---

Suez Canal Zone (Medals)

I speak on behalf of Bill McKnight and other Royal Navy personnel who served in the Suez campaign from October 1951 to October 1954. First, I apologise to the Minister that, having said that I would give him my notes prior to the debate, I could not do so because of the bank holiday. However, the issue has been much discussed and I am sure that there will be no surprises in my speech. In 2002, the Government asked the Committee on the Grant of Honours Decorations and Medals to review whether the Suez campaign was worthy of the award of the general services medal. A sub-committee was set up under General Guthrie to investigate that. It did so, and after consideration agreed that an award should be made. The Sub-Committee issued a paper setting out the detailed criteria for the award of the medal and the covering letter in 2003 referred to the"““Paper in respect of Suez, which has been cleared by the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State for Defence.””" One cannot get much higher than the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State for Defence. The paper is very detailed, which is important, and went into a number of areas. Paragraph 7 detailed the length of service, paragraph 8 detailed the geographical area, paragraph 9 detailed the eligible personnel, paragraph 10 detailed the qualifying period, paragraph 11 detailed the type of award that should be given—the general services medal—and paragraph 12, on aggregation, says, ““Service can be aggregated.”” Paragraph 15 summarises that by saying in sub-paragraph a that the award should be for personnel"““on the posted strength of a Ship…for 30 or more days for operations…within 3 miles of the Egyptian coast””." Sub-paragraph d says:"““Service may be aggregated and any day, part of which was spent as defined above, will count as a qualifying day.””" Those issues are important, and I remind the Chamber that they were cleared by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of State. In December 2002, the sub-committee reported to the HD committee, concluding that the case had been made and that the qualifying service should be 30 days. It did not mention that the service should be continuous or aggregated. Its conclusion was merely that"““The sub-committee therefore recommends that those who served in the Suez Canal Zone between 1951 and 1954 for a period of at least 30 days should be eligible for the award of a Canal Zone clasp to the GSM (for Royal Navy personnel the 30 days should have been spent ashore, not at sea).””" That is important. In October 2003, Command Paper 5999 was approved by the Queen and presented to Parliament. Paragraph 4 covers the length of service and makes a major change. It states:"““Qualifying service for each of these categories will be thirty days or more continuous service in the Suez Canal Zone.””" That is a dramatic change from the original papers, and has been questioned ever since by Royal Navy personnel, so it is important to look at the nature of the operations. The Mediterranean is a short sea; it is not an ocean. Mediterranean fleet ships were able to leave the canal zone and return to Malta for refuelling and replenishing. The commander-in-chief at the time was Lord Mountbatten, who was very active and wanted his ships to have plenty of sea time. He did not want his ships tied up in port longer than necessary. The national archives file WO216/900 states that Lieutenant-General Sir George Erskine, commanding officer of British troops in Egypt, said:"““The operation of the Suez Canal by the royal Navy in spite of opposition, was of major importance””." That was due to the Egyptians withdrawing all their labour. A further quote is:"““In order to keep the Port Said, Adabiya, and Fanara (the latter being two purely military ports) in a position to meet the basic military requirements, steps were at once taken to supply essential service from service sources. This was greatly helped by stationing of H.M. Ships at Port Said, on Lake Timsah and at Suez””." Clearly, the Navy was an important part of the whole operation. Royal Navy personnel, as is normal, undertook shore, transport and escort duties in areas subject to conflict and ambush. My constituent, Bill McKnight served on HMS Glasgow and his service was not atypical with seven stays in port not on patrol, totalling 72 days, the longest three being of 18, 20 and 27 days, in total 240 per cent. of the aggregate criteria, but none reached the 30-days criteria. There are two critical questions. Is there a precedent for the 30-days or for aggregation? In other words, is the request usual or unusual? Clearly, it is usual. The point has been made in a number of areas. In Palestine, the Aden peninsular, the gulf of Suez, South Arabia, Northern Ireland and Lebanon the period was 28 or 30 days, not necessarily continuous. Thirty continuous days is not a requirement for a clasp to be awarded. The second question is: why was ““aggregate””, as approved by the chiefs of staffs and the Secretary of State for Defence, changed to ““continuous””? It has been much more difficult to find the answer to that. A Cabinet Office letter of 20 July 2005 says that"““it was clear from the sub-committee’s discussions that their intention was that there should be a requirement for continuous service and the published qualifying criteria were drafted accordingly.””" That is the criteria in Command Paper 5999. The letter continues:"““The requirement for Royal Navy personnel to serve for 30 continuous days ashore was to ensure that naval personnel would not qualify for the award while serving at sea in the Canal Zone theatre of operations, i.e. off shore, or for service not in direct support of activity in