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Coalition Government

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow—although it is a bit of a surprise to do it so quickly—the noble Lord, Lord Plant of Highfield, a graduate of the University of Hull. Unfortunately, another Hull graduate, my noble friend Lord Cormack, is unable to be with us to make his maiden speech today. He is presently recovering in hospital. I shall not follow on from the noble Lord’s comments but I thought that he made an extremely stimulating contribution. There are two aspects to looking at the constitutional dimension of coalition government. There is the formation of the coalition and the policy agreed as a consequence of parties forming a coalition. On the first, following what the noble Baroness said in opening the debate, it is important to stress the unique situation in which we find ourselves. We have had hung Parliaments before, resulting in minority government. We have had coalitions before, but not as a consequence of an indecisive election. In the 20th century, coalition Governments existed for a total of 18 years, but for 15 of those the Conservative Party could have governed as a majority Administration. The invitation by David Cameron to the Liberal Democrats to enter into negotiations led to a series of events for which there was no precedent. In many respects, the lessons to be learnt were learnt from practice elsewhere as much as from our own history. As has been touched upon, the process was informed by a draft chapter for an intended Cabinet manual, modelled on what exists in New Zealand. One could argue also that drawing up a coalition agreement followed practice adopted elsewhere. Where we differed from practice elsewhere was in the speed with which a new Government were formed. The process was slow by UK standards but rapid by international ones. In the time available, I shall touch upon three aspects already mentioned in the debate: the draft Cabinet manual, the coalition agreement and the Salisbury convention. The last two are inextricably linked and lead to a consideration of how Parliament treats constitutional measures embodied in the coalition agreement. The draft Cabinet manual now covers the situation in which no one party achieves an overall majority. It is designed to create the framework for the resolution of negotiations. At paragraph 49, it states: "““Where a range of different administrations could potentially be formed, the expectation is that discussions will take place between political parties on who should form the next Government””." This takes us beyond description of a political decision to a constitutional precept. It says that discussions ““will take place””, not that they may take place. This is not only questionable as a statement of practice but, if maintained, could give rise to legal challenge. It is not intended that the manual should have any legal effect, but a political party excluded from discussions, even if there is no realistic chance of it being part of a coalition, could conceivably seek judicial review of the process on the basis of what is stated in the manual. This gives rise to wider questions about not only the legal status of the manual but also the extent to which it embodies statements of practice, and statements of what civil servants understand to be the constitutional position—in effect, between statements grounded in precedent and those that are not. This takes us wider than coalition formation. Given that, I do not wish to stray on to these matters, but rather invite my noble friend the Leader of the House to indicate if time may be found to discuss the draft manual. I think there is value in discussing before, and not simply after, it has become a Cabinet manual. I turn to the coalition agreement. As we have heard, this occupies an unusual position as it is a post-election agreement—in effect, a post-election manifesto. It differs from election manifestos in two respects. In one respect, it is stronger; there are key provisions to which both parties are committed, and delivery is therefore central to maintaining the coalition. In the other respect, it is weaker in that it does not have the endorsement of the electorate. The agreement sanctions behaviour that is constitutionally distinct, though not without precedent: for example, allowing one party to abstain on a measure embodied in the agreement and, as a consequence, suspending the convention of collective responsibility for those Ministers in the abstaining party. That distinctive status brings me to the position of this House. There are two consequences. One is in relation to numbers. A coalition of two parties necessitates certain changes in procedures and practice. It has been claimed—we have heard it today—that the numbers also create a majority for the coalition in the House, running counter to the principle, though possibly not yet a convention, that no one party should have a majority in the House. That is not correct, either on paper or in practice. Up to the Christmas Recess, there had been 31 Divisions in the House. The Government lost nine of them, including one on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. They would still not have triumphed in all those had all the recently announced Peers been introduced, so I set aside that claim. What is of importance constitutionally is the implication for the Salisbury convention. As has been noted, the convention rests on the Salisbury/Addison agreement of 1945, essentially updating the thesis advanced by the third Marquess of Salisbury regarding the mandate. The basis on which the convention was advanced has long been spent but the convention has been maintained. There is some imprecision about the convention, in itself no bad thing because it allows for some flexibility and because a rigid application is not in my view compatible with a Conservative view of what constitutes ““the people””. As my noble friend Lord Wakeham observed, the convention has in practice been extended, as the Cunningham committee reported, to Bills included in the Government’s programme for the Session. We therefore do not vote against a government Bill on Second Reading. That practice in many respects protects the status of this House as a revising Chamber. We do not normally challenge the ends of a measure approved by the other place but we focus on the means. We engage in detailed scrutiny; that is our strength and our justification. We are here to probe and improve legislation, not to attempt to deny its passage, other than in the most exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances may arise—Lord Simon of Glaisdale sought to adumbrate what these may be in an interesting debate that he initiated in 1993—so that we need to retain what is, in essence, a reserve power. The Salisbury convention is relevant for present circumstances, and here I bring my points together. The constitutional Bills brought forward by government do not necessarily have their genesis in the manifesto of the winning party. Indeed, as the noble Baroness said, there is no single winning party. The fact that measures derive from a post-election agreement, one constructed in some haste and producing some measures introduced in haste, places a particular burden on this House to subject Bills to rigorous scrutiny. My view is that the circumstances therefore dictate two levels of scrutiny. One is our usual rigorous scrutiny of measures that are not of constitutional significance, and for measures that are, we must employ an enhanced level of scrutiny. I listened with considerable interest to the speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Hart and Lord Wills. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hart, I am a member of the Constitution Committee. I was the first chairman of the committee, and we produced a report on the process of constitutional change. We need, as a House, to revisit the means by which we examine constitutional Bills. It may not require a commission of the sort proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wills—I believe I am one of those scheduled to be on it—but we need, in effect, to draw together and confirm, as a House, the principles developed by the Constitution Committee, as detailed by the noble Lord, Lord Hart. I believe that the Constitution Committee has already done an admirable job in its examination of Bills of constitutional significance and in alerting the House to concerns it has about those measures. We need to build on that to achieve an agreed framework for examination. We need to play to our strengths. In some respects, we are getting there; in other respects we are not. We should be prepared, as my noble friend Lord Strathclyde put it in his 1999 Politeia lecture, to insist on our right to scrutinise, amend and improve legislation. In terms of detailed scrutiny under our existing procedures, I offer proceedings on the Public Bodies Bill as an example of good practice and proceedings on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill as an example of bad practice. I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, says, but I believe that it is not too late for an outbreak of common sense on both sides to prevent the creation of conditions which will be to the long-term detriment of this House and therefore to the quality of legislative scrutiny. On the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, I believe that the will of the House was expressed eloquently last night by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and I trust that both Front Benches will act on the basis of what he said. This is not the time for finger pointing. It is a time for maturity on both sides, and the House should expect that. This House is a Chamber of experience and expertise. It complements the other place. At times, Members must be prepared to put this House, and the health of our constitution, ahead of any tribal loyalties. There is a higher good than party, and it is essential that this House works, as a House, to fulfil the tasks detailed by my noble friend. As he said in his lecture, that right to scrutinise, amend and improve is also this House's purpose and its duty.