Proceeding contribution from Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Tuesday, 25 April 2006. It occurred during Debate on bill and Committee proceeding on Company Law Reform Bill [HL] 2005-06.
Company Law Reform Bill [HL]
I rise to oppose the Question whether Clause 866 shall stand part of the Bill and, in doing so, shall endeavour not to repeat much of what we discussed in the preceding set of amendments. We seek to remove the reserve power for the Treasury to make provision by regulation to require institutions to provide specified information about the exercise or non-exercise of voting rights attached to shares. This follows representations from the Investment Management Association, the Association of Investment Trust Companies, the Association of British Insurers, the CBI and many others. As I said, Clause 866 gives the Treasury power to make regulations to require institutional investors to disclose information about the exercise or non-exercise of voting rights attached to shares in which they have an interest. We support a regime where institutional investors are transparent about voting and disclose information about how they have voted to their clients, but we are against any obligation to disclose being owed to the public at large. Further, we have considerable concern about the practical implications of the Government’s proposals, which appear ill-thought-through. They will impose a regulatory burden with no apparent benefit to British industry and commerce, and we therefore believe that this clause has no place in what is, after all, a Company Law Reform Bill. The arguments in support of the amendment are as follows. First, the voluntary system is working and an increasing number of managers are making certain that their voting records are public. The Institutional Shareholders’ Committee’s Statement of Principles on the Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents, issued in October 2002, sets out best practice in relation to engagement and reporting, and recommends that those who act as agents—that is, fund managers—regularly report to their clients details on how they have discharged their responsibilities. It also helps to ensure that any such disclosures are meaningful. The IMA’s 2004 annual survey of fund managers’ engagement with investee companies showed widespread adherence to that recommendation. The 34 managers that participated in the survey collectively managed UK equities worth £552 billion—about 55 per cent of all UK equities under management. Of those 34 managers, 32 responded that they reported their voting intentions to their clients quarterly. In many instances, these reports covered how the manager voted when he had discretion to do so, and, when he voted against the board or consciously withheld the vote, it gave the reasons. These managers continue to report on that basis. Of the remaining two managers, one reported that he planned to report to clients in the future and the other that he had no external institutional clients. Furthermore, eight of the managers surveyed—Co-operative Insurance, CCLA Investment Management, Henderson Global Investors, F&C Asset Management, Insight Investment Management, M&G Securities, Morley Fund Management and the Universities Superannuation Scheme—made voting information public by putting it on their websites. That continues to be the case, and at least three more managers have since started to do so—Fidelity Investments, Standard Life Investments and Newton Investment Management. Secondly, disclosure would be costly. The regulatory impact assessment published with the draft clauses in October 2005 addressed the ongoing costs of disclosure. It did not address the costs of setting up systems, determining whether voting rights had actually been exercised, vetting the information, and monitoring compliance with legal requirements. These costs are likely to be significant. In particular, the explanatory material published in October stated that,"““the FSA will be able to take any breaches into account when considering the ‘fitness and properness’ of an institutional investor””." Explicitly stating that a breach of such a requirement could affect fitness and properness implies a penal sanction which would have vast implications for compliance and related costs. However, as already stated, the costs of compliance and vetting have not been considered. We understand from one manager that it takes 16 man weeks—that is, four people working for four weeks full-time—to verify the voting information that is required to be disclosed concerning their US mutual funds. Thirdly, institutions cannot necessarily disclose whether votes have been exercised. We have already discussed this at some length, and it is not clear whether institutions have had their instructions carried out at the end of a long voting chain. Fourthly, the voting process could be undermined. Public disclosure could undermine and generally dumb down the voting process due to the sensitivity of the issues and the confidentiality necessary. In particular, public knowledge of a disagreement with investee company management may have an adverse effect on shareholder value without solving the disagreement. Furthermore, where an institution has a general policy not to vote—to be distinguished from votes consciously withheld—a mandatory requirement to disclose the non-exercise of voting rights in each and every situation may drive firms simply to vote without giving due consideration to the issues at stake. Fifthly, mechanistic, meaningless reporting could well result. A statutory requirement would result in pages of statistics and tables, which could be meaningless without further analysis. Furthermore, a requirement that disclosure should be made on each occasion that voting rights are not exercised in cases where an institution has a general policy not to vote would exacerbate that. For those reasons, we consider that Clause 866 should not stand part of the Bill. As an aside, we note that paragraph 14 of the explanatory material published in October stated:"““The Government is not minded at this stage to require disclosure of the number of shares voted””." We support this position, particularly in light of the commercial sensitivities associated with such disclosure. However, fund managers act for different clients and can therefore vote a particular block of shares in different ways. For example, some beneficial owners give managers a discretion to vote; some give specific instructions and some ask that the recommendations of a particular voting service—PIRC, for example—are followed. A fund manager could thus end up disclosing that, of the same company’s shares managed by him, some were voted for, some against and some withheld. It is hard to see how disclosing information about the exercise of voting rights—other than to clients on whose behalf the shares are held—in any way meets the Government’s strategic objectives set out in the Bill. These were explained ably by the Minister at Second Reading on 11 January 2006 (Hansard, col. 182). In regard to these objectives, ““enhancing shareholder engagement”” is already fulfilled; in ““ensuring better regulation””, the Bill represents another tidal wave of forms to be completed; and it has the reverse effect on the ““think small first”” approach, as it does on ““making it easier to set up and run a company””.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 681 c77-80GC
- Session
- 2005-06
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords Grand Committee
- Subjects
- Disclosure of information Company law Companies Costs EU law Insolvency Regulation Shares Shareholders Reviews Impact assessments
- Legislation
- Company Law Reform Bill (HL) 2005-06
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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