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Iraq Inquiry

May I begin by referring to an interest, declared in the Register, in a company that operates in Iraq? I support very strongly the proposal for an inquiry made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague), because the Prime Minister has shown that essentially he is still in denial about the policy over which he has presided for the past few years. On several occasions, I have heard him, when challenged with the drama, trauma and mess that have developed in Iraq, say, ““I accept full responsibility.”” Usually, when someone says that, they follow it with a second phrase—““And I acknowledge that we made a mess of this,”” or, ““It’s all gone terribly wrong.”” The Prime Minister is an unusual phenomenon, because he says, ““I accept full responsibility and I got it right. I continue to defend what I did.”” Not only is that a rather eccentric approach but it damages the Government’s overall credibility regarding future policy in Iraq, and not simply the justification for the past. We saw a remarkable example of the Prime Minister’s tendency towards double- speak in an article for which he was interviewed in The Economist on 31 May. It was headed, ““What I’ve learned””, but when one read it, one discovered that he had not learned very much. He said:"““It is said that by removing Saddam or the Taliban—regimes that were authoritarian but also kept a form of order—the plight of Iraqis and Afghans has worsened, and terrorism has been allowed to grow.””" He went on to say:"““This is a seductive but dangerous argument. Work out what it really means. It means that because these reactionary and evil forces will fight hard, through terrorism, to prevent those countries and their people getting on their feet after the dictatorships are removed, we should leave the people under the dictatorship.””" Considered just in those narrow terms, what the Prime Minister said was entirely logical, but the premise from which he proceeded was utterly wrong. I am reminded of the remark that Harold Macmillan once made about Sir John Simon, when he said that the hon. Gentleman has such a logical frame of mind that starting from a false premise, he moves inexorably to the wrong conclusion. That is what the Prime Minister has done. He is no fool. He knows perfectly well that when any Government, including a British Government, are considering intervention through military means against a country that has not attacked them, no Government, including the present British Government, simply look at the human rights record of the Government concerned. Of course, that is an important consideration. So, too, is the question whether we will win in a conventional conflict and the war will be over quickly. But one also looks at all the wider implications of invading a country and implementing a policy of regime change. I ignore for the moment the fact that regime change was never part of the justification for the war and, indeed, could not have been because it would have been against international law. Even if it had been, the British Government, as we well know, have been disinclined to intervene in other countries which have just as bad a human rights record. Otherwise we would have had British troops in Zimbabwe getting rid of Mr. Mugabe. No doubt the United States would have gone into Castro’s Cuba many years ago, and might have gone into North Korea more recently. In each and every case, the reason was not a judgment about the human rights record or a judgment as to whether a conventional war would be won. It was a wider and a very wise judgment as to the overall implications and consequences of such an invasion of a country that had not attacked us. Sometimes the arguments are valid. I pay credit to what the Government did in Sierra Leone. There was a case where there was a strong human rights argument, but where the consequences of our intervention clearly have been beneficial. That could have been anticipated, and was anticipated, and the Government were right to act. I happen to think that they were right in Afghanistan, but the whole point about Iraq is that most of what has happened since the invasion was not only predictable, but was predicted. It is not the Prime Minister’s integrity or honesty that I question; it is the basic competence—incompetence, I should say—and the poor judgment that guided his actions over that period. That is why an inquiry is essential now. So much for the past. Where do we go from here with regard to the British presence in Iraq? Even those of us who were against the war cannot say that because we were against it, British troops must come out at the first available opportunity. Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia made a very wise remark. He said that the coalition must realise that if they go in uninvited, they cannot just leave uninvited. We have contributed to the mess in Iraq. It has a more democratic Government than it has ever had. That Government want us to retain a presence in Iraq, and they are entitled to have that view taken into account. What arguments should be used? There are three questions that we have to address. First, are we delivering the policy in Basra, in the south, that was the reason for British troops being there in the first place? Secondly, if we are not delivering that policy or only partially doing so, is there nevertheless some justification for a continuing presence on its merits in Iraq over a period of time? Thirdly, regardless of those arguments, what are the wider political implications in regard to both the United States and western interests generally if we continue in Iraq for some time? Let me look at those three questions briefly. First, Basra is a lot better than Baghdad. The number of people being killed is far lower. The terrorism incidents have been much easier to control, but they are not in control. There is not a sectarian conflict between Shi’a and Sunni, but we should not get too overjoyed about that. The main reason is that the Sunni have effectively been expelled from the region and have become a small minority in that locality, so the conflict there is now Shi’a-Shi’a. However, the Government’s writ does not run in Basra, and in