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Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill

I must say that I found the remarks by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) at the end of his contribution rather confusing, and I think he probably did, too, when he was reading them out. I rise to speak primarily to my amendment No. 32, but before doing so I would like to address a couple of points that have been made. The hon. and learned Gentleman has got himself into a bit of a mess by trying to see the three conditions of A, B and C as disjunctive rather than conjunctive. If we put them together—I am thinking in particular of condition A, which cross-refers to clause 4(6)—things become a lot clearer. The provisions in subsection (6) are pretty objective in looking at the level of ““reasonable fear””, and the word ““necessary”” makes it clear that the court will apply a high standard in relation to condition A both of itself and in terms of the cross-reference to subsection (6). I disagree with the hon. and learned Gentleman about adding the word ““serious”” in front of ““injury””, because how do we define ““serious””? Are we talking about a grievous bodily harm level, because I suspect most people would be put off from giving evidence as a result of a rather lesser degree of violence? Common assault might, perhaps, create sufficient fear. We have to be realistic about the level of fear involved, and I certainly think it would be rather less than that of the grievous bodily harm level of injury. By putting all the elements of clause 4 together, the way it is phrased leaves it ultimately to the judge to use his good sense to make the decision on the evidence put before him. My main concern is the question of property. I take issue with the hon. and learned Gentleman on trying to extend the risk to property to include financial loss, because that could be compensated by giving money back. I do not think people can realistically be seen to be fearful of financial loss in these circumstances. I do see the force of the argument in relation to property, however, but I raise the issue primarily because of what was said about the New Zealand provisions, which the Bill mirrors in relation to the phrasing of the issue as it relates to property. I believe the New Zealand system to be preferable to ours and, unlike here, in New Zealand the advice on compatibility given by the Attorney-General is published. He raised the question of whether the risk of harm to property would be acceptable in international jurisprudence. He particularly drew attention to the fact that physical harm to the person was clearly included, but he went on to say:"““Having regard to the approach of the European Court to these matters generally, if faced with an anonymity order made on the basis of risk of damage to property only, it is highly likely that the court would find that the accused's convention rights were breached.””" He said in conclusion that whereas it would be an exceptional case for the risk of property damage without any accompanying risk to persons to be the basis of a witness anonymity order,"““in most cases there will need to be some kind of risk to persons for the damage to property to be serious.””" If that analysis is right, it calls into question the way in which the Bill is currently phrased. We put this to the Director of Public Prosecutions earlier today, and he disagreed with that analysis. He gave an example, saying, ““Well, what happens if I'm told by an associate of the suspect that my house will be fire-bombed?”” That may or may not raise the risk of injury to person as well, but it certainly would be a very real threat in relation to property, and I think we ought to be able to take that into account.