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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL]

I intervene for the first time in these proceedings to support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Alton. It is always important that any legislation should be as precise as is reasonably possible. That is especially so when one is dealing with a subject as sensitive as human embryology, on which reasonable people can, as we have learnt at Second Reading and again yesterday, can take very different views. ““Life-threatening disease””—the language we heard—was something that we could all understand. I imagine that it would not be too difficult to make a list of life-threatening diseases on which doctors could agree. Why, then, are we changing from ““life-threatening disease””? I am of course aware that the Joint Committee took the view that ““life-threatening disease”” was too narrow, too tight. I understand its reasons and largely sympathise with them, but I cannot accept that ““serious medical condition”” was the right substitute. We seem to have gone from one extreme—too narrow—to the other, which is far too vague and too wide. It could cover almost anything. I have serious concerns about ““serious medical disease”” being the right terminology. However, I have much greater concerns—they were set out so clearly by the noble Earl—about the inclusion of the phrase ““other tissue”” in sub-paragraph 1(d). Umbilical cord stem cells are again something that we can all understand. The Joint Committee’s recommendation 17 did not suggest any change. It was the Government’s idea to include ““bone marrow”” and, certainly, ““other tissue””, which presumably means any other tissue. That means that ““umbilical cord”” and ““bone marrow”” become otiose, but I shall put that lawyer’s point on one side. As with ““serious medical condition””, surely ““other tissue”” is much too vague? I have read a paper in which it is said that ““other tissue”” would certainly include organs such as the human kidney. I hope that that is not the Government’s intention, but if it is that raises serious questions. Following the noble Earl as well as my noble friend, I would have great doubts about the morality of creating a child for the specific purpose of donating a kidney to an elder sibling. I would have even greater concern for the effect on the child when he discovers that that is one of the reasons why he has been brought into the world. How, in those circumstances, could we ever be sure that he was donating the kidney truly voluntarily? This is the first time I have intervened in these debates, but we are on very dangerous ground.