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Chinese People's Liberation Army

I congratulate the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Wallace) on securing this debate on the United Kingdom's bilateral military engagement programme with the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Judging from his 11 questions of the past six weeks, it is clearly a subject of great concern to him and his constituents, and I welcome the opportunity to put on the record the rationale for our ongoing bilateral military activities. Following the Tiananmen square massacre in 1989, the European Union rightly registered its disapproval by issuing the Madrid declaration, which included measures such as the halting of military co-operation, an embargo on defence sales, the suspension of bilateral ministerial and high-level contacts, the postponement of new co-operation projects and reduction in cultural, scientific and technical co-operation. However, the China of 2008 is not the China of 1989. We have to take into account the significant social and economic progress that has been made over that period. Infant mortality rates are down; life expectancy is up. There are more than 5 million university graduates a year in China. People are free to choose their own employment. People can now marry whom they wish and travel abroad, and limited elections have been introduced at village and community level. Only the week before last, the temporary regulations that permitted greater media freedom during the Beijing Olympics were made permanent, although only for foreign media. We still have great concerns about China's human rights record, however, and we regularly raise those concerns—including some of the issues that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, such as Tibet—with the Chinese authorities. We want significant progress in areas, such as political freedom and judicial independence, and we are keen that China should ratify the international covenant on civil and political rights. I believe that we will have more success in influencing China's emergence as a responsible global player through a policy of proactive engagement than by seeking to coerce it through isolation. Although there has been no formal lifting of the Madrid declaration of 1989, many of the measures have outlived their usefulness, both for the United Kingdom and for other member states. However, the most significant measure, the arms embargo—the hon. Gentleman at one point tried to give the impression that we were selling, or were prepared to sell, arms to China, whereas we are not—remains in force and the United Kingdom is one of its strictest adherents. Against that backdrop, the bilateral programme that the Ministry of Defence operates with the Chinese People's Liberation Army is coherent with Government strategy and the military programmes of other EU member states and the United States. It recognises that China is a growing regional military power, with a key role to play in the continued political stability of the region through activities such as the six-party talks with North Korea. The programme also recognises that China already makes a significant contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations and has the potential to offer much more. To put that in context, the most recent United Nations statistics show that China has more than 2,000 military personnel deployed in 10 locations, placing it 12th in global troop contributions and making it the greatest contributor among the five permanent members of the Security Council. We conduct a programme that comprises a two-way flow of high-level visits, lower-level training events and exchanges. Such activities generate greater knowledge of each other's capabilities, intentions, culture and ethos, which we hope will lead to increased mutual trust and a reduced risk of misunderstanding and strategic miscalculation. We also try to encourage China to sustain and increase her contribution to peacekeeping operations. However, we recognise that there is a balance to be struck to encourage the development of a military force that is willing to make a positive contribution to global stability, rather than one that might abuse its military strength. Put simply, our engagement programme is designed so that it will not provide skills with any applicability to internal repression or that will upset the strategic balance in the region. That is achieved through our continued adherence to the EU arms embargo, by limiting the scope of the programme and by reviewing the use that the People's Liberation Army makes of the training that we provide. Our senior leadership engagements develop trust, but they also offer the opportunity to explore possible areas of mutual benefit face to face. The limited command and staff training offered in the United Kingdom exposes senior People's Liberation Army officers to a military who are accountable for their actions and embrace the international law of armed conflict. Junior leadership training, such as the attendance of cadets at Sandhurst that upset the hon. Gentleman so much, achieves similar ends. We use the principles set out in the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria to guide us in what support we offer to the Chinese. On that basis, it is appropriate to allow Chinese military personnel on to courses that have direct relevance to peacekeeping operations. Other examples include the border security programme, which facilitates co-operation in global counter-terrorism, and the peace support operations programme, which introduces students to British Army peace support operations doctrine and training. There are also areas of military co-operation that have a clear benefit for the wider global community. An example is the sharing of hydrographic survey data, which offers increased safety to international maritime traffic in the region. The Chinese offer us reciprocal opportunities to send military personnel to China, although it is difficult to take advantage of lower-level training courses, because the majority are conducted in Mandarin and we have few military personnel with the necessary language skills. However, we send officers to the national defence university's annual international defence symposium, which is conducted in English and includes students from around the world. I am sure the hon. Gentleman, as a former serving officer, will recognise the value of such shared international military opportunities. The hon. Gentleman's recent questions, which he has brought up again in his speech, highlight his concern that our military activities might be out of step with those of our European neighbours and that—this is a particular concern—we are upsetting the United States of America. That is not the case: our activities and involvement with the Chinese military are very similar in scale and scope to those offered by France, Germany and the United States—all countries with which China has a close involvement. Our defence attaché in Beijing liaises with the attachés of our allies to ensure that our practice remains coherent with theirs, and the programme is reviewed at a regular pan-Whitehall China strategy meeting. We will continue our military engagement unless there is evidence of any misuse of the skills or knowledge that we provide. The hon. Gentleman alleged—saying that it was dangerous and silly—that we have not consulted our European partners and the United States, or even the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. None of that is true; our engagement with the Chinese Liberation Army is known to and shared with them, as is theirs with us. The suggestion that we risk a major upset with the United States authorities, or with France or Germany, all of which are doing the same thing, is palpable nonsense.