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Proceeding contribution from Mark Durkan (Social Democratic & Labour Party) in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 19 April 2006. It occurred during Debate on bill and Committee of the Whole House (HC) on Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill.


Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill

The Minister will obviously be aware from the previous debate that there is real suspicion and concern that the Bill gives the Secretary of State significant override powers when the concept of ““public interest”” is not defined. Going on form rather than faith, it would be hard to trust any Secretary of State who had such sweeping powers, especially in circumstances where the Secretary of State was not required to exercise them in a defined and clear context—where there was no clear working premise for the exercise of such powers. If the Minister wants us to believe any of the reassurances, I am sure he will accept the amendments, which would define the public interest. In his closing contribution on the last group of amendments, the Minister told us that the integrity of the registration process must be paramount, yet he offered as the only specific public interest consideration that would lead the Secretary of State to override the recommendation of the chief electoral officer a financial consideration—that in the circumstances, £1.7 million might too much to uphold the integrity of the registration process, which is said to be paramount. The amendments would ensure that the terms used by the Minister are extended to the Bill. If it is good enough for Members to be asked to accept his assurance, it should be good enough for him to include it in the Bill on behalf of Members. That is the point of the amendments, which seek a clear definition of the public interest. We know from so many other occasions that when it is not defined, we are treated to those empty but supposedly magic words, ““the public interest””. When parliamentarians demand answers and explanations, the explanation that we are given is ““the public interest””. Parliament is not allowed proper debate, scrutiny, consideration and exposure of the issues involved. The concept of the public interest is meant to protect the public from stupid decisions, not from proper parliamentary scrutiny. I ask the Minister to accept these reasonable, sensible amendments, which are entirely consistent with the arguments that he made. He cannot ask us to believe those arguments, and then reject the amendments and call on his colleagues to vote against them. I was trying to be helpful, perhaps in a dangerous way, when I pointed out to the Minister that there are other public interest considerations that might influence the chief electoral officer and perhaps even the Secretary of State when it comes to adjusting dates. The clauses that we have just passed permit a general canvass before 2010, as opposed to just after 2010. A census is due in 2011. I accept that there could be a number of practical issues in relation to 2010 that would give rise to legitimate questions of public interest. If the chief electoral officer is to undertake a general canvass in the autumn of 2010, he will be trying to marshal many of the same canvass personnel as will be employed in the census in the spring of 2011. That gives rise to issues of comparable remuneration and pay rates. That was an issue when I, as Minister for Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland, was handling the census in 2001. There are also issues of public communication. In the run-up to the general canvass in 2010, will that be confused with the public information that has been issued in the build-up to the census in the spring of 2011? There could well be good reason for bringing the general canvass forward to 2009, for example. Various public interest questions are involved, but when it comes to decisions about electoral registration, the paramount consideration must be not whether it is for the convenience of people carrying out the canvass, but whether optimum working conditions will be created for the chief electoral officer to ensure that a proper registration canvass is carried out. If the Secretary of State has powers to overrule the chief electoral officer, possibly for unstated reasons, or to ignore his recommendation, and if those powers are combined with those given later in the Bill for the Secretary of State to take control of the appointment of the chief electoral officer and to dismiss that officer, a potential twilight zone begins to emerge. One of the things that we are constantly shown on television is the famous Jeremy Paxman interview with the former Home Secretary and former leader of the Conservative party about whether he did or did not threaten to overrule the former head of the prison service, and whether or not there were implications or suggestions about this, that or the other. We see a twilight zone where all sorts of scenarios that are suggestive and reminiscent of what is implied by those questions might well arise. We might not be dealing with the same the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in a number of years’ time. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is also the Secretary of State for Wales. We know from previous proposed departmental reconstructions that the Government have thought about doing something along the lines of the BBC’s director of nations and regions, by putting together some of the territorial ministries. We could well find that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will be housed in future in some mutation of the Department for Constitutional Affairs, which is the Department where overall responsibility for electoral administration resides. If the precedent is created that a Minister in that Department has powers to appoint, dismiss, override and ignore the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland, hon. Members from my side of the water need to consider the precedent into which they might be sleepwalking if they accept what is being offered. So I ask the Minister, on behalf of the Government, to think again and to think better, not just with eye to the situation that would unfold, but because of the very awkward and dangerous precedent that might be created more widely.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
445 c169-70 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Devolved matters Fraud Elections Ministerial powers Northern Ireland Public appointments Public interest Political parties Registration Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland
Legislation
Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk