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Channel Tunnel Rail Link (Supplementary Provisions) Bill

My Lords, I apologise; that is what I thought I heard. The noble Lords have regaled us with their reflections on conversations that they have had, perhaps at lunch, perhaps on other occasions. When they got stuck into the hors d’oeuvre, and before the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, got round to sipping his nicely chilled Chablis, there was clearly a meaningful conversation to be had with a potential purchaser of High Speed 1, who indicated that they would be happier with regulation by the Office of Rail Regulation rather than with regulation by the Secretary of State. I hope that fair consideration was given to the issue in those congenial discussions, because it is clear that it requires some thinking through. The noble Lord asked me to explain why the Government wanted to retain a regulatory role that has worked well. The answer is that we believe that keeping the current structure will secure a higher sale price by enhancing the commercial stability of High Speed 1. We did not come to this decision lightly, and we will consider which parts of the Secretary of State’s current and future duties can be undertaken by the Office of Rail Regulation as soon as the sale of High Speed 1 is under way next year. Coming to a definitive view on what those duties might be, and finalising the detail of the contract between the Secretary of State and the owner of High Speed 1, will be an important element of our thinking. I share the view of both noble Lords, who have made big contributions to this debate, that once the detail of that contract is agreed, and where functions of a regulatory nature continue to exist, the Office of Rail Regulation would be the obvious and competent candidate to undertake them. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, raised the operation of the CTRL. There is a contract between LCR and Network Rail for the operation of High Speed 1 which lasts until 2086. The Department for Transport is in discussions with Network Rail. We will try to find a way to amend the current relationship so as to introduce more effective incentives to reduce costs. However, there is no possibility of it being transferred to the Office of Rail Regulation; it seems to us that the current arrangement works sensibly. I return specifically to access charges. The noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield, mentioned them as did the noble Lords, Lords Berkeley and Bradshaw. The enterprise value of High Speed 1 is determined largely by the amount of income that the company will receive in future. The income stream is generated by the access charges paid by train operators. It makes commercial sense to assume that the more secure the income stream, the less risk that bidders and their lenders will associate with HS1’s business. For that reason, investors will see attraction in having a firm contract with the Secretary of State which defines precisely the parameters for them to set access charges in the long term. The Secretary of State will set the charging framework within that contract, because the level and structure of charges will directly affect the value that taxpayers receive in a sale. Our only concern is to protect value by providing potential bidders with certainty. Bidders will know that the maximum price that they will be permitted to charge train operators will not be reset at regular intervals, neither by the Secretary of State nor by the Office of Rail Regulation. The rest of the rail network is subject to economic regulation by the Office of Rail Regulation, which allows it to review prices charged at regular intervals and to increase or reduce them if appropriate. That is necessary for Network Rail’s network given the historical uncertainty about the company’s cost base. In the case of Network Rail, it will provide comfort to investors in the same way as in the water industry, for example, where privately owned utilities also have complex, historical asset bases. However, we do not see High Speed 1 in the same light. Furthermore, developments in EC legislation since the Railways Act 1993 and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Act 1996 mean that charges for HS1 are subject to independent regulatory control by the ORR through the appeal mechanism in the Railways Infrastructure (Access and Management) Regulations 2005. Given these factors, subjecting HS1 to additional regulatory scrutiny through periodic reviews of access charges would introduce an unnecessary burden as well as unnecessary uncertainty for the business. The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, spoke about the necessity for certainty—I completely agree with him. Additional scrutiny would damage value, rather than enhance it. LCR, the present owner of the business, shares this view, and we are confident that investors will be comfortable with it, too. The relationship of HS1’s future owner with the Secretary of State will be similar to that between the Secretary of State and many other owners of public infrastructure, most obviously those operating under long-term concessions or PFI or PPP contracts. That is a well understood relationship, and investors’ cost of capital for those projects has decreased significantly as the market has matured. In the context of the future restructuring of LCR, the Government have considered carefully whether there are good reasons to augment the EC model of regulation for HS1. The department took professional advice on the options available and discussed the plans with the Office of Rail Regulation. It concluded that there was no overriding reason to do so. The department has not received feedback from any of the parties to which it has spoken that would suggest concern in the industry about the regulatory arrangements for HS1. The Government have no desire to undertake the functions of an independent regulator in relation to HS1. In the context of the restructuring, we will consider which powers can be transferred to the Office of Rail Regulation, given its expertise and available resources. For example, the duty to ensure that the charges set by HS1 comply with the 2005 regulations could usefully be managed by the ORR in the future, once a long-term charging regime has been put in place. Until the sale process begins, the Government—as well as potential purchasers—can only speculate on whether the market as a whole will see more value in either a railway subject to periodic charging reviews by the ORR or one for which there is a charging framework established in a long-term contract with the Government. The key choice is the type of regulation, not a choice between having the Secretary of State or the ORR acting as the regulator. The case is not clear cut, and the course that we have chosen to follow is the one that we think will deliver the greatest possible return. In our opinion, any arguments against it are not sufficiently compelling to merit changing the existing regulatory arrangements.