the interior of the Canal Zone.””" That was covered by the criteria on the geographic area, and the answer was rather feeble. The MOD letter, reference D/US of S/TW 3015/06/L/sb, from Tom Watson to the Solicitor-General, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. O'Brien) on 27 June 2006 gave a further excuse when it stated that it was"““inappropriate for the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force to have any less rigorous eligibility criteria””" than people in the Army who bore the brunt of the service. That is a canard. At no time has anyone suggested that the service qualification for Royal Navy personnel should be any different from that for any other service. All that we are asking for is that the whole period should be counted as aggregated service rather than continuous service. A letter to Mr. L. Golder, MBE of Bolton on 30 May 2006, reference D/DS Sec/1102/10, answers the question about who and attempts to say why. It says that"““the word ““continuous”” was inserted by Mrs. Catto instead of ““aggregated””, as it reflected the decision of the chairman and the sub-committee.””" No it did not. It was clear that the declaration was ““aggregated”” and that that criterion was approved by the chiefs of staff and the Secretary of State. An earlier Cabinet Office letter on 16 June 2006 to Bill McKnight said:"““The sub-committee report recommended that service of at least 30 days would be required. It did not indicate whether eligible service must be continuous or aggregate...The HD committee, on the advice of the sub-committee, with agreement from MOD, and as confirmed by Lord Guthrie, took the decision to set the qualified criteria at 30 days continuous service.””" That is quite different from the documentation. A further letter from the Cabinet Office to the Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Kennedy on 30 June 2006 said that the report by the sub-committee"““did not contain and was not intended to contain a detailed account of the eligibility criteria.””" It continued:"““No Ministry of Defence staff members had been present at the discussions of the sub-committee; they were therefore not aware that the sub-committee had agreed that the service should not be aggregated but continuous.””" There is clearly a problem with the differences between the two. There are two broad reasons for opposing the change from continuous to aggregate service. First, there are the differing criteria. I do not think that anybody wants them, so we do not need to discuss them any further. As I said, it is an absolute canard, and frankly, I hope that the Minister will not bother dealing with the issue. There is also the issue of the reflection of the advice from the sub-committee’s discussions. And secondly, the sub-committee’s criteria were not detailed. The only evidence that we have is a written submission from the sub-committee, which clearly says that service should be aggregated. It cannot be clearer: four words make it clear that service should be aggregated and not continuous. If the criterion was to be continuous service, why did no one say so? It is not a subtle change or a minor issue; it diametrically opposes Command Paper 5999. It is as different as black and white, as up and down—as aggregated and continuous. The only evidence that has been presented to me is hearsay versus clear documentation, and in a court of law documentary evidence would take precedence over hearsay. The evidence in the document that the sub-committee produced and sent to the committee is also more detailed than in Command Paper 5999. As I have said, the Command Paper was approved by the chiefs of staff and the Secretary of State for Defence, and changes were made—apparently without their knowledge. Perhaps we are being asked to believe that the Secretary of State signed it on the understanding that continuous meant aggregate and that aggregate meant continuous. I cannot believe that. It is stretching credulity too far to believe that the Secretary of State and the chiefs of staff did not understand that the documentation meant aggregated and not continuous service. Why was the Secretary of State not informed of the re-documentation and the changes that were made? Were the chiefs of staff informed? I do not know; I have not found any evidence to say that they were or were not informed. If they had been notified, would they have approved it? I doubt that they would, because of the nature of the Mediterranean fleet and of the operations in the Mediterranean sea. The change would have meant that, in effect, every single Royal Navy sailor serving in the Mediterranean sea was denied the opportunity to add a clasp to the general service medal for Suez canal service. I do not expect my hon. Friend the Minister to say that he can make a change today; I know that that is not how things work. However, I ask him to consider the case very closely. He should not deny the case today; he should have a clear look at it, and consider all the papers. I am sure that he has more available to him than I do. He should also try to obtain the answers to my questions. If he is not satisfied that the case has been made, and if he is satisfied that the Royal Navy and all other service personnel who served in that theatre for 30 days’ aggregate service should be awarded the clasp, he should ask the HD committee to review the case. Only then will the sailors feel that their service for our country has been properly recognised, and that the dangers that they were placed in have been understood. They will then be able to take their place with pride alongside their brothers in arms in the Royal Marines, the Royal Air Force, and the Army, who served our country in a difficult and dangerous time.