaints procedure. Ofcom is well placed to take that on. But good broadcasting, that is of a high quality and accurate, is a public good which is not secured by a complaints procedure. Noble Lords will have detected a slight area of uncertainty in some of the comments of members of the committee about the role of Ofcom in so-called ““content regulation””—we should always keep scare quotes around the phrase ““content regulation””. We agreed that if Ofcom develops a stronger content board—that is very much for the future—it might be able to take on a stronger role as a so-called ““content regulator”” for BBC television and radio, parallel to the role it takes with respect to other public service broadcasters. However, the type of content regulation assigned to Ofcom by the Communications Act 2003 is quite limited. It is more concerned with policing a limited number of prohibitions and ensuring that broadcasting broadly fits certain defined public service broadcasting quotas and commitments than with quality or even accuracy of content within those quotas. Although Ofcom has explained that it will,"““examine issues where the citizen interest extends beyond the consumer interest””—" and I hope that it will do so—the forms of content regulation that it will then be equipped to take on will not in any way reduce the need for the BBC to treat quality and accuracy as fundamental matters of governance. Ofcom’s additional competence for so-called ““content regulation”” with respect to the BBC would still lie within the competences assigned by the Communications Act, and those in charge of the BBC would therefore still have the primary, central and fundamental responsibility. It has been curious to conduct this inquiry while knowing that it is widely said that the Government have already reached conclusions on the most fundamental matters. I can only hope that they will also listen to the arguments that we have put forward.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
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- 676 c903-5
- Session
- 2005-06
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Complaints Accountability BBC Digital broadcasting Fees and charges Management Parliamentary scrutiny Location Political impartiality Public service broadcasting Ofcom National Audit Office Standards Regulation Reviews Royal charters BBC World Service Television licences
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- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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