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Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

moved Amendment No. 49: 49: After Clause 16 , insert the following new Clause— ““Limitations of proceedings Proceedings for an offence of corporate manslaughter may not be instituted against an organisation if an action for damages for negligence would be time barred under the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 (c. 58).”” The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of the amendment is to provide for limitation for bringing proceedings for corporate manslaughter. I make it as clear as possible that I am not suggesting that there should be a limitation period for manslaughter by an individual, but there are good practical reasons for distinguishing between the two offences. It is of course unusual to have a time limit for serious crime, but corporate manslaughter is an unusual crime. It is based not on criminal intent but on the civil concept of negligence. In ordinary civil actions for negligence, there is a time limit of six years because it is simply not fair to ask people to defend themselves 10 or 20 years after the events giving rise to the claim. That is reflected in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, entitling a defendant to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. That applies to crime just as it applies to civil actions. However, we are not concerned with the ordinary six-year time limit for actions for negligence. A special time limit applying to claims for negligence resulting in either personal injuries or death is contained in Section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980. That is three years, which is obviously less than six years. Yet that it is not from the events giving rise to the claim, but three years from the date of the plaintiff knowing that his injuries are attributable to the defendant, or his death if that should occur earlier. The special time limit applying in such cases is much more flexible than the ordinary time limit. If such a time limit is required in civil proceedings based on negligence in order to ensure fairness to the defendant, it must surely be even more applicable in the case of criminal proceedings based on precisely the same facts. How can it be fair or in the public interest that a company should be criminally liable when it is no longer under any civil liability in respect of exactly the same facts? Those were the points I tried to make in Committee. I said that I would study the reply of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, which I did, but I did not find it satisfactory in all respects. He made two main points. First, he suggested that the time limit that I was putting forward was too short. However, in the case of corporate manslaughter the time limit does not start until the victim dies, even though that may be many years after the events giving rise to the claim. The Crown Prosecution Service then has three years after the death in which to bring the proceedings, so my time limit clearly cannot be said to be too short. Indeed, the reason I chose a limitation period based on the Limitation Act rather than a fixed period of five, 10 or 15 years is that it is much more flexible. The noble Lord’s second point was that there isno time limit in cases of manslaughter where theyare individual offences. That is right, but the circumstances are different. In the case of manslaughter committed by an individual, the victim dies at once, which is the most usual case, or within a very short time of the events giving rise to the claim. However in the case of corporate manslaughter, the court might, if this amendment is not accepted, be required to investigate the conduct of senior management many years after the events giving rise to the death. In the mean time, the senior management of the company would probably have changed, witnesses would be incapable of remembering the events or might be dead and the evidence would have gone cold in every respect. It is when cases of this sort are being investigated years after the event that the worst miscarriages of justice will arise. This is a simple and beneficial amendment. In ordinary cases, it would ensure a fair trial and in more extreme cases, it would obviate potential miscarriages of justice. It is not good enough simply to rely, as the noble Lord did, on the discretion of the Attorney-General or the inherent jurisdiction of the court. We need something in the Bill, and therefore I beg to move.