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Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Bill [HL]

My Lords, I should begin by declaring an interest as the chair of the board of the United Nations Association of the UK, which is a member of the Cluster Munition Coalition which has been campaigning for Britain to join the ban on cluster munitions which we are debating today. I should also like to thank the Minister for the extremely comprehensive way in which she introduced the Bill, which I found remarkably helpful. In the plaudits to those who have played a part, including the noble Lords, Lord Elton and Lord Dubs, I should like to add my old department, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which I think played a remarkably skilful role in the negotiations on the convention under circumstances which, with somewhat divided counsels behind them, were not absolutely ideal. I mention in that respect my noble friend Lord Jay of Ewelme, who has been a very strong supporter of this since he joined this House. I shall pass over in silence whether he was a strong supporter of it when he was in government service, but I think that rather likely. In general terms, the Government deserve a lot of credit for deciding almost a year ago to sign the Dublin convention banning cluster munitions, and also for their decision to give a high priority in our legislative programme to early ratification of the convention. This Bill is an essential preliminary to that. Those of us involved in the campaign are only too well aware that the decision for Britain to sign up to the convention was not at all an easy one. There was resistance to it within the Government and by a number of major world powers, including our principal ally, the United States. Our own Armed Forces possess a considerable arsenal of these weapons, which will now have to be destroyed and, as the Minister said, is in the process of being destroyed. So it would have been easy to have stood aside—easy, but quite wrong. Not only have the truly appalling consequences for the civilian population of using these weapons become more and more evident following the hostilities in Kosovo and south Lebanon, but their basic military utility has been increasingly challenged, as was so ably demonstrated by my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham, as hostilities have moved away from the pattern of high-intensity warfare between armoured forces and towards what has come to be known as "war amongst the people". The advocacy of my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham and a number of other military figures has been extremely powerful in undermining the military rationale for retaining these weapons. I hope that the Government’s campaign to persuade those who have not yet signed up will make use of those military views. In some countries that are resisting signing up, a group of former military men explaining as cogently as was explained to us this afternoon why these weapons are not useful militarily could have more effect than diplomatic jawboning. The Government deserve credit for their decision and can take real satisfaction from the influence that our decision had on a number of other Governments that were undecided up to a late stage in the negotiations as to whether to sign up. The Bill before us will clear the way for early ratification of the Dublin convention by this country and will thus help towards the early entry into force of the convention by adding to the list of those who have ratified, ensuring that Britain continues to play a leading role in the governance structure of the convention, as it has in its negotiation. I strongly support the Bill and hope that the cross-party support for it will ensure that it completes all its stages, here and in another place, before the end of this parliamentary Session. I have one or two detailed points, on some of which the Minister has already commented but on which I should like further clarification, which would greatly assist the legislative process on which we are embarking. First, I note that there is no trace in the Bill of the implementation of our commitment to destroy our cluster munitions, which is part of the convention itself and by which we will be bound when we have ratified. Will the Government reflect whether some commitment might not be contained in this Bill on the destruction of our cluster munitions, given that we have embarked on the process and seem to be reasonably well advanced on it? I should have thought that there was value, as has been the case with legislation on things like climate change and our commitment to aid targets, to put that in our national legislation and not just leave it as an international obligation. Secondly, I note that several noble Lords have raised the problem of the stockpiles on our territory of other states which are not party to the convention. I welcome the Minister’s reassertion of what the noble Lord, Lord Malloch-Brown, said in June. I hope that in some way or another it is possible to make that very clear and very firmly on the record when we ratify. Thirdly, nothing is said in the Bill, but quite a bit has been said by the Minister and her colleague in the other place, about indirect investment in the manufacture of these weapons. Such investment could perhaps be by British banks or other companies in manufacturing capacity overseas in non-signatories of the convention. I have heard it suggested that such investment already exists in manufacturing capacity for cluster munitions in Singapore, South Korea and Pakistan. I note what Ministers have now said about their intention to pursue a voluntary code of conduct with British business on this matter, which I welcome. It is a valuable first step, although I hope that they will not omit to say that if that were not successfully agreed, legislative force might have to be given to that measure at some stage. It would be a help if the Minister could say that clearly in winding up the debate. I know that it was in the Written Statement made yesterday by the Minister and Chris Bryant. Fourthly, I note too what the Minister said about the detailed provisions of the Export Control Order 2008, which is a bit more rigorous than the provisions in the Bill. She stated that these provisions would be complementary and would match each other. Before Committee stage, I would like her to look again at whether it is entirely desirable to have two sets of obligations running side by side in that way. I am, alas, all too well aware of the problems we got into over the International Criminal Court Act when we discovered that we had legislated a loophole by mistake. It would be a disaster if we did that again in this case. I am not suggesting that we are doing that, but I would be greatly comforted if a further look could be taken before the Committee stage. Having reiterated the hope that some of these points can be dealt with, I now turn away from the detail of the Bill to the wider diplomatic scene and the Government’s policy objectives in moving the ban on cluster munitions to that universality of application which is so highly desirable. It is a matter for regret that so many states, among them a number of our close allies and Commonwealth partners, have declined so far to sign the convention. What progress have the Government made? I very much welcome the efforts taken by the Minister at the Commonwealth conference last week in attracting new signatories since Dublin was signed. What are the prospects for the future? Even if universality is likely to elude our grasp for a considerable period of time, which, alas, I fear may be so, have the Government given any consideration to the possibility of promoting at least a de facto moratorium on the actual use of these appalling weapons in any areas with a substantial civilian population? After all, in the context of the testing of nuclear weapons, while entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not yet been achieved, a de facto moratorium has been widely observed even by some of those who have not ratified. Could not that sort of approach be promoted in the field of cluster munitions? On the vexed question of the verification of how signatories implement the commitments into which they have entered, as with all international agreements prohibiting or controlling categories of weapons, this issue of verification cannot be ducked if we are not to run the risk of the international regime gradually unravelling. After all, not all the signatories to this convention, as with all the signatories to many others, can necessarily be trusted to apply its provisions in a uniform and rigorous way. What thought are the Government giving to this aspect of the prohibition? When the convention enters into force and its governance is taken forward, will they press for genuinely international verification procedures? Will there not need to be some kind of system of challenge inspections to handle any evidence that emerges of non-compliance by signatories? In conclusion, I apologise for raising so many points, but I have done so in a positive spirit and as one who is extremely appreciative of the way the Government have handled this whole matter.