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Defence Policy

My hon. Friend is correct; the situation could deteriorate significantly, but at present there is no evidence of such an unholy alliance materialising. There have been no major military incidents of a comparable kind in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, there is not the sectarian split that has so dominated the Iraqi issue. Afghanistan is overwhelmingly a Sunni country and no one suggests that that situation is likely to change in any meaningful way. There is no equivalent of the Kurdish dimension; no part of Afghanistan has aspirations to the total independence that would fragment the country. Nor does Afghanistan have what is in one respect the curse of oil, to create further division in that state. However, there are big problems and we must look frankly at why the coalition forces of NATO and others, including the Afghan Government, are finding it so difficult to cope. Part of the problem is that the Taliban were never defeated in the conventional sense; they simply faded away. They realised the overwhelming strength of the United States, in particular, and its allies, and withdrew to their villages, to the hill areas and the frontier where they could regroup and continue, which creates a very different situation. In addition, there is the inability of the western forces to act in a coherent and united fashion. Earlier, I raised the question of the integration of the international forces operating in Afghanistan. I appreciate and understand the difficulties. Even within NATO, there are countries with different views on whether they would wish to take part in the kind of work being carried out by Operation Enduring Freedom. However, it is manifestly absurd to have a situation in which many thousands of British, American and other NATO forces are all operating within the country, but with two separate command structures for all practical purposes, two different rules of engagement and with an attempt now being made to draw them closer together. That is a wasteful use of resources and a wasteful way of approaching these matters. The Minister knows that perfectly well—although he is not in a position to say it in quite the blunt terms that I am using—and the United States knows it perfectly well. Most countries know it well—even if the only way in which we can get a single unified command in Afghanistan, in order to maximise operations against the Taliban and other elements in that country, is to say to the one or two countries in NATO that do not want to go in that direction that they should no longer take part in the operation. Most of NATO is willing to work in a unified way. The United States, which is NATO’s leading member state, can hardly be expected not to be part of a single, unified process. There is a word of warning for the United States. It has seen the British and NATO involvement in Helmand province as the beginning of a process that will enable it to reduce its own troop complement in Afghanistan. Indeed, Donald Rumsfeld, in his usual sensitive fashion, has said as much, and has anticipated that the Americans will now be able to reduce their commitment. That would be an incredibly foolish mistake—comparable to the mistake that the United States, and indeed the rest of us, have been making since the beginning of the Afghan operation. When the Taliban were overthrown—when Karzai’s Government came into effect—the best estimate at that time was that Afghanistan would need an international force of about 30,000 to provide real stabilisation. In fact, we ended up with about a third of that number. Against that background, it is not surprising that warlords in individual provinces have been able to continue in control, and it is not a matter for any particular astonishment that the central Government in Kabul have not been able to extend their authority, even in many of the areas where the Taliban are not remotely present, or not present in any significant numbers. The problem is not just the south and the east. It is the failure in Afghanistan—in this sense it is comparable to Iraq—to realise that once the war is over, we still need a major international military presence. I am afraid that Mr. Rumsfeld is the guilty party, as he is in Iraq, for having decreed that somehow the numbers needed were far more modest than has turned out to be the case. The Government are entitled to the support of this House. The United States continues to have a considerable degree of international support for what it is seeking to do in Afghanistan. All the warnings that have been given by the Minister and others about what would happen if the west simply withdrew from Afghanistan are entirely correct and justified, but that should not be used as an excuse to maintain an inefficient military command structure that cannot deliver the best results and, most of all, it cannot be used to justify a reducing American military commitment over the next few years. One of the lessons that we should all have learned from history, over 100 years, is that if one wants to make a profound change in countries of lower economic and social development, which have major internal problems of stability and cultural differences, one needs to be there for a long time. If one is not prepared to do that, one should not go there in the first place. That is particularly true in Afghanistan at the moment. If the Government are able to pursue such an approach—not only in their own policy, but in the recommendations that they make to other Governments, including the United States—they will deserve the support of the House.