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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 142: 142: Clause 46, leave out Clause 46 The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, tabled the amendment, but unfortunately she is not able to be with us this evening and so invited me to take her place in dealing with the matter. Your Lordships will be relieved to know that this has nothing whatever to do with any kind of definition; it is a simpler issue. One of the situations covered by Clause 46 is that, "““the child has been carried by W as the result of placing in her of an embryo””." That is the first point, which relates to what I assume is not the natural way of doing what was intended here, although it might be enough to cover that. Secondly, it must be that, "““the embryo was created at a time when W was a party to a civil partnership””." So, at the time of the creation of the embryo there has to have been a civil partnership. Then, it must be that, "““the other party to the civil partnership died before the placing of the embryo in the woman””." There was, then, some interval of time between the creation of the embryo and the placing of it in the woman W—““W”” seems to be the initial that one uses for a woman in this provision. That interval might be quite long, depending on the circumstances. Then it must be that, "““the other party to the civil partnership consented in writing (and did not withdraw the consent) … to the placing of the embryo in W after the death of the other party””." I assume that the consent was given before her death, but she consented to the placing of the embryo in W after her death. She had also to agree, "““to being treated for the purpose mentioned in subsection (4) as the parent of any resulting child””." The purpose mentioned in Clause 46(4) is to be registered as a parent, and nothing more than that. You start off with a situation in which this person who was a party to a civil partnership has agreed to these two particular conditions. Now what happens to the child? Possibly more than one child is born because it is at the embryo stage. It then must be that W—the lady carrying the child or children—has, "““elected in writing not later than the end of the period of 42 days from the day on which the child was born for the other””," party to the civil partnership, "““to be treated for the purpose mentioned in subsection (4) as the parent of the child””." This person, who may have been dead for quite a long time, is to be treated as the parent of the child for the purpose of registration if the woman who has carried the child decides that that should be so—and not otherwise. If all this happens, the provision is that the child will be registered with this dead woman as a parent. What is the purpose of this provision? It seems an elaborate provision to secure a registration. The answer is to be found in Clause 48(4). It says there that, where Clause 46(1) or (2) apply—I have taken only the example of Clause 46(1), but the considerations are similar for Clause 46(2)—the deceased woman, "““is to be treated in law as a parent of the child for the purpose mentioned in section 46(4)””," that is, for registration. Yet, she, "““is to be treated in law as not being a parent of the child for any other purpose””." The only purpose for which all this elaborate procedure is designed is to secure that the dead woman is named on the child’s birth certificate. I cannot understand the purpose of that; you cannot rely on it for any other purpose, according to the provision that I have just read. I am interested to know what good it does to put on to the register of births, marriages and deaths the name of a deceased person who is not to be treated as the parent of the child for any other purpose than to appear in the registration. That seems to require some explanation. My other point is that the Government have been reluctant, despite some people wishing it, to require donor conceptions to be marked on the register. Yet this will inevitably mean that the child in question is marked on the register as donor conceived because there is no way in which two women—one the mother and the other a parent—could have produced the child in any other way given the present status of science. That is the present situation, whatever the future may hold. Therefore, this measure would inevitably result in putting on the register the fact that this child is donor conceived when the Government have declined to do that in respect of other donor-conceived children. Moreover, this type of provision is apt to be blamed on scientists. Sometimes people say that scientists, including doctors, have developed all these procedures. But this is nothing to do with that science; some other motivation is behind this measure. I am not sure exactly what it is; perhaps we shall hear. However, one of the results is that the child in respect of whom this provision applies will be strongly differentiated from the vast majority of other children. Therefore, the equality agenda under which all this appears to have taken place seems to apply only to adults; the children will be subject to severe differentiation in the application of this doctrine. I await with interest the response to the suggestion that this clause be deleted. I beg to move.