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HMS Tireless

I begin by thanking the Minister for advance sight of his statement and of the board of inquiry report. That is a long, detailed and thorough document which does not pull its punches. It is not surprising that it took longer than the originally anticipated four months to complete, but can the Minister explain why it has taken fully 15 months to complete, for the information not only of the House but above all for the families of those who lost their lives? Paragraph 15 of the report states:"““Despite careful handling within service channels, the story broke in the media before all the next of kin had been informed and before . . . staff had been able to contact the next of kin of the remainder of Tireless's crew.””" Can the Minister throw light on how that happened, and explain to the House what safeguards have been agreed with the media on not reporting military fatalities before the families have been told, and whether such safeguards were flouted on this occasion? The report concludes:"““If it had not been for the outstanding efforts of””" the third crew member, the one who was injured,"““the consequences of this incident may have been much worse””." In the light of that, does the Minister wish to revise the statement by a Ministry of Defence source, reported on 22 March 2007—two days after the incident—that"““the vessel was never in any danger””?" Also reported early last year, soon after the incident occurred, was the tribute paid by Commander Breckenridge, the commanding officer of the submarine, to the crew member who was"““injured by the initial blast and thrown to the deck . . . recovered himself despite his injuries, placed an emergency breathing mask on his face and, in complete darkness and zero visibility due to the smoke, extinguished the numerous small fires in the compartment and allowed access to the fire-fighting and medical teams.””" The report reveals that owing to the buckling of the bulkhead doors, it took 44 minutes before anyone was able to get into the compartment, and the conditions in which that seaman was operating can barely be imagined. The injured submariner who is reported to have acted so heroically has not been named in the report. I wonder why that is. Is he one of the seven submariners who have been honoured with their commander-in-chief's commendation so far? Is he to be separately honoured? If he cannot be named for security reasons, does the Minister agree that that should not prevent his bravery being appropriately rewarded? Turning to the self-contained oxygen generators, I understand that these have been fitted in Trafalgar class submarines since 2001. Will the Minister tell us whether they have also been fitted to the Vanguard class submarines that carry the nuclear deterrent; if so, what is the status of such SCOGs on these particularly important vessels in the Royal Navy? We understand that, on this occasion, the accident occurred some distance away from the nuclear reactor in the submarine, but are SCOGs fitted to other parts of the submarine that are closer to the nuclear reactor? How near was the explosion to the cruise missiles—conventionally armed cruise missiles, which are the standard main armament of Trafalgar class submarines such as HMS Tireless, and how near to other explosive hardware carried by the submarine? Are there any other combustible products deployed on Her Majesty's submarines similar to SCOGs to which similarly lax procedures as described by the Minister have applied? The report identifies"““shortcomings in the acquisition, manufacture, transport, storage, stowage and logistics management of SCOGs””." In detail, the recommendations state that"““The existing population… should be withdrawn from service””—" the Minister has given us an update on that—but they also draw attention to the fact that"““MoD-approved quality control checks and acceptance processes””" should be"““introduced to ensure that the manufacturer supplies sodium chlorate candles that are free from contamination and physical damage.””" Will the Minister explain why those checks were not carried out previously? The report also emphasises:"““Logistics management for the SCOG replacement must ensure that guidance is clear about when the equipment is to be designated unserviceable””." It seems inexplicable and unacceptable that no passed sell-by date was clearly applied to these combustible products—probably with fatal consequences for the two sailors. The report states:"““Sufficient approved stowages should be identified””," which suggests that there were not enough stowages for those dangerous products in the submarines, so I would be grateful if the Minister updated us on that point. If, as I have already alluded to, the bulkhead doors jammed shut, that is really a design fault that I would not have thought could happen in a modern nuclear-powered submarine. Significant sections of the report have been redacted, perhaps out of consideration for the families. Is the Minister satisfied that the arrangements made for the return of the deceased to the United Kingdom were handled correctly? Finally, I would like to say that the tributes to the two young men have shown what outstanding personalities they were. Paul McCann, from Halesowen, was a keen sportsman with an inspirational personality, who was about to leave the service to marry his American fiancée last August. Tony Huntrod from Sunderland was a live wire with great charm and a fine sense of humour. They both join the roll of more than 5,000 submariners commemorated in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Peter Viggers). We should all be very proud of them and very grateful to them and their families.