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Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill

I can reassure my hon. Friend on that. In all the cases that I am aware of, the identity of the witness is known to the judge, and the screening—and, for example, the mechanical disguising of the voice—is for the defendant and his representatives, but the jury can see the witness. Therefore, such special measures are put in place—and precisely those arrangements were put in place in the case of Davis, which was the subject of the Law Lords' judgment. [Interruption.] My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General points out that clause 2(4) sets out the conditions. It states: ““Nothing in this section””—or, indeed, in the Bill—"““authorises the court to require—""(a) the witness to be screened to such an extent that the witness cannot be seen by—""(i) the judge or other members of the court (if any);""(ii) the jury (if there is one); or""(iii) any interpreter or other person appointed by the court to assist the witness””," and the witness's natural voice has to be heard by those three. In addition to the five conditions in clause 5(2), following suggestions I have received, an amendment tabled in my name proposes that courts must act so as to have regard to whether the evidence might be the sole or decisive evidence before granting anonymity. That was a concern for the Opposition parties and others, and it was central to the judgment in Davis. This is not a bar on the granting of an anonymity order, but it will be stated as a consideration in the legislation. The Bill will come into force on Royal Assent, hopefully before the summer recess. The House, however, is well aware that there are a number of cases in the pipeline, and that there may well be defendants who have already been convicted who would seek to make out-of-time appeals, either directly or via the Criminal Cases Review Commission, in the light of their lordships' judgment. Clauses 10 and 11 will therefore ensure that the new law can also apply to any proceedings in cases of this kind. Clause 10 applies to proceedings and trials that are already under way. In essence, the judge has to look at existing common-law orders, which are already made, and decide whether they could have been made under the new law. If the witness has already given, or has started giving, his or her evidence and the judge concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial, subsection (7) tells the judge that he must make suitable directions for bringing the trial or hearing to a conclusion, and that includes the possibility of a retrial. Clause 11 applies to proceedings that have been completed. The appellate court then has to consider whether the new statutory anonymity order could have been made under the new law. It must treat the conviction as unsafe if it concludes that the defendant had not received a fair trial. The remaining clauses relate to interpretation, commencement and extent.