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Arms Export Controls

The case of Guinea provides a powerful argument for an international arms trade treaty rather than its being a re-export issue. The press report alleges that one country exported to Guinea when it was under a regional arms embargo. A regional embargo on arms exports to Guinea was imposed in the last week or so, so that matter seems to provide the case for an international arms trade treaty and is not strictly a re-export issue. Let me give an example of a re-export issue that came up the last time we debated this. Some years ago, the UK exported aircraft to India, and there were rumours in the press that India was then going to re-export them to Burma. As it happened, that did not occur. If the UK feels that it is wrong to grant an export licence for arms to Burma, which it clearly does, and it is the subject of an embargo—we do not export arms to Burma—presumably UK policy should be to try to prevent any re-export of arms to Burma from a third country. Therefore, the whole case for a re-export clause is precisely to be consistent about that. The Government have previously rejected our recommendation on that matter for two reasons. The first relates to the difficulty of enforcement. There are always difficulties in enforcing laws. We spend a fair amount of time in this place passing legislation that, if we are frank about it, we know is not always enforced 100 per cent. Indeed, 50 per cent. or perhaps even 10 per cent. would be a success. Enforcing legislation, therefore, is always difficult. If there were a re-export clause in a licence agreement that said an applicant could not export to an embargoed destination, that would make it perfectly clear to the applicant and the recipient what the Government felt was appropriate. At the end of the day, we may not be talking about going to court over the matter. If an applicant exports to country A with a re-export clause that says that country A shall not export to an embargoed destination, and country A goes ahead and does that, I assume that the British Government would say, "Don't anyone come rushing to us in the near future, saying can we please have a licence to country A, because you won't get it." So, the clause does not have to be enforced by going to court. It can be enforced by the simple message that, "If you breach this re-export commitment to which you have signed, then, sorry, no more arms export licences." The second reason that the Government give for their unhappiness with the re-export clause relates to the risk assessment. It is the case that there is a risk assessment under which licences are considered. The argument is that the risk assessment is sufficient. So, when an applicant is exporting to a country, they always ask the question, "What is the risk that that country will re-export to an embargoed destination?" The answer will help to form their decision. The Government will argue, "If we had any fear that that might take place, we probably would not grant the licence." The truth of the matter is that risk assessments are sometimes inaccurate. We exported aircraft to India and it was rumoured—based on a fair amount of evidence—that there was serious consideration of India re-exporting to Burma. Our Committee genuinely does not see any disadvantage in having a re-export clause. In fact, it believes that there are major advantages in such a clause being introduced. Several EU countries, namely France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, use re-export controls to some degree. Will the Minister say when the Government will report back to the Committees on their assessment of whether the introduction of non-re-export clauses would enhance the effectiveness of the licensing process? I know that I mentioned a number of countries, but let me just pick on France. Will the Minister say how effective France's non-re-export clause provision is? We have a common code in arms exports in the European Union, but that does not mean to say that we all do the same thing; we do not. The code is interpreted differently by member states. None the less, there is a real issue that other countries in the EU have approached the matter differently, and I would be interested to hear from the Government why we have it right and they have it wrong. Let me return to the issue of the international arms trade treaty. Light weapons worth some £27 million appeared in Guinea. The press said that they had possibly come from Ukraine. However, those arms arrived in Guinea despite the fact that an embargo had been imposed by the Economic Community of West African States. So, the region had imposed an arms embargo on Guinea. Clearly, individual countries or regions can adopt particular policies, but if it is possible, the arms brokers will find a way around them and continue their activities. Therefore, countries have to act individually, as we do, but acting collectively is much more effective. That was the ambition for an international arms trade treaty that was launched about a decade ago. The demand for such a treaty has been effectively supported by our Government. As one would expect, we have argued that if we are to have a treaty, it should be comprehensive, enforceable and as strong as possible. I am pleased that the Government, in their response to our report, agreed with our conclusions and confirmed that they were working—as we know that they are—with partners in civil society and industry to build up support for an arms trade treaty. During our last debate, I noted that in December 2008, a large majority of Governments—131—voted in favour of a UN General Assembly resolution that established an open-ended working group on the arms trade treaty. The only state to vote against the resolution at the time was the United States, with 19 countries abstaining. I understand that last week, states at the UN voted overwhelmingly in favour of negotiating a strong and robust ATT, with 153 in favour, 19 still abstaining and one voting against, which was Zimbabwe. As Members know, the United States under the new Administration is strongly in favour of an arms trade treaty.