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Iraq Dossier (September 2002)

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I shall try to answer his questions and the debate in my own way, and my own words. I am sure that he would not have taken a leaf out of the book of spin doctors, and tried to mouth what I am about to say. However, I will say this: first, he has said that Alastair Campbell commissioned the dossier, and I can tell him categorically that that is not true: the Prime Minister commissioned the dossier. I have no doubt that Alastair Campbell was involved in subsequent discussions with other civil servants about the dossier—I should be surprised if that did not happen—but the Prime Minister commissioned it. That is the first assertion that must be nailed. Secondly, it is claimed that the first draft of the of the Government’s dossier was produced not by intelligence officers in the Joint Intelligence Committee but by press officers. That is essentially what the hon. Gentleman is saying, and it is simply not true. As I have said, John Scarlett and the Joint Intelligence Committee were commissioned by the Prime Minister to produce the Government dossier and they led throughout in drafting and finalising it. What Mr. Williams did, on his own initiative, immediately after hearing the Prime Minister call for such a document in a speech made on 3 September, was to produce a version of his own over the weekend of 6 and 7 September. By the time that Mr. Williams produced it, it was already redundant, because Sir John Scarlett had in the meantime been asked by the Prime Minister to produce a dossier. That is what he set about doing. As I said earlier, John Scarlett and the JIC produced what became the Government dossier. It was not based on the Williams draft. Again, as I said earlier, I can also categorically assure the House that Williams made no reference in his draft to the issue of WMD being deployed within 45 minutes. The hon. Gentleman also suggested that there is no evidence that the document was provided to Lord Hutton’s inquiry. As I told the House on 1 May, Lord Hutton had access to all documents that he wished to see, including the Williams draft. That document was provided to Lord Hutton’s team on 12 September 2003. It did not appear among the documents that Lord Hutton chose to make public on the inquiry’s website, but that was Lord Hutton’s decision. Next, the Government are asked why, if they have nothing to hide, they should refuse to release the draft in response to a freedom of information request. That is a very fair question, and it is currently the subject of an appeal to the information tribunal over the Information Commissioner’s ruling that the document should be released. I am therefore somewhat constrained in what I can say. I will, however, say that an important principle at stake: it is vital that we provide thinking space for officials and others who routinely draft policy documents. They should not feel constrained in presenting new or challenging ideas because they fear that they will be made public. That is specifically recognised in the Freedom of Information Act 2000. I can understand that the hon. Gentleman would press hard on the question, which is at the heart of his case. However, when I intervened on him he said that the document was of such importance that it should be published, which implies that judgments must be made about what things it is important, very important or vital to release. He is making that judgment without having seen the document. This is a matter that has never been easy for any Government. It is very difficult to decide whether the release of a document may in the future prevent the radical thinking that is sometimes needed to take policy forward.