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Proceeding contribution from Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Monday, 2 July 2007. It occurred during Question for short debate on EU: Company Law.


EU: Company Law

rose to ask Her Majesty’s Government what studies have been made of the impact of the provisions of the eighth company law directive on the competitive position of the City of London. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Temple Guiting, will forgive me for saying that I very much hoped to be the first to welcome his colleague the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, or one of the other Ministers to their new role. They are Ministers for no longer the DTI but the rather inelegantly named DBERR, or Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. It is regulatory reform that is central to my remarks this evening. I know that, although this is pretty detailed and technical stuff, the noble Lord will deal with it with his customary calm, expert and dispassionate approach. I want to raise concerns about the provisions of the eighth company law directive, which must be implemented by 29 June 2008. I appreciate that the title ““eighth company law directive”” does not exactly send the parliamentary pulses racing. Nevertheless, these directives contain, sometimes well hidden in the rather leaden prose favoured by Brussels bureaucracy, decisions that can have grave implications for British competitiveness. Nowhere is that truer than in those affecting the UK financial services industry and the City of London. I am afraid to say that all too often this Government have been a bit casual and too ready to accept uncritically what is spoon-fed to them by Brussels. As an example, last year during the Committee stage of what is now the Companies Act 2006, we on these Benches argued strenuously that the sections in that Act making it a criminal offence, and not as hitherto a civil offence, to fail to comply with provisions regarding takeover documents represented a gold-plating by the DTI of the takeovers directive, a gold-plating that we further suggested was not going to be matched by other EU countries. Not so, said the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, the then Attorney-General, replying for the Government. Far from it; the proposals were the minimum required. Because at that stage the directive was not yet in force, we could not tell how individual EU countries would comply. Now, 18 months later, we can tell and, according to the paper that was kindly circulated by the department, very few countries have sought to criminalise and none of those is one of the UK’s major competitors. Another example is the insurance mediation directive, which was published in December 2002 and supposed to be in force before 15 January 2005. According to the City research series, only the Netherlands among the UK’s major competitors has a comparably strict regulatory regime. The French regime is much less proactive, while the German regime is still not yet in place, even two and a half years after the due date. Tonight, I wish to raise another regulatory imposition that the Government blithely appear to be prepared to accept. I have said that the eighth company law directive is in its final run-in to implementation. While most of the directive deals with auditor training, supervision and so on, and is uncontroversial, hidden away in Articles 41, 45 and 46 are two provisions that will affect listed companies and as such have implications for the competitive position of the London Stock Exchange. The first of these in Articles 45 and 46 concerns what are known as third-country auditor provisions. The basic premise is that the auditor of any company that issues securities on a regulated market—not including AIM—in an EU member state should be subject to an equivalent minimum level of regulation, even when the company whose securities are being listed is incorporated outside the EU. Noble Lords will note the element of extraterritoriality in those provisions. Equivalence can be achieved in one of two ways: first, if the third country where the auditor is located has equivalent systems on quality assurance, oversight and so forth and that third country agrees to offer reciprocal arrangements to the EU; or, alternatively, through direct regulation by the EU audit regulator. Consider the position of a company located in an eastern European country outside the EU that wishes to list on the London Stock Exchange. Its accounts are audited by one of the big four firms, but the partnership of the big four firm in that particular country is an independent partnership under the big four ““umbrella””. If so, those accounts will not be acceptable unless the country—not the firm—in question demonstrates to the EU that it has equivalent supervisory systems for auditors and that it will offer reciprocal opportunities to the EU. If the above cannot be achieved, the only solution is for the company to have its accounts completely reaudited by a firm within the EU, which is a costly, time-consuming and duplicative exercise. It does not take much imagination to see from this example that this gives rise to many technical, organisational and indeed diplomatic niceties, including the issue of territoriality. It is no wonder that some have described this as a potential EU Sarbanes-Oxley. Articles 45 and 46 of the directive may therefore, as a result of the law of unintended consequences, have a similar impact in London to Sarbanes-Oxley in New York. Very few financial centres in the EU other than the London Stock Exchange have many listings of companies from outside the EU, so most EU country Governments are indifferent to these measures. It is London that will suffer most. Some may think that this is a trivial matter involving few companies and fewer countries. However, the facts are these. The Commission estimates that 220 audit firms from no fewer than 63 countries will be affected. More parochially, the London Stock Exchange has said that there are 320 international issuers on the exchange, with an equity market value of £2,611 billion, or £2.6 trillion. In addition, there are 6,000 international debt securities, which may also be affected. Technical this matter may be, but trivial it most certainly is not. Secondly, I turn to the provisions of Article 41 concerning audit committees. This is of a lesser order of importance, but nevertheless it is a significant pointer to the attitude and approach adopted by the EU. Article 41 will place a statutory requirement on all listed companies to have an audit committee. Nearly every UK listed company already meets or exceeds this requirement under the provisions of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance. Those that do not have such a committee have to provide a reason for not having one under the ““comply or explain”” provisions of the combined code. If investors do not like the explanation given, they can choose not to buy the shares or, if they are already shareholders, they can choose to sell their holding. What are we achieving by accepting this clause? The short answer is nothing. In fact, we may even be going backwards, because a statutory role may be regarded as likely to increase the personal liability of the individual director, which may in turn reduce the pool of able men and women who are prepared to assume those responsibilities. That cannot be in the interests ofUK plc. I am very much looking forward to being reassured by the Minister when he replies that the Government have looked into these matters and have everything under control, although in the light of their record to date I will take some convincing. I hope that the Minister will not fall back on the tired arguments that we cannot do anything about the issues now—we have really had enough of doors being slammed after horses have bolted—or that we will defer any difficulties by lengthening the transitional period so that implementation of the provisions is deferred by several years. That would be a complete dereliction of duty on the part of the Government. First, transitionals do not solve the problem; they only defer it, thus often making it worse, because of the intervening uncertainty. Secondly, transitionals can be implemented only with the consent of member states, thus introducing an element of EU-wide horse-trading. Since few EU Governments have any interest in this matter, for reasons that I have explained, it is hard to see much being achieved. Finally and most significantly, transitionals can be introduced only where the Commission has made a formal finding that a third country’s regime is not adequate. It will be instructive, to say the least, to watch the reaction in, say, the United States or Japan when those countries are told by the EU authorities that to qualify for transitional status they will have to accept that their existing supervisory regime is not adequate. To conclude, the clock is ticking down fast. Many non-EU countries are very concerned; that is as it may be. What should concern us and, in particular, the Government is the impact on the competitive position of the City of London. As I said at the outset, this is quite technical stuff and it is probably a bit unfair to leave the noble Lord, Lord Evans, to face this bit of fast bowling. However, I hope that when he reports back to this newly named department he will remind it that the last two letters of its new acronym stand for ““Regulatory Reform””. This eighth company law directive would be a good place to start to show that the department really means business.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
693 c883-6 
Session
2006-07
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Audit Company law Company accounts City of London EU law Foreign companies Standards Regulation Stocks and shares London Stock Exchange Stock market Trade competitiveness
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk