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Banking Union and Economic and Monetary Union

I should like to make a little progress if I may.

I know that hon. Members will say, “How can we manage to secure these particular arrangements? What should our stratagem be?” Government Members will recall Lady Thatcher’s invocation of the Luxembourg compromise—a quiz question for hon. Members who recall that device. It has not been in use in recent times, but it was a way, in certain circumstances for qualified majority voting arrangements, to ensure that there was a capability of promoting vital national interest. There was at one point a recognised device for ensuring that one could stay in the room. If vital national interests were affected, then certain levels of protection were possible. I do not in any way deny that that is a difficult position, but that is the sort of scale of proposition that the Government should be more actively asserting. The Government need to negotiate a clearer and more distinct set of rules that protect our status outside the eurozone while ensuring that we have an ongoing role in how new rules develop across the whole EU. In our view, that must be the Prime Minister’s negotiating objective.

We have other concerns and questions about the SSM. How can it connect with the wider public and be subject to democratic accountability? That is an important point, because the bodies at the heart of the SSM will need to be more transparent. I am not clear whether they will publish their minutes in the same way as the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve, but we need to start addressing some of those transparency questions. Furthermore, what will be the relationship between the ECB’s monetary policy stance and its approach to decisions on financial supervision?

The composition of the SSM is complex and lines of accountability are extremely confused. For example, the European Central Bank is a superior treaty institution, yet the EBA will in theory sit on a junior institution. It is extremely difficult to see lines of accountability and how the legal issues raised in the amendment will be resolved. What will happen in the intervening months and potentially years before this complex constitutional wiring is settled? What if new market pressures force banking crises that require the stability mechanism or outright monetary transactions to be triggered, and what if there is no SSM in place?

How do we prevent City of London institutions and firms, which contribute about one sixth of Britain’s GDP, from changing their opinion about London in the long run as the right place to locate, when there is a risk that we will be marginalised in the decision-making forum for EU banking rules? They will worry about the prospects of operating under a different set of rules from those on the continent. Our vital national and economic interests are at stake, so we need to ensure that we keep involved, do not get pushed out and avoid being marginalised, while of course reserving our rights.