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Parliament: Legislative Proposals

I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for initiating this debate. Because it is a very short debate, I begin by accepting both his diagnosis and his principal recommendation to deal with what is wrong in our legislative process. In my opinion, his recommendation that Parliament should pass a resolution put before it by the Government has the merit of being a simple proposal that could be grasped without legislation and advanced quickly. Having said that, I do not think that it goes far enough. I would wish it to happen but I do not think that it goes nearly far enough to address a number of the issues that were alluded to very forcefully in the committee’s recommendations on the Better Government Initiative, to which the noble Lord belonged and which was chaired by Sir Christopher Foster. This is not a problem unique to this parliamentary democracy. It is, I think, sensible to consider what is done in other countries and to consider whether at this time, when the Government are contemplating a considerable process of constitutional reform designed to strengthen Parliament, there are ideas and lessons to be learnt in other parliamentary jurisdictions. I draw the Government’s attention, in particular, to the experience in New Zealand. In a notable speech made about a year ago, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, former Prime Minister of New Zealand, concluded—he might have been talking about the United Kingdom— "““From where I sit the real problem is that we still legislate too easily. We give insufficient thought to what we are trying to do when we legislate. And then, having legislated, we do not examine whether we even achieved what we were trying to. We amend too readily when often we should start again. We fail to assess ""properly the economic consequences of many of the regulatory mechanisms in which we engage … I think the time has come to put a lot more thought into the legislative process before it starts. In a system where statute is Emperor, we need better methods of statute design, manufacture and maintenance””." In New Zealand there are two advisory committees in place to try to achieve some of this betterment. Sir Geoffrey has admitted that he does not think that they are sufficient and has suggested that they should be ““melded””, to use his word, into one. Another example that we should look at is that of the Council of State in the Netherlands, which is a body considered to be one of the high councils of state, appointed by the Government. It is a relatively small body but it has a very large staff; it provides a very useful service, considering whether the problem being addressed is one that could or should be solved by legislation. It asks whether a Bill is necessary and whether its necessity has been demonstrated, whether the proposed legislation will be effective and the proposed solution efficient and balanced as regards costs and benefits. It asks, too, whether it will be possible to apply and enforce the Bill or to monitor its effects. This comes at a time when the future of this Chamber is under consideration and its very important revising role is to some extent at risk. Let no one imagine that a representative body of elected Peers will perform its revising role in anything like the same manner as the present House of Lords does, because it—like the House of Commons—will be looking for the political headlines. Should we consider a third institution as part of Parliament? I believe that we should. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, in looking at the experience of New Zealand’s advisory council said that the trouble with it was that it was not at the heart of the legislative process. I think that that is what we need; there should be a council of state of people appointed who reflect the kind of expertise that there is in this Chamber—not only lawyers, as in New Zealand. The body would have pre-legislative and possibly post-legislative scrutiny role. The elected second Chamber could then act as it will, as a political Chamber, holding the Government to account and ending—even blocking—legislation, without the close, detailed work on legislation being sacrificed by those political considerations. I saw it reported this week that 450 Members would be elected to an upper House. That may be utter nonsense, but you would need something like that to bring together the expertise that you have. It is inconceivable that we would have an elected Parliament of 1,000 Members. I commend that in outline to the Lord Chancellor as a field of inquiry.