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Political Parties and Elections Bill

Just to correct the hon. Gentleman, let me say that that was not my analogy. I was quoting him, and I am not sure that I share his view. The point is that it will be for the commission to determine the circumstances, and we have to allow it flexibility as a regulator. To return to the point made by the hon. Member for Cambridge, when we depart from the regulatory framework that the House agreed to in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, we must have a compelling reason for doing so, and I do not see any such reason here. I am sorry to pray in aid the hon. Member for Cambridge again, but as he said, we must be careful about suggesting to the people whom we all serve that we are somehow immune from the kind of sanctions and regulatory frameworks that apply to other people in public life. I hope that I have now said enough to convince the hon. Member for Huntingdon to ask leave to withdraw his amendment. Amendments 64, 65, 66 and 67 are all consequential on amendment 63, and they would remove variable monetary penalties from the range of discretionary requirements proposed for the commission by the Bill. Again, I am going to ask the House to resist those amendments if they are pressed to a vote, because to accept them would be to remove an important part of the Commission's range of civil sanctions and take away some of the flexibility that we believe to be desirable. The sanction of variable monetary penalties is closely modelled on those contained in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. The provisions are intended to allow the regulator to ensure that the financial penalty is appropriate to the offence. I come back to the fundamental point that, unless there is a compelling reason to do so, we should not depart from the principle that politicians should not be treated differently from those in the other regulated fields. As well as that matter of principle, there is also a positive reason for including variable monetary penalties in the suite of powers that the Bill gives to the commission. They will provide greater flexibility, and enable the commission to adapt the penalty specifically to the facts of each case. The draft enforcement guidance issued by the commission indicates that it intends to use variable monetary penalties for the graver breaches of the Act, and to use fixed monetary penalties in cases of more minor, technical, breaches, where a penalty is still appropriate but where the breach is less grave or more routine. Having said that, variable monetary penalties, while flexible, must still be imposed proportionately and, in summary cases, they may not exceed the level of a fine available to a criminal court dealing with the same sort of breach. Currently, that is £5,000 where a case would otherwise be tried in a magistrates court. In other words, the word ““variable”” does not mean ““unlimited””. Factors that could be taken into account—I am not saying that they would be, but they could be—include the history of compliance of the individual or organisation concerned and also the gravity of the failure. The commission's draft enforcement policy—to which I am sure that the commission would welcome contributions from all hon. Members—draws this distinction, stating that fixed monetary penalties are likely to be used for"““low level non-compliance such as the late delivery of statutory information””," and that variable monetary penalties will be used for"““more serious breaches than fixed penalties where a fine can be set at a level to reflect the gravity of the offence and remove any financial benefit resulting from non-compliance””." In this sense, variable monetary penalties are an important part of a graduated suite of powers and of the proportionate approach to regulation that all hon. Members want to see. As the commission states in its latest briefing on the Bill, removing these sanctions"““would significantly reduce our ability to apply the appropriate sanction in a proportionate way””." If there are still concerns about safeguards, I would draw the House's attention to the fact that discretionary requirements may only be imposed by the commission when it is satisfied ““beyond reasonable doubt”” that an offence or breach has occurred. That is a high threshold. It is the criminal standard of proof, and it ensures that the commission must act responsibly in the use of these powers. The Bill proposes to ensure that regulations are properly enforced by an effective regulator, not to lower the required standard of evidence. The Bill also proposes an appeal mechanism against the imposition of a variable monetary penalty. Moreover, it also proposes to allow a person to make representations before the imposition of a variable monetary penalty. There is, therefore, a suite of safeguards. Amendments 64, 65, 66 and 67 are consequential, and I hope that the arguments I have already outlined against amendment 63 will also stand against those consequential amendments. I hope that I have said enough, therefore, to persuade the hon. Member for Huntingdon to withdraw his amendments. I am sorry that, even before the hon. Gentleman had heard my reasons why amendments 74 and 82 were a bad idea, he said that he would press them to a vote. However, I hope that I can still persuade him to change his mind, although he said that they were very important to him. They provide that appeals against the imposition of fixed monetary penalties and non-compliance penalties should be heard by the High Court, rather than a county court as the Bill currently provides. The Government believe that county courts are a more appropriate forum for appeal. The precedent for appeals in electoral law is to a county court, which will therefore have the appropriate expertise. Raising appeal to the High Court would inevitably place an unnecessary strain on the resources of the High Court, when the county court already provides an appropriate opportunity for appeal. It would also risk slowing down the appeals process, which could have a seriously negative impact on the person or organisation whose appeal was under consideration. I do not subscribe to the logic that the hon. Member for Huntingdon put forward, at least in Committee, that the Electoral Commission might act with more restraint, should an appeal against the imposition of a civil penalty be to the High Court, rather than the county court. Under all circumstances, the Electoral Commission is under a duty to act reasonably and it is required, as I have just said, to meet the criminal standard of proof for the imposition of most of its new civil sanctions. Cases must be—and they will be, I am sure—judged on the facts of the case, not on the processes.