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House of Commons (Participation) Bill

I must confess that I feel slightly guilty for participating in this debate, because I am aware that there are Scots here from all parts of the House who want to make a contribution. I shall try not to detain the Chamber for too long, although I am sure that at least one Scot will be called before the end of the debate. We have heard a lot about the history of the subject. We have had a quick trot through the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, and mention has been made of 1949 and the Republic of Ireland, and the devolution referendum for Scotland in 1979, which I can remember—and I remember only too painfully the events that followed shortly afterwards. I also remember the poll tax—it would be nice if Opposition Members were to say that I am too young to remember it, but somehow I do not think that that will be the case. We have also heard a great deal about the West Lothian question. None of that persuaded me, however, that the Bill is anything other than an attempt by the Conservative party to build the possibility of getting a majority in the House of Commons on many occasions. Before I speak about the Bill in more detail, I recommend that the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland follow the example of the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald), who is not only the shadow Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs but the shadow Minister for Sheffield—at least he has made some constructive efforts to build support in that city. If only the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland would do the same in Scotland, perhaps the Conservative party could start to think about rebuilding its base there. It is a long way from doing so, and today’s Bill is a shortcut to solving a sorry state of affairs for the Conservative party. On the territorial matters in the Bill, the isolation of English-only parts of a Bill is unlikely if not impossible. Many Acts that could be perceived as dealing with English-only issues have sections that extend to Scotland and Wales. Even when the territorial clause is applied, that is not always apparent. An example from last year was the Compensation Bill, which, thanks to the efforts of my hon. Friend and parliamentary neighbour the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone (Mr. Clapham), ultimately contained an important clause relating to mesothelioma and compensation for miners who had contracted it. In almost every regard, the Compensation Bill applied principally to England, but that one important clause, clause 3, applied to Scotland. The Bill related to legal matters, on which there is a huge difference between Scotland and England, but that clause had to apply to Scotland. It would have been very difficult, had the Bill before us been in force, to separate that clause out and to have a Second and Third Reading. There are fundamental difficulties relating to the Bill. It has been mentioned already, but it needs to be mentioned again, that a fundamental constitutional principle is at stake: all MPs are equal in this Chamber and should be able to vote on any issue brought before them. Limiting the voting rights for MPs would create two classes of Member, which is unacceptable. It is a fundamental principle of the Union that all parts of it are equally represented at Westminster. My right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) made probably one of the best defences that I have heard of an unwritten constitution, which may not please Liberal Democrat Members. I agree with him that there is never an end to constitutional debate, but I am sure that he will agree with me that, whatever constitutional change takes place in future, there cannot be two classes of MP. I would go so far as to say that having English votes for English laws is not sustainable. The in-and-out principle to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen referred would create tensions that would soon lead to demands for a separate English Parliament, which in turn would threaten the Union. I know that that argument is denied by the Opposition, but the Bill would inevitably lead to that tension and threaten the Union in the end, because the English Parliament’s measures would be so dominant that neither the Union Parliament nor the other devolved institutions would be able to maintain their autonomy. For example, if an English Parliament reduced public spending and made a demand on the Union Parliament that taxation be cut as a consequence, those tax cuts would apply to Scotland and Wales equally as they would to England, via a Union Parliament. The expenditure implications of any legislation apply across the Union more often than not. It is that fundamental underlying point, made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sherwood (Paddy Tipping), which more than anything else makes it impossible, or very difficult, for us to accept the Bill.