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Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

My Lords, the Government believe that requiring the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is an important part of the Bill. A key feature of this offence is that it will mark a particularly serious level of offending by an organisation. It is important that this truly is reserved for the worst cases and that the deterrent effect of possible proceedings is not reduced by very poor cases being brought against organisations. Furthermore, potential defendants have been concerned that every work-related death will resultin a charge of corporate manslaughter and that companies which pay proper attention to the management of health and safety will have their reputations damaged through manslaughter charges, even though the charges are bound to fail. Part of the reassurance that only the worst cases of health and safety failures will proceed to court is that the DPP must be satisfied that in every case the evidence supports a realistic prospect of conviction. Requiring the DPP’s consent does not prevent private prosecutions but it ensures that such prosecutions will be able to proceed only if the two-stage test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors is satisfied; namely, that the state of the evidence is such that there is a realistic prospect of conviction and that a prosecution will be in the public interest. As we have said before, where the allegation is manslaughter, we think that only rarely will the public interest test not be met, so the main issue will be sufficiency of evidence. We do not think that allowing prosecutions to proceed where there is insufficient evidence will be in anyone’s interest—neither the organisation’s, whose reputation will be tarnished unfairly, nor the family’s, whose expectations will be raised unrealistically. By their nature, corporate manslaughter cases are likely to involve complex evidence about company structures and management, as well as about industry standards. We believe that the Crown Prosecution Service is best placed to assess whether there is sufficient evidence of the necessary standard. It is asking a lot to expect the families of victims to make that assessment objectively. There is an argument that the prohibitive costs of bringing a private prosecution in such complex cases will act as a barrier to prosecutions and that requiring the DPP’s consent is unnecessary. It is, of course, true that bringing a private prosecution will be an option only for those who can afford it. In the history of work-related deaths, we are aware of two private prosecutions for manslaughter, neither of which was successful. However, in one case we understand that the person bringing the case—a man who owned a business—was bankrupted by doing so and in the other case the person bringing the proceedings appears to have been a millionaire. Relying on the very high cost of private proceedings in itself is unsatisfactory. We do not think that ability to pay should become the criterion for whether a prosecution should proceed if there is no evidence to sustain it. The costs underline that private prosecutions are rarely a practical option and the requirement to obtain consent will operate in few cases. If the DPP does not consent to a private prosecution, that decision can be judicially reviewed and, for the vast majority of people, applying for a judicial review is going to be far more of a realistic proposition than pursuing a private prosecution, especially as legal aid is available for judicial review. There is also precedent in corporate manslaughter of a successful judicial review of a decision by the CPS not to bring a manslaughter prosecution. That case was then brought to trial by the CPS, which initially decided not to press charges, although again it was not successful. I turn to conflicts of interests, which the noble Lord raised. Would they exist in cases against the Crown or in cases against the CPS? I start by quoting the honourable Member for Beaconsfield. In Committee in another place, Dominic Grieve put the argument very well. He said: "““I do not share the … view about the DPP being subject to political pressure. Never in my professional experience have I seen a hint of it. The DPP is a civil servant, but once he holds his office he cannot be removed other than for misfeasance or personal misconduct. For those reasons, I do not think that that is a live issue””." I do not always agree with Dominic Grieve but on this occasion I certainly do. He has put the position very well. It is a poor argument that the DPP will succumb to pressure not to prosecute the Crown. It is not the CPS or the DPP who will investigate a case: that will be for the police. It will be the police who gather the necessary evidence and they will then present it to the CPS for a decision about charges. So the role of the CPS and the DPP, whether consent is required or not, will be to consider the evidence, properly presented by the police, and decide whether that presents a picture of gross negligence. That is a decision they will take independently as prosecutors. The CPS, of course, comes under pressure at present from both sides in cases of manslaughter and many other cases. Defendants lobby in order to have charges dropped and victims and their families understandably press for prosecutions, sometimes with passion. But cases always have to be taken forward on the merits of the case not the pressure for or against prosecution. The Government cannot halt investigations or prosecutions simply because they are embarrassing. Furthermore, the process of judicial review will act as a safeguard, where any allegation of bias can be considered. For these reasons, I do not think that requiring the DPP’s consent will reduce victim’s rights or lead to cases against the Crown being dropped when they should not be. In view of those arguments, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.