Proceeding contribution from Viscount Eccles (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 19 March 2008. It occurred during Debate on bill on Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill [HL].
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill [HL]
moved Amendment No. 13: 13: Clause 7, page 4, line 18, leave out ““LBRO”” and insert ““The Secretary of State”” The noble Viscount said: My Lords, before moving the amendments, I acknowledge the great assistance that I have had, both in letters from the Minister and from the Bill team, which directed me to one of the longest links that I have ever tried to tap into my laptop. In the end, I obtained the information for which I was looking. I am truly grateful for that and the other comments that have been transmitted to me in the dialogue on who should have the power to direct. Amendments Nos. 13 to 18 and 20 to 23 would simply move the power to direct local authorities from the LBRO to the Secretary of State. In Committee, the Minister said: "““The power to direct is intended as a backstop power that might be used where, for example, one or more local authorities persistently acts with disregard for a particular piece of guidance and that disregard is, frankly, detrimental to business or the public or, as could often happen, both””.—[Official Report, 23/1/08; col. GC 111.]" That is a pretty stern test. This important statement was and remains welcome as a description of the need for the backstop power. In what follows, I am using—I hope, without plagiarism—persistent disregard as the way of looking at the situation. The Minister also said on a more personal note that I was a sturdy champion of local government, a charge which I fully accept. However, my concern on this occasion is centred on the relationship between Ministers and Parliament. As the Delegated Powers Committee reported, directions can have a legislative effect. It is one thing when they are used for administrative matters, but another when, as in this case, they change the legal position of the person directed. I believe that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House would agree. Therefore, Parliament needs to be very careful as to whom it gives the power of direction. In this case, when the Minister’s test of persistent disregard comes to be considered, it will most probably be when a local authority has either failed to follow Clause 6(3), under which it must have regard to guidance, or, as is much more likely, when it has regard but remains convinced that the guidance is faulty and so should not apply. It is after all human to err. The LBRO will be no exception. It is also likely that if and when a local authority persists in disagreement, there will have been a long and diligent dialogue. The Secretary of State is the best person to resolve the matter. He should retain the backstop power of direction and Parliament should expect him to do so. There are several other good reasons for this conclusion. Non-departmental public bodies do not now have powers of direction, nor should they. An analogy with the Food Standards Agency has been suggested and I am grateful for a full briefing from it. There is one power of direction which enables the agency to bring a food authority into line, subject to an order in the High Court. This power has never been used. It is certainly not a precedent for the interrelated purposes of Clauses 6 and 7. Further, the giving of the power to the LBRO would make it in all essentials judge and jury, not only in its own approach to persistent disregard but also on behalf of regulators, thus widening the power in a completely unprecedented way. Then there is the obvious point that an unelected public body can enforce compliance on an elected local authority. Finally, the LBRO will face a steep learning curve. It is to be a temporary body. To whom might its powers of direction be transferred when it is dissolved? For all these reasons, the LBRO is the wrong choice. In Committee, there was an extensive discussion of consultation on the powers to be given to the LBRO, summed up by the Minister with a carefully phrased sentence: "““Consultation produced an overwhelming view from business that the LBRO would need significant powers of compulsion beyond those of merely issuing guidance””.—[Official Report, 23/1/08; col. GC 112.]" I hope the Minister will forgive me emphasising ““from business””. It is possible to see the picture quite differently. There was no consultation on the power to make directions because there was no Clause 7 in the draft Bill. The parliamentary procedure of direction was not mentioned; instead, questions were asked. Proposal 5 of the Government’s response to the consultation was that: "““Local authorities be placed under a statutory duty ‘to have regard to’ guidance issued by LBRO””." The questions asked were: "““Do you agree with this approach?””;" and, "““Should a stronger requirement be placed on local authorities to comply with LBRO guidance? If so, what is your argument?””." Some 79 per cent of the respondents answered that there was no need for a stronger requirement, while 21 per cent answered yes. Among the yeses was the National Consumer Council, which answered to the second question: "““However if outcomes suffer because guidance is being consistently ignored then LBRO should have appropriate reserve powers to deal with this””." The Trading Standards Institute—incidentally, these two bodies were discussed in Committee—answered the same question by saying: "““If LBRO determines that there is a limited take up of guidance and yet clear benefits from adherence then LBRO should be able to be instructive to authorities on implementation of any such guidance””." It is clear that Ministers have allowed the 21 per cent—mainly business respondents—to prevail. By including Clause 7 they have gone further than anyone consulted could have expected. One can question the purpose of consultation if its results are not then accepted but, being where we are, we need to make the best of it. It is also now said that, having seen the clause, both the National Consumer Council and the Trading Standards Institute are content with it. Yet do they fully understand the constitutional issue involved? What about the 79 per cent? Defending the late entrance of Clause 7, it is argued that the Secretary of State is an adequate safeguard because he has to be consulted before a direction can be made. Why have a safeguard when you do not need it? It is much better to put the responsibility where it truly lies, with the Secretary of State. This is not only normal practice but also improves accountability to Parliament, particularly if the Secretary of State was to lay an order rather than proceeding straight to a direction. All the detriments associated with the LBRO having the power are removed. Its relationships in pursuit of its core aim— "““to support local authorities to regulate more effectively””—" would be that much easier to manage productively. In summary, Clause 7 would remain in place if my amendments were accepted. The Secretary of State would have the power to direct when he was satisfied that there was persistent disregard of sound guidance. The Government thus retain all the substance they want. There is only a change in the form. We can all hope with some confidence that the power would never in fact turn out to be necessary. I beg to move.
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- 2007-08
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- Disclosure of information Devolved matters Business Borrowing Finance Northern Ireland Non-departmental public bodies Scotland Regulation Wales Parliamentary papers Local Better Regulation Office Sunset clauses
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- Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill (HL) 2007-08
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