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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill

The kind of stem cell research that the hon. Gentleman supports might not attract the same level of criticism, but, on the strength of the information that I have garnered thus far, I am sceptical as to whether it is likely to deliver the scale and quality of outcomes that could be achieved by the kind of embryo research planned for in the Bill. I respect the hon. Gentleman's position, but I stand by the view that we need all sorts of different sources of potential improvement. We should not act as the exclusive arbiters in favour of one source, rather than of either of the other two main sources that are on the table at the moment. Let me confront some of the key issues, as other hon. Members have honourably and powerfully done. The first is the issue of admixed embryos. I respect the fact that some Members feel an almost overwhelming revulsion at the idea. I do not share that feeling. I have said that I am motivated by the pursuit of results, and I believe that the pragmatic arguments are strong. There is a shortage of human eggs, and the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) and others have referred to another relevant factor in this context—the fact that the whole process of egg harvesting is difficult, burdensome and hazardous. Moreover, for a proportion—admittedly only a small proportion—of women, it is potentially fatal. My view is that if we can efficiently deploy an alternative by using animal eggs as part of the mix instead, there will be much to commend that. I look forward to the possibility—I put it no more strongly than that—that that process might yield beneficial results. I would simply say to my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), for whom I have the highest regard and personal affection, that I hope he would accept that all the morality is not to be found on one side. Of course he is motivated by moral considerations, and so am I. I cannot stand idly by and look at the situation of someone who is withered and debilitated by the most appalling disease—be it Parkinson's, Alzheimer's or motor neurone disease—knowing that there might be a possibility of a cure or alleviation by one or more of the methods provided for in the Bill. I cannot simply turn away, saying that some abstract theory, dogmatic reasoning or religious insistence prevents me from giving the go-ahead to that work. That is where I am coming from on this subject. There are similar moral considerations with regard to saviour siblings. Let me confront the point that is most regularly and passionately made against the concept. The notion is that what is entailed is the bringing into being of an additional human being for a purely utilitarian purpose. It is said that this would devalue the individual, that that person might suffer subsequently and that the process would be intrinsically wrong. My view is that, in the first instance, that should be a judgment for the prospective parent or parents. If the prospective parent says to himself or herself—or if the partnership decides—that this is something that they want to do because a sibling can be helped, a disease can be cured or a life can be saved and, as a consequence, extended, I have respect for that. The pursuit of tissue-typing offers the best and most obvious example of the deployment of the potential of scientific research for the ultimate purpose—the saving or improvement of human life. These processes exist not in isolation but to provide a particular benefit.