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Territorial Army

Yes. My hon. Friend points to one of the—dare I say it—rather imaginative proposals that the all-party group included in its list of recommendations. Of course, his suggestion would have a small cost attached to it, whereas the two things that I mentioned earlier would be virtually free—they are just a question of getting organised. None the less, such a proposal would provide an excellent return, as well as providing officers for the Regular Army, and I thank my hon. Friend for raising it. The TA must be treated as an army that supports the Regular Army as a junior partner. It must always be more than an army reserve that is just there to fill the gaps when the regulars are short of numbers. It is interesting that the United States has two volunteer reserve armies—the national guard and the US army reserve. Their structure, in terms of units, and their pay and conditions are identical, but their philosophies are totally different. The reserve is used mainly as a pool for individuals to backfill the active army, while the guard has a distinct, local identity and is usually deployed as formed units. The difference in recruitment and wastage is startling. The wastage rate in the national guard is well below two thirds of that in the army reserve, and despite the fact that the guard has suffered heavy losses in Iraq—16 people from the Louisiana brigade, which I know well, were killed during its deployment there, which, coincidentally, happened at the same time as hurricane Katrina—its website proudly proclaimed last month that it had recruited fully up to strength. The active army and the army reserve are some way from that. As with the national guard, TA soldiers should, as far as possible, be deployed together and, usually, as a formed sub-unit, thus giving their commanders the crucial opportunity to lead their men. However, as Regular commanders press for soldiers to fill their ranks and the operational work load makes it harder to get substantial groups of territorials to leave their civilian jobs again, there is a tendency towards deployment by individual reinforcement or so-called cohort. That often provides individuals in junior ranks, such as corporals and privates, with an excellent experience, but the danger is that such an approach will predominate, with officers having no opportunity to command in the field. It is no wonder that it is becoming so hard to recruit and retain junior officers as the demands of civilian life continue to grow. One positive step, on which I congratulate the Government, was the introduction of a two-star, part-time general in the MOD in 2004. The general has access to Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff to ensure that the volunteer reservist voice is heard in the corridors of power, and the all-party group applauds the Government on that. Nevertheless, there is considerable concern that last year’s reorganisation of the TA, which was based on the future army strategy, threw up some serious problems. There are two dimensions to the strategy. The first related to the macro aspects, such as deciding the locations at which individual units would be based and the cap badges that they would wear. I have no problem with that, and things are, indeed, starting to settle down nicely. The big problem was with the other dimension, which related to the decision to design the TA structure on the basis of very occasional, large-scale, deliberate interventions—large-scale wars in which most of the TA would be called out, happening perhaps once in a generation—rather than of supporting enduring operations, which is what the TA actually does. The problem was most acute in two areas: the infantry and yeomanry. The substructure of each company and yeomanry squadron, which determines what happens at each individual location, was rewritten in an unfortunate way, and that has seriously diminished TA infantry and yeomanry regiments’ ability to train and develop officers and fulfil the operational requirements on them. To focus on the infantry, there is now only one rifle platoon in each company, plus an enormous support weapons set-up, which means that companies do not have the critical mass to provide interesting training. Providing an interesting exercise requires several sub-units, usually from many miles apart, to be consolidated through a mix-and-match approach, but that is no way to develop team spirit. Therefore, the most rewarding part of being a TA officer or NCO in peace time—taking one’s troops through their paces—is, in effect, being denied to company and platoon commanders in the infantry and yeomanry. If the young professionals and managers who regularly give of their precious free time at the end of a hard working week are denied the most rewarding aspect of their job, they will soon vote with their feet, as will the men and women under them. The macro side of the future army strategy must be allowed to settle in. I am not suggesting that a single location is reorganised, but the crucial substructure of the individual infantry company and yeomanry squadron must be rebalanced. In the case of the infantry, that means that there must be a big cut in the number of support weapons to provide enough rifle platoons, given that riflemen are the overwhelming requirement for Iraq and Afghanistan. The all-party group’s report ends with 18 recommendations, most of which are based on the factors that I have set out. Just as we went to print, the Department for Transport announced an initiative on one of them—the problem of drivers’ hours, which affects a small yet significant number of territorials. I hope that the MOD will look hard at the other 17 recommendations. In summary, if bright young men and women are to be attracted to the TA, it must never become a mere adjunct to the regular Army. It should integrate with the Regular Army only in so far as that is compatible with the grain of civilian life. The TA is a precious, priceless asset to this country, but it will be so only as long as it attracts good-quality men and women into its ranks. To do that, each TA unit must remain part of its local community—that is, it must remain territorial.