---

Torture (Damages) Bill [HL]

My Lords, I am in the advantageous position of having heard the speeches that preceded mine. Much that I might have said has already been said, and I closely endorse what my noble colleagues have said. In particular, I express my appreciation for the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, which has enabled us to debate his excellent initiative in the Bill. When one looks at its purpose as a lawyer, one can say that its task is a narrow one: to change one provision of legislation passed in 1978. However, I submit as forcefully as I can that the outcome of the Bill will send a signal to other parts of the world about how this country views the offence of torture. It is perhaps unfortunate that the State Immunity Act was passed in 1978 but that the convention on torture, to which reference has been made, dates from 1984. I wonder whether, if the order had been reversed and the number of states that would ratify the convention on torture had been known, the absence of torture as an exception to the State Immunity Act would have been rectified. In the world today, there is much greater appreciation that we live within a world society where people are travelling from one country to other, where mishaps can occur to them in one state and where they will find themselves ending up in another state. Victims of torture in this country suffered their torture elsewhere. Can it be right in this day and age that our domestic legislation, which is this country’s personal responsibility, does not cater for a situation where people find themselves in this country, perhaps contrary to their private desires, because of what has happened to them in another country, and are deprived of any redress from our courts, notwithstanding the fact that they cannot get redress elsewhere? In the case of Jones, which is the case that gives rise to the Bill, their Lordships were faced with a conflict between two principles of international law—state immunity and abhorrence of torture—but with domestic legislation before them that did not, when it could have, make an exception for torture. The Bill would ensure that if a case such as Jones came before our courts in future there would not be, as there appears to be now, an immovable block to the progress of the law of this country. The courts would no longer be faced with a domestic law that creates state immunity. Instead, if a state wished to rely on state immunity, it would have to rely on the state immunity principles of international law at the time that the point arises. In that situation, I suggest and hope that there would be developments in international law that would make it clear that state immunity should no longer be a bar to proceedings in a country where it is appropriate for those proceedings to be brought. If the Bill proceeds, as I earnestly hope it will, this House will send a signal to other jurisdictions where the views of this country on matters such as those to which I have referred still carry great weight. The right answer is that if a person has been tortured and has no other remedy and that person resides in a civilised country—which will therefore be the convenient jurisdiction—should be able to get civil redress, particularly where redress is available with regard to the criminal law.