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Proceeding contribution from Lord Maude of Horsham (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 12 June 2008. It occurred during Ministerial statement on Cabinet Office Assessment (Documents).


Cabinet Office Assessment (Documents)

The Minister was absolutely right to come to the House at the earliest opportunity to make a statement, and I am grateful for sight of that statement. The Prime Minister said yesterday that we should take no risks with national security. There can be few greater risks than the casual abandonment of top secret intelligence material on a train, posing obvious risks both to national security and potentially to the safety of our armed forces personnel. There can scarcely have been a graver breach of intelligence and security procedures than this case. That al-Qaeda do not today know precisely what Britain knows about its activities and, more importantly, what Britain does not know, is entirely due to the responsible way in which the BBC has behaved, and reflects no credit whatsoever on the Government. This lamentable lapse of basic security awareness and procedures raises a number of specific questions for the Minister for the Cabinet Office, and I would be grateful if he would respond to them. How quickly did the BBC alert the Cabinet Office to the loss? We assume that it was almost immediately, but I would be grateful for confirmation of that. When was he personally aware of the problem? When did he inform the Prime Minister of the problem? What steps were taken immediately when the loss of the file was known on Tuesday? Were these two documents the original, numbered copies of the document—obviously, it would have been a breach of procedures for them to be allowed out of the Department in such circumstances—or were they illegal photocopies made in breach of the established existing procedures? What reason could there possibly be for this official to remove such files, apparently to read on the train? Why, now that such powerful encryption is available, are documents of such an extremely high level of security printed on paper at all? It may be too early for the Minister to say this, but he may be able to give some indication: will anybody be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act? Was he aware of there being a problem with information security in the relevant part of his Department, in the JIC, before the incident? There is clearly a major systemic problem with data security at the heart of the Government, and the saga goes on. In November last year, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs lost 15,000 records of Standard Life customers, followed by the loss of 25 million data records. In December, 18,000 personal records from the Department for Work and Pensions were found at a contractor's home. In December, the Secretary of State for Transport admitted that 3 million driver records were lost, apparently in Iowa. Also in December, NHS trusts lost 168,000 confidential records. The Ministry of Defence lost three laptops, stolen from the boot of a Navy officer's car, containing sensitive personal details of no fewer than 600,000 people. In January, hundreds of DWP records had apparently been dumped on a roundabout in Devon. It is not as if there had not been forewarning of the risks. Two years ago, the Walport report called for the Government to improve data security, warning that leaks of personal data would damage the Government's reputation. More than a year ago, in February 2007, General Sir Edmund Burton, the Cabinet Office's own adviser on information assurance, said:"““What keeps me awake at night is that, with some notable exceptions, across government there's too little awareness of the scale and breadth of the risk facing us at the moment””." Just last summer, at about the time when the Chancellor assumed his current responsibilities, Lord Coleman raised concerns in his report on data security, saying"““adequate mechanisms are not yet in place””." Obvious and dangerous issues arise from this kind of failure to comply with basic procedures, and the fact is that there may be—I should be grateful for the Minister's comments about this—a real problem with civil service morale, leading to laxity in the way in which procedures are not complied with. The Cabinet Office has responsibility for information security across the whole Government, and the Minister for the Cabinet Office is its ministerial head. I am sorry to have to say that there is no evidence that he takes this crucial part of his responsibilities nearly seriously enough. When we have asked questions in the past, he has allowed his junior Ministers to reply on this crucial issue. It is clear that he did not even read the Coleman report when it was published last summer. Does he understand that he must himself take very direct personal responsibility for this latest shocking failure at the heart of his own Department? Ministers cheerfully claim credit for anything good that happens, but all the failures are someone else's fault. Does the Minister understand that this buck really does stop with him?


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
477 c486-7 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Disciplinary proceedings Data protection Criminal investigation Intelligence services National security Official secrets Senior civil servants Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk