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HMS Tireless

I should like to inform the House of the outcome of the board of inquiry on the incident on board HMS Tireless in March last year, in which two members of the Royal Navy—Leading Operator Maintainer Paul McCann and Operator Maintainer Anthony Huntrod—tragically lost their lives. Another member was seriously injured. Uppermost in our minds and, I am sure, the thoughts of the whole House are the families and friends of those killed and injured, to whom I would like to reiterate our deepest sympathy at this very difficult time. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence felt that the House should be informed of the outcome at the earliest opportunity because of the tragic nature of the incident, and because it is clear that the Ministry of Defence must bear responsibility for it. Indeed, the Secretary of State would have preferred to have made the statement personally. However, the need to complete the work required to release the board of inquiry, the commitments of the families and his need to attend a NATO meeting of Defence Ministers, at which important issues relating to operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo will be discussed, made that impossible. In those circumstances, I hope the House will understand his asking me to make this statement. I would like to pay tribute to the very high levels of professionalism shown by all those involved in the incident on HMS Tireless, which, as revealed by the board of inquiry, should serve to reinforce our confidence in the willingness and ability of our armed forces to uphold the highest standards of behaviour and display extraordinary bravery in life-threatening situations. This is something of which we should all—especially the families—be justifiably proud. The House will know that the purpose of a board of inquiry is to establish the circumstances of an incident and to learn lessons from it to prevent a similar incident from occurring. A board of inquiry does not seek to apportion blame. We have done everything that we can to establish the causes of the incident, so that we may learn the lessons from it. Running parallel to the board of inquiry, which was extremely thorough, there has been a full investigation carried out by a police taskforce, led by the Royal Navy police special investigations branch. That comprised military investigators and civilian detectives, and was assisted by the UK Forensic Explosives Laboratory and NASA in the USA. Those highly experienced investigators independently investigated the incident, and their findings are consistent with those of the board of inquiry. The board of inquiry set out the background to an explosion in the forward escape compartment of HMS Tireless on 21 March 2007, while she was undertaking an exercise under the ice near north Alaska. The explosion caused the death of two of the ship's company and filled the forward end of the submarine with smoke. Small fires followed the explosion which, had they taken hold and a major conflagration ensued, would have had even more serious consequences. Instead, however, the extensive training and preparation undertaken by all submariners proved their worth, and owing to the professional conduct of the ship's company, and in particular the stamina and presence of mind of one member, who was already seriously injured, the incident was rapidly contained. The integrity of the submarine and the power plant remained secure at all times. The board concluded that the explosion was caused by a self-contained oxygen generator—a SCOG—which had been wholly appropriately activated by one of those who lost their lives. It has not been possible to determine beyond doubt what caused the oxygen generator to explode. However, the board did identify the most likely cause as significant internal contamination of the generator's canister with oil, probably enabled by cracking within the canister solids. Organic contaminants are a known hazard for these oxygen generators, which are manufactured with protective seals, but cracking had not been previously identified as a contributing risk factor. In the event, the board was not able to establish how any contamination occurred, but oil would certainly have been present in the submarine environment, and this, it says, is the most likely cause of the contamination. The board of inquiry has exposed an inadequate appreciation of the risks of contamination and a number of shortcomings in the logistic handling of these generators. The shortcomings identified include SCOGs being left, unprotected, on the dockside and SCOGs being stowed on board submarines in a manner that left them at risk of contamination. The board of inquiry also found that there were a number of SCOGs that had previously been earmarked to be taken out of service which were returned for use on submarines. This was achieved by changing the paperwork. The board established that it could not be known for certain whether any of these SCOGs subsequently ended up on HMS Tireless. These events are unacceptable and it is clear from the board of inquiry, and other work to date, that the Ministry of Defence must accept responsibility for what happened. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I therefore consider that it is right for me to apologise unreservedly, on behalf of the Department, for the actions or omissions that contributed to this tragic incident. I am extremely sorry, particularly to the families of those who lost their lives, and to those who were injured. We have already investigated whether any of the shortcomings were such that criminal negligence was involved. The Crown Prosecution Service has advised that the evidence does not support a prosecution, although it directed that the Health and Safety Executive must be made aware of the findings. This has been done and the Health and Safety Executive will now examine the reports and recommendations and see whether an investigation is required under its own powers. In addition, the Defence Equipment and Support organisation is carrying out a detailed investigation into the acquisition, manufacture, storage, submarine stowage and logistic management of SCOGs, to ensure that any further lessons are identified. Given that ongoing investigation, the House will understand that at this stage it would not be right for me to comment in detail on issues that remain the subject of an investigation. We have taken urgent action to seek to ensure that there is no recurrence of this tragedy. All the board of inquiry's recommendations have been accepted and have been, or are being, implemented. In addition, we put action in hand immediately after the accident to minimise the risk associated with oxygen generators. Their use has been tightly restricted to an emergency-only basis since the incident. These emergency oxygen generators are stowed separately and handled less frequently on board a submarine than those that were assigned for routine use. All emergency oxygen generators have been inspected for any signs of damage or possible contamination since the incident. This is to ensure that risks are minimised, should oxygen need to be generated in the unlikely event of an emergency situation. Developments have already been made to upgrade the design of the canisters further to reduce risks, and we have already started to replace the emergency stocks with an upgraded design. We are also working towards developing an alternative solution to meet future operational requirements. It will never be possible to eliminate every risk to those who serve our country in our armed forces so selflessly, but I can assure the House that my right hon. Friend and I do and will continue to do everything we can to minimise those risks wherever possible. I will make copies of the board of inquiry report available in the Library of the House. Action continues to implement its recommendations. I will update the House as further developments emerge.