---

Coalition Government

My Lords, I was not going to dwell on the five days because, as the noble Lord will know, many thought that it was rather a rushed job. The document was published by the Cabinet Office rather than by the parties concerned. Of course, it was a legitimate and sensible course of action to take for the coalition, but it has never been endorsed by the electorate in this country. I make that point as clearly as I can, because many people believe that we are likely to have more coalitions in the future, partly because of the breakdown of traditional voting patterns in this country and because there will be many more coalitions if a system of AV or proportional representation is introduced, as the Liberal Democrats want. However, it means that there are serious questions about how far any coalition government can rest on the old conventions of parliamentary practice. The coalition has recognised that. The nature of its constitutional programme seeks to alter our institutions. So does its practice in government. For example, the Cabinet has been significantly altered by the coalition removing, in effect, the powers of the Prime Minister on the appointment and dismissal of Ministers and placing those in the hands of others on a party political basis, and by the explicit abandoning of the constitutional doctrine of Cabinet and ministerial collective responsibility in a range of policy areas, such as the crucial decision on the renewal of our nuclear defence system. The proposal for a referendum on AV directly addresses the Westminster electoral system, while the rearranging of constituencies proposed in the Bill that we have debated this week will fundamentally alter Parliament in a way not done since the 1832 Act. I am not seeking to argue the merits of the Bill but merely to argue that, if enacted, these proposals will permanently alter the way in which Britain is governed. Given the fundamental point that no one voted for this programme, the constitutional ambitions of the coalition are bound to raise some very difficult questions. The nature of the coalition Government has particular implications for this House because of the Salisbury convention, the best and most recent definition of which—best because it was agreed by all parties in both Houses—is contained in the report on the conventions of the UK Parliament from the Joint Committee on Conventions chaired by noble friend Lord Cunningham of Felling and on which I have the privilege to serve. The Joint Committee laid out that the convention means that, in this House: "““A manifesto Bill is accorded a Second Reading … A manifesto Bill is not subject to 'wrecking amendments' …; and … A manifesto Bill is passed and sent (or returned) to the House of Commons, so that they have the opportunity, in reasonable time, to consider the Bill or any amendments the Lords may wish to propose””." The standing of the Salisbury convention is clear. Where a proposal from the coalition Government was contained in the 2010 general election manifestos of both the political parties in the coalition, that proposal would rightly be subject to the Salisbury convention. But it is those proposals alone that are subject to the convention and not the proposals in the coalition document, except where they appeared in both manifestos. Of course, I recognise that there is a strong counterpoint to be put here, although I do not believe that it is an overriding one. That is, in being asked by Her Majesty to form a Government, the coalition enjoys the confidence of the House of Commons, meaning that what the Government do in the Commons and in this House must have commensurate authority. However, that does not detract from the legitimacy gap at the heart of the coalition, particularly in relation to constitutional reform. Neither manifesto proposed a referendum on AV and neither proposed the reduction in the number of MPs proposed in the Bill discussed this week. Therefore, the Bill is not a manifesto Bill and not subject to the convention. The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, which we shall debate shortly, was in the Liberal Democrat manifesto but not in that of the Conservatives, so, again, the Salisbury convention will not apply. The House of Lords Reform Bill was in both manifestos. We will judge on their merits the proposals for reform when we finally see them, but we on this side of the Chamber are determined to give the proposals the scrutiny that the issues merit, just as we have given proper scrutiny to the coalition’s proposals to change the voting system and the number of constituencies. We believe that the entire issue of further House of Lords reform should be put in a referendum to the people of the country. If a voting system which benefits the Liberal Democrats is worthy of a referendum, surely one of the key checks and balances in our constitution, this House, is equally worthy of a referendum. The coalition has produced a number of other significant constitutional innovations. There is the Cabinet manual, at which I am sure many of your Lordships will have looked, but none of us has yet debated it. It was written by a small group of senior officials in consultation with some clever academics, but neither House has debated the full document. What is the status of the document? Can the Leader of the House tell us whether it is the first step towards a written constitution, as accepted by the Cabinet Secretary, or is it, as stated by the noble Lord in reply to a Question in this House from my noble friend Lady Royall, of a rather different nature? If it is of the importance and enduring significance implied by Sir Gus O’Donnell, surely we should debate it fully and soon. Of course, some reforms are welcome and very helpful; for example, revealing the date of the Budget. Once, that was a sacking offence, but it is a sensible and right move. Similarly, setting out the dates of Recesses is laudable and, frankly, I wish that my party had done it years ago. But sadly, such a sensible approach is not applied elsewhere. Since 10 January, coalition Peers have joined us so fast that, including today’s Introductions, the coalition majority is 71. It has risen from 54 to 71 in just seven working days. We have to ensure that this House remains a revising Chamber, not an approving Chamber. In effect, we have returned to the pre-1997 position. The Conservative-led Government have an unassailable majority in both Houses, not because of a landslide victory in a general election, but because of a coalition agreement. If, for example, the Conservatives had won a landslide victory at the 2010 election, they would have a majority in another place, but certainly not in here. By performing worse in the election than predicted, they have gained a stranglehold on both Houses. That has serious implications because an important part of the role of this House is the role of the Cross-Bench Peers. As independents, they listen to, assess and make judgments on the arguments they hear, and they vote accordingly. They are a huge asset to us and a huge constitutional asset to the country. But that important constitutional role in this House as the provider of checks and balances is under threat with so many coalition Peers coming in. The conventions on how we operate are indeed important. The Companion tells us that there is a firm convention that from Monday to Wednesday, the House will rise at 10 pm. The Companion describes a closure Motion as ““a most exceptional procedure””—very strong words—but it has been deployed twice this week. That has been done because the Government really believe that it is fair to use it on an issue which is not the subject of the Salisbury convention, which has had no pre-legislative scrutiny and no public consultation. We disagree. What is clear is that the application of closure Motions in this way is tantamount to a guillotine. Of course it is not a guillotine on the whole Bill, but it is clearly a guillotine on individual amendments. It is a guillotine that I do not believe is appropriate in this House, and I hope that it will never be appropriate. What is clear is that this kind of parliamentary innovation is of a piece with similar innovations in the coalition. I refer to the use, for example, of framework legislation, which is similarly problematic. The Public Bodies Bill has been extensively criticised on constitutional grounds. As has been well put in this House, in the Bill the Government are seeking to use Henry VIII powers on an industrial scale. That is just plain wrong. It is not a correct use of such powers, and those powers were rightly criticised by many constitutional experts as being something inapplicable in a modern democracy. Moreover, coalition Ministers have questioned the decision in this House to seek to vote down secondary legislation, specifically on tuition fees. There are clear provisions in the terms of the Cunningham committee—