Skip to main content

Proceeding contribution from Lord Butler of Brockwell (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 20 January 2011. It occurred during Debate on Coalition Government.


Coalition Government

My Lords, I add my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, for giving us the opportunity to discuss this fascinating subject. There was a time when she and I were sparring partners in other capacities. I was Cabinet Secretary and she was general secretary of the First Division Association, and I had responsibility for recording the conventions and rules, political and constitutional. My responsibility was for recording them, not for framing them. It is not the job of the Cabinet Secretary to make rules, except perhaps for the Civil Service. Rules are made either by Parliament through statute—for example, the statutes governing the length of a Parliament or the number of paid Ministers—or by the Government themselves, as in the Ministerial Code. Rules that the Government make for themselves, the Government or a successor can change. As others have noted, the present Cabinet Secretary has brought together the rules and conventions by which the Executive operates in the draft Cabinet manual. This seems to be a really useful exercise, which, in my view, has been well done. I have some suggestions to make about its content to which I will return. But we should be clear; it is not the creation of the coalition which has made it necessary to produce the manual. The two events are coincidental, although usefully so. The Cabinet manual was in preparation anyway, based on a similar document produced in New Zealand. I want to say something on three aspects of the political and constitutional implications of the coalition; that is, the implications for the operations of government, the implications for the Civil Service and the implications for the Salisbury/Addison convention in the House of Lords. As regards the operations of government, there is a lot of evidence, not least from the Prime Minister’s speech on public services earlier this week, that announcements of government policies are now preceded by serious discussions and debate in the Cabinet. As a believer, like my noble friend Lord Hennessey, in the idea that well informed debate produces better policy decisions, I welcome that. A coalition was not essential for restoring Cabinet government but if, as it seems, it has had that result, long may it continue. As regards the Civil Service, it has been suggested—the noble Lord, Lord Morgan, was saying this—that there are difficulties for an apolitical Civil Service in serving a Government composed of two political parties. I do not agree with that. The role of the Civil Service is to serve the government of the day. As the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, said, all Governments are coalitions of people with different shades of opinion—often quite widely differing shades of opinion, even when they are drawn from the same party. The Civil Service is used to reconciling loyalty to their departmental Minister with loyalty to the Government as a whole. An apolitical Civil Service can be seen as the cement which helps to hold the Queen’s Government together. That is why I have always taken the view that a single Civil Service should serve the Government as a whole and the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. In that context, like other Members of your Lordships’ House, I will say a word on the position we have got into on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. The implications for Parliament, and for your Lordships’ House in particular, have been said to be that since the coalition Government agreement was not in front of the electorate at the time of the general election, it is not covered by the Salisbury/Addison convention. That is strictly correct. Like the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, however, I doubt whether that has much practical effect. The Salisbury/Addison convention says that a ““manifesto Bill”” should be accorded a Second Reading in your Lordships’ House, should not be subject to ““wrecking amendments”” and should be passed and sent, or returned, to the Commons so that they have an opportunity to consider the Bill and any Lords amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, said, that is not so different from what your Lordships’ House would do to any Bill presented by the Executive. It is always right for this House to give weight to the perceived wishes of the elected House. It seems to me that your Lordships should carry out a similar exercise of judgment in relation to the contents of the coalition agreement. In that context, like many other Members of your Lordships’ House, I greatly regret the war of attrition that has been going on in the House of Lords this week. I strongly support the role of the Lords as a revising Chamber, in causing the Government to think again, particularly about constitutional Bills and particularly about provisions that may have been forced through the House of Commons without proper debate. However, that should not extend to preventing the Government from passing their legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, referred—I think I quote him correctly—to a ““torrent”” of constitutional legislation. There was a pretty good torrent of constitutional legislation in the first year of the new Labour Government in 1997. Indeed, it would be a useful antidote to some of the things that have been said today if your Lordships were to read some of the records of the first year of that Government. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, that this is a time for reasonable behaviour rather than pointing fingers. I confine myself to saying that, like the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, I do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, is correct in attributing the present situation to the fact of the coalition. Although the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, about the nature of the politics of the coalition have obvious weight, a similar situation could have arisen if the Conservatives had introduced the Parliamentary Voting Systems and Constituencies Bill as a single-party Government. I do not think that this is attributable wholly to the fact of the coalition. I return to the Cabinet manual. My noble friend Lord Hennessy suggested that two items that might be added to the manual are an up-to-date formulation of the Salisbury/Addison convention and an up-to-date statement of the convention of what constitutes a money Bill. It is not often that I disagree with my noble friend but I rather question these; they are two matters on which Parliament should take the initiative, rather than the Executive. The manual could properly record what Parliament has decided, but it is not for the Executive to take the decision. What I would like to see added to the manual, however—this is another matter that some noble Lords have referred to—is some rules that the Executive might impose on themselves to improve the quality of the legislation that they present to Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, made this point powerfully. The Government might commit themselves to a clear statement of the policy intentions of legislation introduced and why legislation is necessary to achieve those intentions, as well as adequate time for public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny wherever possible. That is a theme that has run through many contributions to the debate. Such a statement could include an estimate of the costs of implementing legislation, including a regulatory impact assessment and an indication of targets and performance measures against which the effectiveness of legislation can be measured in post-legislative scrutiny. In my evidence to the Constitution Committee of this House, I shall be making representations that the coalition should adopt such standards and include them in the Cabinet manual.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
724 c586-9 
Session
2010-12
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
House of Commons Constituencies Alternative vote British constitution Cabinet House of Lords Distribution of seats General elections Fixed-term parliaments Public appointments Public bodies Political parties Referendums Parliamentary procedure Parliamentary scrutiny Peers Reform Liberal Democrat Collective responsibility Government bills Conservative Manifestos Coalition governments Henry VIII clauses Statutory instruments Cabinet manual
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk