Proceeding contribution from Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Commons on Monday, 13 September 2010. It occurred during Debate on bill on Fixed-term Parliaments Bill.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
The right hon. Gentleman may be referring to the continuation of the existing powers to prorogue Parliament, which will remain in place, particularly after the House has been dissolved for exceptional reasons. In addition, the Bill provides for a new power for the House of Commons to dissolve Parliament early by means of a motion, passed by a majority of two thirds of the total number of seats in this House, which states that an early general election should take place. This new power ensures that Parliament will be able to dissolve itself in any eventuality, regardless of whether the reasons relate to the merits or failings of the Government of the day. As you will be aware, Mr Deputy Speaker, these votes have already been the subject of considerable discussion. I shall therefore take a little time to explain to the House exactly how they will work. First, on the new power of early Dissolution, the defining principle of this Bill is that no Government should be able to dissolve Parliament for their own political advantage. So as I said, in order to secure a Dissolution motion, a vote will need to be passed by a majority of two thirds of MPs— the same threshold that is required in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Hon. Members will remember that originally the coalition proposed a threshold of 55%. That was not found to be satisfactory by many Members of this House, who feared that it would not provide a sure enough guarantee against a Government with a large majority triggering an election for partisan gain. We listened to those arguments and we agreed that the bar should be raised. At two thirds, we have settled on a majority that no post-war Government would have been able to achieve. It will be possible only if agreement is secured across party lines, thereby preventing any one party or the Executive from abusing this mechanism. On powers of no confidence, no-confidence votes have until now been a matter of convention.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 515 c628-9
- Session
- 2010-12
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Commons chamber
- Subjects
- Alternative vote General elections Fixed-term parliaments Dissolution National Assembly for Wales Referendums Parliament Parliamentary privilege Parliamentary session Reform Scottish Parliament Royal prerogative Censure motions
- Legislation
- Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 2010-12
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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- 2023-12-15 18:09:59 +0000
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