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Proceeding contribution from Evan Harris (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 20 April 2006. It occurred during Adjournment debate on Forensic Science.


Forensic Science

: I am cautious about criticising judges, but my hon. Friend mentions the judge. The judge in the Sally Clark trial made it clear to the jury that the case was not about statistics, particularly on sudden infant death syndrome, as the defence were not arguing that these were deaths from sudden infant death syndrome—that is, unknown natural causes. The judge escapes criticism in that respect, as he made that clear. Indeed, the Court of Appeal, when looking at the Meadow evidence in the first instance, upheld the conviction, even with regard to the fact that the evidence was found to be flawed. What about the defence? We had an interesting exchange with the Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, in the evidence session on 23 November 2005. My hon. Friend, the Chairman of the Select Committee, asked at Question 67:"““How do we stop an expert witness like Meadow giving expert information on an area in which he was not an expert? Was that the judge's fault, or the prosecution's fault for asking him a question which was of a statistical nature rather than in fact within his remit?””—" a well put question, if I may I say so. The Attorney-General replied:"““All of these cases teach us lessons, both on the prosecution side and on the defence side.””" The defence was not mentioned in the question—he volunteered that. He went on:"““A particular statistical statement was made. I do not know whether the defence even challenged it or challenged his expertise to give that answer””—" I can tell the House that the defence did not do either of those things—"““which would really be the right way of dealing with it. I am certainly not blaming the defence.””" I asked at Question 69:"““Lord Goldsmith has just said that he would not blame the defence in this case. I do not understand why . . . Everyone has blamed the expert who is said to have given it, and judged by the GMC to have given it””—" that is, his evidence—"““in good faith; he was not malicious in so doing. So all the blame is on the good-faith guy, and then you are saying no blame attaches to the professionals who are paid to ensure that juries are not misled.””" In response to that, Lord Goldsmith stated:"““If I may say so, I think that you make a very good and important point. I think it is unfair to put all the blame for these things which go wrong on a single expert, and I think that some of them have been vilified . . . All I was seeking to do was to avoid, frankly, the headline ‘Attorney Blames Defence' in this particular case.””" The Attorney-General may have his reasons for worrying about headlines rather than what is fair and right in law, but there is now a clear argument that there was a failure in this case. The question must be asked—I hope that the Minister will respond to it—whether judges with adequate training should step in and say, ““That is a statistical point, it may or may not be right, you are not a statistician.”” That could have been done in this case. As it happens, I do not think that it was necessary. I would be interested to know whether the Minister thinks that more could be done in this area. The other point is that Mr. Justice Collins in the High Court found for Roy Meadow on three bases: first, that he should not have been struck off, and secondly, that he should not have been found to be guilty of serious professional misconduct. He said that in strong terms, and the GMC have not appealed those two aspects of the judgment, which suggests that it accepts them. The GMC needs to reflect carefully on his criticisms of their judgment and processes. Mr. Justice Collins's third point was that expert witnesses should have immunity from disciplinary proceedings. That is a substantial part of case law now, and may well be challenged. The GMC has signalled that it will challenge it. It would be useful for Ministers to say what they think is right, as expert witnesses want to know—there should not be this limbo—whether they run the risk of facing disciplinary action by the GMC or other professional bodies and having the vilification that even Ministers such as the Attorney-General have accepted took place in this case. Mr. Justice Collins makes a reasonable suggestion in his judgment, which is that the principle that there should be immunity from civil prosecution for expert witnesses should apply for disciplinary proceedings, except when the judge makes the referral. If there is serious criticism by a judge, the judge will make the referral themselves, yet the GMC states in its response to the judgment, and later in seeking to appeal this aspect of the judgment, that where there has been criticism by a court, the GMC's procedures should be allowed for disciplinary cases. However, there was not serious criticism of Sir Roy Meadow by a judge in this case. Mr. Justice Collins said that if there is serious criticism, a judge can make a referral. That would be sensible, and I hope that the Minister will give his view on it. I hope that the judgment in the High Court and the clearing of Sir Roy Meadow will make it possible for paediatricians to come forward and do work that protects children. There have been miscarriages of justice in this area—I am in no doubt about that—but we face equal or greater miscarriages of justice if we do not correct the impression out there that expert witnesses are themselves on trial. When they act in good faith, they should not be on trial or facing that threat; otherwise, children will suffer.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
445 c171-3WH 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
Westminster Hall
Subjects
Forensic science
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk