---

Human Rights Judgments: Joint Committee on Human Rights Report

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part this afternoon, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for moving the debate. He has a deserved reputation in this field, not just from his advocacy in many of the leading cases themselves, but from his own work on the implementation of judgments at the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. He has a life-long history of being involved in human rights cases and legislation and in trying to bring human rights legislation to the fore. My opening comment will undoubtedly be preaching to the converted, but I want to emphasise none the less how strongly the Government feel that human rights standards are respected. I am proud to be a member of the Government who introduced the Human Rights Act, which received Royal Assent just over 10 years ago, almost to the day. We did not just talk about it; we brought the Act into force. With that Act, we ““brought rights home””—the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights to which the United Kingdom is party along with all the other members of the Council of Europe. This is not a party political debate, but it is important and fair that I ask the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, who spoke for the Official Opposition today, to ponder this question, although I do not expecting to get to his feet to answer it. If and when they come to power, is it the policy of the Conservative Party—the Official Opposition—to abolish the Human Rights Act? That question will have to be answered in due course and is as basic as any question that we are dealing with in this debate. I now turn to the debate and to the report. By way of context, we have in this debate focused on a limited number of cases—those that have raised particularly difficult issues of principle or otherwise. Thanks to the Human Rights Act, convention rights are routinely considered by courts and tribunals throughout the United Kingdom every day. Their judgments have two important features to which I want to draw attention. First, they are made by judges familiar with our legal system, and the way that our public services are delivered. Secondly, they apply directly to the parties before the court without people having to wait to go to Strasbourg. Nevertheless, some of the most difficult questions are still considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. When it decides against the United Kingdom, we have an obligation to implement its judgment—an obligation that we take seriously. As a Government, we are of course answerable primarily to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for our implementation of Strasbourg judgments. Therefore, while we are of course grateful to the Joint Committee for this report and its excellent work and recommendations, which we are considering, I know that it will acknowledge that the final say on these matters lies elsewhere. The mechanism of declarations of incompatibility in the Human Rights Act was another part of ““bringing rights home””. That mechanism strikes an important balance: it allows higher courts to identify primary legislation that they consider incompatible, but does not allow them to strike it down. We argue that that compromise respects the supremacy of Parliament, and has worked very well over the eight years that the Act has been in force. It is of course true that there is no legal obligation on the Government or Parliament to take remedial action in response to a declaration of incompatibility. However, the Government have always committed to present remedial measures to Parliament following a declaration of incompatibility. We were particularly pleased that in April this year, the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court opened the door to a possible future finding that declarations of incompatibility might constitute an effective remedy; that is, a remedy that has to be sought before a case is taken to Strasbourg. We know that we have a way to go to demonstrate the consistent practice that the court demands, but this is already a significant step forward in the court’s jurisprudence. I turn now to the specific cases and issues raised by noble Lords in their powerful contributions. On artificial insemination, we have to say bluntly that the Joint Committee’s views on the case of Dickson are very disappointing. We have remedied the violation in Dickson by amending the policy, under which the Secretary of State will continue to make decisions based on the individual merits of each case. The judgment does not require primary legislation to be changed. We simply disagree with the Joint Committee on that point. The judgment was about the way in which requests for artificial insemination are considered and we believe the steps that we have taken have fully addressed these points. What steps have we taken to implement this judgment? The fact that the policy has been amended, and that the Secretary of State is taking a flexible approach in applying it, means that legislation is not required. We have removed the presumption against granting requests, taking account of the partner circumstances. We no longer say that permission will be granted only in exceptional circumstances. There is a non-exhaustive list of policy considerations, including the impact on the prisoner’s partner. Applicants are asked to provide information on these or anything else that supports their case. No one factor takes precedence over the others and each case is decided on its merits, against those equally weighted considerations. On the basis of what I have said, we hope that the Committee of Ministers will soon agree to close the case. The case about which most noble Lords have spoken is prisoners’ voting rights. I hope that it will be generally accepted that this is a sensitive and complex issue, as has been demonstrated when the issue has been considered before in your Lordships’ House. The Hirst judgment requires the Government to reconsider their policy of a blanket ban on the voting rights of convicted prisoners. There have been those elsewhere who have used this judgment as an opportunity to criticise the Human Rights Act. I do not need to tell your Lordships that this was a judgment of European Court of Human Rights under the convention itself, and we would be obliged to implement this judgment whether there was a human rights Act in force in the United Kingdom or not. Repealing the Human Rights Act would make no difference to this judgment or to any other judgment of the Strasbourg court. As your Lordships know, we have conducted the first stage of consultation on implementing this judgment. We remain committed to carrying out a second consultation, examining in more detail how voting rights might be granted to serving prisoners and how far those rights should extend. We need to take account of the wide spectrum of opinion in the country, as well as the practical implications for the courts, the prison authorities and the conduct of elections. The solution that we reach must respect the court’s judgment and the traditions and context of the United Kingdom. We will continue to keep the Committee of Ministers updated on our progress on this case, as we have done so far. We remain committed to carrying out a second, more detailed public consultation on how voting rights might be granted to serving prisoners and how far those rights should go. As far as the results of the first stage are concerned, we concluded the first stage in March last year, and we intend to publish the results at the same time as we launch the second stage of consultation. Most noble Lords want to know when the judgment is likely to be implemented in the United Kingdom. I cannot give a date. I repeat our view that this is a very sensitive and complex issue, and we will be looking carefully at what the right approach will be and how it will be implemented.