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House of Commons (Participation) Bill

My hon. Friend makes a point that has already been talked about. The constitution is messy and it is not even. There will be inconsistencies. Part of the fundamental objection to the Bill is that it seems to want to clean up and categorise the constitution. I think that that is impossible. My hon. Friend gives an example of the way in which that would be difficult. While I am mentioning Northern Ireland, I want to pick up and reinforce the point that a number of hon. Members have made—that the West Lothian question is not new. The issue of home rule in Ireland and the debates at that time were a precedent for the issues that we are discussing today. As Professor Brigid Hadfield commented:"““only those with short memories have called this the West Lothian Question.””" Before that, there was the war of independence in the United States and the issue of no taxation without representation—something that I will return to shortly—which was very live at that time. The issues have been around for many years and we should not be afraid of them. We have to acknowledge that our constitution is not clear, that it is messy, that it changes over time and that time passes very slowly, as we have seen this week in relation to the debate on the House of Lords. Earlier I said that I wanted to object to some of the many principles behind the Bill. I will mention eight principled objections. First, if the Bill became law, it would create a de facto English Parliament. England has 84 per cent. of the population of the UK. It provides more than 82 per cent. of the MPs and it provides 86 per cent. of the UK’s GDP. The representatives from Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, high quality as they are, are swamped by the number of English MPs. In a day when Labour MPs revolt, and revolt frequently and in large numbers, we are nowhere near the scale of revolt that is needed for 200 English MPs to join the MPs from the three other countries and overturn the majority in the Chamber. If we go forward on this basis, rather than enhancing the powers, the powers of people from Wales and Scotland will be brushed away. They will be overwhelmed. This will become, in fact, an English-dominated English Parliament. Secondly, in a week when we have spent a great deal of time discussing the House of Lords, I am concerned that we will return to the issue of having two classes of representatives—elected and unelected in the other place, and, under the Bill, MPs in this place who can speak on certain issues, but not others. The proposal, which is being actively considered by the official Opposition, is one of the many encountered in politics, as in life, which sounds superficially attractive and simple, but which, on closer examination, turns out to be incredibly complex, confusing in practice and profoundly damaging. There is not a case for a two-tier system of MPs or two classes of MPs. Most importantly, to have such a system would be fundamentally to misunderstand the role of Parliament and the MPs in it. MPs should represent the nation as a whole. Burke said that Parliament was"““a deliberative assembly of our nation with one interest, that of the whole…You choose a member indeed, but when you have chosen him, he is not a member for Bristol, he is a member of Parliament””." That is the point. MPs should speak for the whole nation. They should be able to pick up issues and pursue them vigorously. The notion of two different classes of MPs or two different classes of peers in another place is profoundly damaging. Thirdly, the premise behind English votes on English laws is fundamentally flawed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) has already talked a little about the settlement with Scotland. It is correct that, at any one time while the Scotland Act 1998 is in force, some legislative matters that for England, and to some degree Wales, would be dealt with in the Westminster Parliament, are, for Scotland, dealt with in the Scottish Parliament. But the only legal reason why the Scottish Parliament has those powers is that this Parliament has passed the relevant legislation. We have conceded the powers. The settlement is with Scotland and the Scottish people. It is possible, although unlikely, that the legislation could be reversed. Rather than losing the power, we have ceded it to Scotland. That reinforces the point that I made earlier: settlements change and will need to be revisited. Fourthly, and importantly—this is not an issue that we have discussed at great length today—there is the issue of the supply of money. Decisions taken in this House, whether on an English issue or anything else, will have consequences for the devolved bodies. The Scottish Parliament is dependent on the Barnett formula. Decisions taken in this place reflect back to Scotland. It is therefore important that colleagues who represent Scottish constituencies have an opportunity to discuss English matters, because of the consequential financial effects. It cannot be right that MPs representing Scottish constituencies should lose the power to discuss issues that will affect their home country financially. When discussing the same issue, Lord Trimble, as he now is, said that"““expenditure of taxation is so fundamental to government that there must be equal representation for all parts of the country.””—[Official Report, 21 January 2004; Vol. 416, c. 1419.]" That must be right. Fifthly, behind this debate lies an issue of symmetry, which we have discussed throughout this morning’s proceedings. It is not just an issue for this country and for this settlement. I shall cite an example given by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House in his Hansard Society lecture of July 2006. He said:"““Nor are we alone in this. Classically federal systems like the US are, on closer examination, asymmetrical. In the US Senate the smallest 26 states, representing just 18 per cent. of the population, can command a majority over the other states, with 82 per cent. of the population.””" That situation involves no more than ours does. Good constitutional arrangements try to introduce a series of checks and balances to deal with that asymmetrical nature. Sixthly, as some of my hon. Friends have said, we have a history of strong government. If the Bill were introduced, I think it likely that we would reach a situation where the Government would not be able to command a majority in their own House and Parliament. That is a recipe for chaos. Seventhly, there is an issue relating to Ministers, and it is linked to my previous point. They should take collective responsibility and take the Government line. How could we have a situation where those from Scotland would not be able to vote in this House—or support collective responsibility—on issues of Government policy? Eighthly, and finally, there is the issue of the other place. We have discussed that a little, but it needs to be developed further.