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Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Report)

Lord Saville and his team carried out public hearings beginning in March 2000, and the final witness was heard in January 2005. In total, 2,500 statements were taken, as a result of which 922 people were called to give direct evidence. Some 610 soldiers, 729 civilians, 30 journalists and photographers, 20 Government officials and 53 police officers gave evidence in some form. As we have heard on numerous occasions, the total cost was in excess of £191 million. Some of the families of those killed in Londonderry on 30 January 1972 have received some form of closure. As I alluded to in my recent intervention, Saville concentrated almost exclusively on the events of the day in question. However, I and others have repeatedly stressed the need to examine the background and context of the events. After the Saville report was published in June, I spoke out saying it was simply not possible to declare the absolute truth about what happened some 30 years after the event. Because of what I said I was subjected to a vicious hate campaign, not least of which included a Facebook site where a number of contributors indicated that I should be shot dead; a Nazi poster showing a bullet hole through my forehead was put on the site. I went to the police and, that fact having become public knowledge, it was pleasing to see on Monday 21 June that hundreds of people who had signed up to supporting the aims of that site—wanting me murdered—had withdrawn their names within hours of the story breaking on that day. It would appear that supporting violence in secret is quite a good thing for some people but when it becomes public knowledge, they are not so keen. I understand from the police that the prosecution service is studying the evidence and that the police and prosecution service are deciding whether a prosecution is warranted—I await the outcome in due course. Whatever is found about the attacks or the consequences, the truth about Saville, the context and the background must and will be told. Some try to insinuate that Bloody Sunday was the origin of the troubles, while others attempt to rewrite history by saying that if Bloody Sunday had not happened, the IRA would have been a footnote and a mere minor problem, but Northern Ireland was subjected to frequent attacks. The campaign between 1956 and 1962 was very fresh when the troubles, as they became known, broke out in 1968. Internment had been brought in just before Bloody Sunday to deal with the worsening problems. Widespread violence, right across Northern Ireland, was endemic. Twenty-one people were murdered in three days of rioting in August 1971. On 10 August 1971, some six months before Bloody Sunday, Bombardier Paul Challenor became the first soldier to be killed by the Provisional IRA in Londonderry, when he was shot by a sniper close to the route of the fateful march on Bloody Sunday. A further six soldiers had been killed in Londonderry by mid-December 1971, five weeks before Bloody Sunday occurred. Almost 2,000 rounds were fired by the IRA at the British Army, which was patrolling the streets, and 211 explosions and 180 nail bombs were aimed at the Army, civilians and ordinary civilian properties, shops and homes in the vicinity, so Provisional IRA activity was rife before Bloody Sunday occurred. Thirty British soldiers were killed in the remaining months of 1971. Both the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA had established no-go areas for the Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary through the use of barricades. At the end of 1971, 29 barricades were in place to prevent access to parts of the Bogside where the march was to take place, 16 of which were impassable, even to the British Army's one-tonne armoured vehicles. IRA members openly mounted roadblocks in front of the media, and daily clashes occurred between nationalist youths and the British Army. Rioting and incendiary devices aimed at shops caused a then estimated total—this was 40 years ago—of £4 million-worth of damage to commercial property. I say all this to lay out the context, which Lord Saville did not lay out—£191 million was spent and he did not lay out the context of why the soldiers were there in the first place. I shall tell hon. Members why they were there. The central element of any comprehensive investigation into the events is that the soldiers were going into an area that was extremely hostile and where they were likely to encounter violence. But did Lord Saville—did the report—indicate that that was the factual premise from which to conduct the investigation? No, I am afraid he did not. The fact that the soldiers met with violence only reinforced their view that they were in for a heavy concentration of fire. Such a concerted level of terror was not unique to Londonderry; as I have said, it was endemic in other parts of Northern Ireland. The truth is that murder, mayhem and terror were rife. In the weeks before the day, there were nine separate bomb attacks on commercial premises, six separate shooting incidents and an 80-minute gun battle, and gelignite and nail bomb attacks were prevalent. Reference has been made to the despicable and cowardly murder of two policemen that then took place three days before the parade and on the very route of the parade. One was a Protestant and the other a Catholic, and one was buried on the day of Bloody Sunday. It remains the case that we will probably never know the truth of all that transpired on that day. Lord Saville can give his conclusions, and the Front-Bench teams of the Government and the Opposition can concur with those, but we will never know the truth. One participant in the Saville inquiry revelled in the thought that he would not engage in open-ended dialogue about what he was doing in the run-up to Bloody Sunday or on that day. He said that he was the 2IC of the Provisional IRA on that day and in that era; he is now the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness. I welcome his move away from violence and endorse the move towards embracing peace, but unfortunately he refused to go into any detail about his involvement in the IRA on that day. Lord Saville concluded that he ““probably”” had in his possession a machine gun on that day. As has been alluded to in the debate, it would appear that some people are demanding prosecutions of soldiers who complied with the Saville inquiry and answered all the questions posed to them throughout the inquiry, but there does not appear to be the same eagerness or intensity of purpose to say that we should also look at the prosecution of someone who ““probably”” had a machine gun on that day. We have to ask what he was doing with the machine gun on that day. The conclusion is that we will never know. Saville fell well short of analysing what happened before and during the events of that fateful day. We will not know the truth of all that happened. The one lesson that we can learn from the Saville report and the inquiry is that inquiries, however intense and however long, however protracted and however costly and expensive, seldom, if ever, bring progress towards the future. Let us move forward and not back to the past.