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Defence Procurement

It is right and proper for me to add the condolences of the Scottish National party and Plaid Cymru, the party of Wales, to those already expressed following the tragic loss of service personnel in Afghanistan. Procurement is not just about the acquisition of new assets; it is also about the responsibly managed transition from the systems that they are replacing. That applies most acutely to the Nimrod replacement programme, in which the current MR2 fleet based at RAF Kinloss in my constituency will be superseded by the MRA4. I am pleased that the Secretary of State visited RAF Kinloss today. He will have met and heard from the air and ground crew as well as the civilian contractors, who do an excellent job and are working hard within the resource constraints to ensure that the appropriate safety standards are met. He will also have heard the concerns of the civilian work force and their union about job security. I hope he was able to provide the reassurances that they sought. As matters stand, BAE Systems expects to conclude flight-test activities on its three Nimrod MRA4 development aircraft later this year. Nine MRA4s are under contract for the RAF, and there is also an option for the three refurbished design and development aircraft. It has been reported in the specialist aviation press that the first production MRA4 will achieve ““power on”” by September this year and will then enter an extended equipment fit, load and test programme before making its first flight next year. Under the current programme schedule, BAE Systems will deliver four production MRA4s to RAF Kinloss by the end of 2010, when the new type is expected to be declared to be in-service. Colleagues in the Defence Committee, a number of whom are still in the Chamber, recently called on the MOD to reconsider its options in relation to the Nimrod MRA4. Without dismissing the awful track record of the programme or the lessons that need to be learned from it, I should stress that most of the costs have already been incurred. To walk away now would mean losing massive sums of taxpayer investment. Although the delays and budgetary increases in the Nimrod MRA4 programme are of course cause for concern, another particular and deadly problem has resulted. Owing to the important capability of the existing Nimrod and the need for its vital services in a range of theatres, the 40-year-old Nimrod MR2 fleet has been pushed to the limits. In the recent case of Nimrod XV230, it proved fatal. Shortly after refuelling over Afghanistan on 2 September 2006, the aircraft exploded near Kandahar, killing all 14 personnel aboard. It was the biggest UK loss of life since the Falklands war, and more than half the victims were my constituents. On 5 November 2007, a further mid-air incident took place, this time when Nimrod XV235 was over Afghanistan. The crew noticed a fuel leak during-air-to-air refuelling operations. After issuing an in-flight mayday, the aircraft was landed successfully. The Minister of State admitted recently that there had been at least 111 fuel leaks since Nimrod XV230 exploded. On 4 December 2007, the report of the findings of the official board of the inquiry into the loss of XV230 was published. Four separate factors were listed as having contributed to the accident, and are a matter of public record. On 23 May 2008, only a few short weeks ago, the coroner who led the inquest into the deaths stated that the entire Nimrod fleet had"““never been airworthy from the first time it was released to service””," and urged that it be grounded. The assistant deputy coroner for Oxfordshire, Andrew Walker, added:"““I have given the matter considerable thought and I see no alternative but to report to the secretary of state that the Nimrod fleet should not fly until the Alarp””" —as low as reasonably practicable—"““standards are met.””" The Chairman of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot), said earlier that we needed answers. I agree. We have been given no detailed statement, or indeed any detail at all. What I would describe as a badly advised and badly timed press release was issued only minutes after the deputy coroner had announced his ruling. There cannot have been time for serious consideration of the points that he had made. Last December, the Secretary of State assured Members that Nimrod was safe, citing a report by QinetiQ. It has proved difficult to establish whether that was factually correct. It has taken freedom of information requests to establish that the report said that the aircraft would not be fully safe until its 30 recommendations had been implemented. All but one of those recommendations related to a failure to implement mandatory airworthiness regulations. The inquest heard that if the risk of something going wrong on a plane is only ““tolerable””, MOD rules stipulate that it must be further reduced to make it as low as reasonably practicable—ALARP—before the plane can be declared safe. The QinetiQ report cited by the Secretary of State as showing the aircraft was safe in fact found that it was only ““tolerably safe”” but, because of the 30 problems, it was not ALARP. It is still not ALARP. In a letter to me, the Secretary of State for Defence said that of the 30 recommendations, 21 have been accepted—using the present tense—by the MOD and are still being implemented. Six relate to air-to-air refuelling, which is no longer done with Nimrods. Three more are still—again, present tense—being considered. Group Captain Colin Hickman, who is in charge of the safety of the Nimrod fleet, admitted to the coroner that the remaining Nimrods were not ALARP and would not be so until the end of this year. Asked if this process could be speeded up, Hickman replied:"““No, it is driven by resources.””" Reassurances need to be given about transitional arrangements from the MR2 to the MRA4 and about safety standards for ageing systems facing replacement as part of a managed procurement process. We need answers on this. I would welcome the Minister giving some detail of all the 30 recommendations. How many have been fully implemented and when will the rest of them be implemented? It is only fair that we have the answers. Some say this is a technical point, but I think it is easily understood by the man in the street. The situation now with the Nimrod fleet is as if a driver had been notified of 30 improvements necessary for his car to pass an MOT and, nearly two years later, he is only partially through the mandatory work and is still considering whether to go through with some of the other repairs. It would not be allowed in a car. Why does the MOD think it is okay for a plane? Given that the ALARP standard is the MOD's own standard, I do not understand why it is not complied with. I hope the Minister will explain that this evening.