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Iraq

As the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Wallace) remarked earlier, it is extraordinary that it is apparently acceptable for the head of the Army to speak out on behalf of his troops—as he ought to do, even though normally and more traditionally it would be done in private—yet the House is supposed not to have that debate. Four years on from the dossiers and the fateful decisions to go to war, we are still none the wiser about the political decision-making processes that led to the war. We have been given snatches from the Attorney-General’s legal advice and titbits from the diaries of Cabinet Ministers and former diplomats, but no serious examination of the critical issues. How did the Prime Minister and the Cabinet consider the issues facing the country? Where did Foreign Office advice fit into the calculations? How serious were the attempts to get the second resolution? At what point did we make a commitment to the United States to support them in the invasion? When and how did the Attorney-General get himself involved in the process? What planning was there for the aftermath in the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development? That is just a sample of the huge range of issues that we have still not considered in this country. We must learn from the past, but we must also ask about the future and what the strategy now is. Across the Atlantic there is a debate about that, and it is every bit as fierce as here. The difference is that in the United States there is a serious attempt to fashion a new strategy, with the bipartisan Iraq study group chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton. That group’s remit is to review the strategic environment in and around Iraq, the security of Iraq and the key challenges to enhancing security within the country, political developments within Iraq following the elections and the formation of the new Government, and the economy and reconstruction of that devastated country. Secretary Baker has said in plain American terms that Iraq is a ““helluva mess.”” Already there have been suggestions that his panel will depart from Mr. Bush’s repeated calls to stay the course. In particular, Mr. Baker has strongly suggested that the White House enter direct talks with countries that it has so far kept at arm’s length, including Iran and Syria. He has indicated that if a new strategy is not found within the next few months, the whole process could be overtaken by the chaos on the ground. The search is on for the least worst option, with the group’s overriding concepts being ““stability first”” and ““redeploy and contain.”” That is a blunt but welcome recognition of the new realities and indicates a greater emphasis on stabilisation, especially in Baghdad. None of that is easy. Much of it has been thought unthinkable in the United States up until now. However, the United States is having a proper debate. What about here? Has the United Kingdom been involved in making submissions to Secretary Baker’s group? What does it make of the suggestions that are being discussed fairly openly in public now?