that sense the British Government’s presence there through their military forces has not delivered the kind of peace and stability that we hoped would be the case over the past three or four years. I broadly accept the Government’s argument that it is sensible over the next few months to withdraw those of our troops who are involved in patrolling in Basra. Three of the four provinces have already been handed over. It makes sense to work towards a handing over of the fourth province in months, not years. That would allow a substantial deployment. That brings me to my second question, which is highly relevant to what the Foreign Secretary said earlier: should we continue with some military presence even after most of our troops have been withdrawn and Basra province has been handed over to the Iraqi Government? In my judgment, the answer is yes because there are activities where we can continue to make a useful contribution to the objectives of the Iraqi Government, which we share, with regard to some possibility of stability in that region. What are those objectives? First, we have been heavily involved in training the 10th division of the Iraqi army, and that job is not yet complete, so a training function should continue even if we withdraw our troops from Basra province in relation to regular patrols. Secondly, when our troops move from Basra palace to Basra airport, the protection of that airport in terms of ensuring that it is able to be used with free passage is an important contribution that British troops could continue to make in an effective and credible fashion. Thirdly, a major requirement will be to ensure the free movement of logistics from Kuwait to Baghdad and to the central part of Iraq. Such convoy work is crucial. Indeed, we will do a huge disservice not only to the Iraqis but to our American allies if they have to redeploy some of their own scarce resources to cover that purely transport-related requirement from the southern part of the country to the north. That function can be carried out pretty effectively and with minimal casualties. Fourthly, there will be occasional operations where we could assist the Iraqi army where it does not have particular capabilities available to itself. On the basis of that argument, we would perhaps reduce our troop numbers from 5,500 to 1,000 or 1,500, ensuring that those who remained would not be as visible to the Iraqi public—and therefore could not be used as targets as has been the case in the recent past—but would continue to be able to make a useful contribution to the ongoing battle to try to get some stability and security in the country. My third question concerns the wider political implications. We cannot get away from the fact that if the United Kingdom simply pulled out every single last soldier in the next few months, that would gravely damage the United States. I make that remark not out of love of the United States, although I happen to approve of it as a country, but because we have no national or international interest in giving comfort to al-Qaeda and terrorist elements. Leaving the United States completely exposed in Iraq, with even its closest ally having completely abandoned it, not even carrying out those responsibilities that it can credibly and effectively carry out, would be an over-reaction to the problem and should therefore not be supported. I would not make that argument were there not a job that could be credibly done, but in training and the other areas that I mentioned it is justified on its merits as well as in terms of the political strategy that points in the same direction. We often hear comparisons between Vietnam and Iraq. In some ways, it is a false comparison: in fact, Iraq is worse than Vietnam. In Vietnam, there was already a war going on and the United States intervened to try to help one side—the Vietnamese Government. In this case, the coalition started the invasion and the war that would not otherwise have occurred. There are other highly relevant differences. In Vietnam, there was one group of insurgents—the Vietcong—and an alternative Government: the North Vietnamese Government who were ready and willing to take over control. Neither of those factors applies in the case of Iraq. Iraq does not have one insurgency—it has multiple insurgences throughout the country. Some involve Shi’a versus Shi’a’, some involve Kurds, some involve Sunni operatives, and some involve foreign jihadists such as al-Qaeda: all are battling with their own agenda and their own grasping for power. Moreover, no alternative Government are available to take over. As a result, we have a situation whereby 2 million Iraqis have fled Iraq since the end of the original war, and they are overwhelmingly Iraq’s middle class—the people who are essential if there is to be any economic reconstruction of the country. That makes the situation even more dire than it would otherwise have been. What has happened is essentially this. Yes, it is true to say that under Saddam Hussein Iraq was a rogue state, but in the past four years—I take no pleasure in saying this—it has moved from being a rogue state and is now a failed state. A failed state can have even more serious implications for its neighbours and for the region as a whole because of the vacuum that is created—we all know what happens in vacuums when very nasty and vicious people are able to operate in ways that they would not otherwise have been able to. There are powerful reasons for ensuring that the United States is not humiliated. If Britain can continue to make some contribution to the wider international effort to achieve stability despite withdrawing its patrol forces and the bulk of its troops, that must be the right course of action. We are not going to see an end in Iraq rather like the end in Vietnam. There will not be any US helicopter taking off from the American embassy in Baghdad on the last day of this conflict. Even if the Americans withdraw their combat forces, they are probably in for a long period of years with a very substantial presence. It will be a long haul for the Americans and probably for the United Kingdom and a number of other countries. The good news is that it will not end like Vietnam—but that is probably the bad news as well.