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Proceeding contribution from Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Tuesday, 25 April 2006. It occurred during Debate on bill and Committee proceeding on Company Law Reform Bill [HL] 2005-06.


Company Law Reform Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. A256A:"Page 420, line 16, after ““about”” insert ““instructions given by the institution or its duly appointed agent regarding””" The noble Lord said: As I think the Minister is aware, there has been a good deal of unease about this clause, and we have received a good many representations about it. Amendments Nos. A256A, A256B and A256E, which make up the first group, together with Amendments Nos. A256C, A256D and A256F, which follow, are alternatives to the removal of the whole of Clause 866, which we shall debate later in clause stand part. We are by no means convinced that this clause in any way meets the Government’s stated strategic objectives for the Bill. Rather, we see it as a knee-jerk reaction to requests from the trade union movement. Of course, we accept and agree that shareholders whose shares are held through nominees or are managed on their behalf are entitled to know what is being done with the shares that they own. That is the argument we had on Part 9. But why the world at large should be told is less clear to us. We are looking to the Government to show that the financial costs and administrative complexities of the clause have been fully considered and that it has a commercially logical foundation. The purpose of Amendments Nos. A256A, A256B and A256E is to amend subsections (1) and (8) in the following ways: first, it is not information about the exercise or non-exercise of voting rights that is required to be disclosed but the voting instructions given; secondly, in the case of the non-exercise of voting rights, the disclosure is required only when specific instructions have been given not to vote on a particular resolution—that is, votes are being consciously withheld; thirdly, recognition is given to the fact that many institutions appoint agents such as investment managers to exercise voting rights on their behalf; and, fourthly, where the disclosure obligations are being met by the institution’s agent, the institution itself is not required to make the necessary disclosures. Clause 866(1) gives the Treasury the power to make regulations to require institutional investors to disclose specified information about the voting rights attached to shares, and Clause 866(8) expands on that by stating that the information required is,"““such information as may be specified about the exercise or non-exercise of voting rights””." That is on line 22 of page 421. With respect to the exercise of voting rights, although institutions will give instructions to the next entity in the voting process as to how their votes should be cast, they do not know whether those instructions are exercised and are therefore not in all cases able to disclose how their votes have been exercised. First, resolutions are decided by a show of hands and, unless a poll is called, an instruction to vote may not be exercised. Secondly, the voting instructions may well go through a chain—the beneficial owner, the fund manager, the custodian, the custodian’s nominee, a registrar and, possibly, a proxy voting service. That makes it difficult for those initiating instructions to determine whether those instructions are communicated down the voting chain—let alone whether they have been exercised. That is the purpose of our Amendment No. A256A. When considering the non-exercise of voting rights, we argue that it is important to distinguish between where a decision not to vote on a resolution has been taken—that is, it has been consciously withheld—and a where an institutional investor does not vote because it has a general policy not to do so. In the latter case, we do not see any logical reason for requiring disclosure. Moreover, this provision seems to carry with it several potential disadvantages. First, it may drive firms who are not generally active to vote without giving due consideration to the issues at stake in order to be seen to be doing something. That could skew the result by diluting the impact of those votes that had been exercised in a considered manner. Secondly, the disclosure of every resolution where voting rights have not been exercised would result in pages and pages of meaningless tables. Furthermore, in the case of an authorised collective investment scheme, the authorised fund manager—the operator for a unit trust, or the authorised corporate director for an OEIC—has an obligation to exercise the voting rights on behalf of the scheme. As a result, it is the authorised fund manager, rather than the scheme itself, which exercises the voting rights. In addition, other institutional investors—for example, pension funds, life companies and investment trusts—will often give fund managers discretion to vote on their behalf. Those different structures and approaches need to be recognised in the drafting of the Bill. Further, we consider that, in the interest of cost and minimising the regulatory burden, institutions should not be required to make such disclosures where they have taken reasonable steps to ensure that someone else—for example, a fund manager—is acting on their behalf. Amendment No. A256A inserts the word ““instructions”” in line 16; Amendment No. A256B permits an institution to rely on an agent to act for it; the last amendment in this group is consequential on Clause 866(8). Therefore, in the first instance, I beg to move Amendment No. A256A.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
681 c69-70GC 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords Grand Committee
Subjects
Disclosure of information Company law Companies Costs EU law Insolvency Regulation Shares Shareholders Reviews Impact assessments
Legislation
Company Law Reform Bill (HL) 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk