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Browne of Ladyton, Lord (21)
Legislative stage
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Deployment (21)
Publisher
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which units have been deployed to (a) Iraq and (b) Afghanistan over the last 12 months with full-strength bearing; and how many troops were deployed.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which units have been deployed to (a) Iraq and (b) Afghanistan over the last 12 months with full-strength bearing; and how many troops were deployed.
Asked by
Andrew Murrison
(Conservative)
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
23 January 2008
For answer on
28 January 2008
Answered on
29 January 2008
[holding answer 28 January 2008]: All units deploy at the required strength for the tasks they are asked to fulfil during their operational tour.Information on the number of troops from each unit which deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in the last 12 months is being collated. I will write to the hon. Member when the information is available.
Notes
Further information printed on 17/06/2008 at 477 c851W.
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Afghanistan
Date
29 January 2008
Reference
182606; 471 c186W
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what percentage of the (a) total UK military helicopter fleet and (b) the helicopter fleet deployed in (i) Iraq and (ii) Afghanistan are considered (A) fit for service and (B) fit for purpose, broken down by helicopter type.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what percentage of the (a) total UK military helicopter fleet and (b) the helicopter fleet deployed in (i) Iraq and (ii) Afghanistan are considered (A) fit for service and (B) fit for purpose, broken down by helicopter type.
Asked by
Nick Harvey
(Liberal Democrat)
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
10 October 2007
For answer on
15 October 2007
Answered on
29 October 2007
The percentage of the total number of military helicopters in the Forward Fleet and considered 'fit for purpose' is detailed in the following table. Fit for purpose is defined as helicopters that are available, reliable, airworthy and capable of carrying out their planned missions on a given date. The term 'fit for service' is not recognised in this context.
These numbers will vary from day-to-day. The figures shown are the average for the month of August 2007.All UK helicopters deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan are considered fit for purpose, but not all will be available for operational flying each day due to routine maintenance requirements. However, operational capability is measured in terms of flying hours rather than the number of airframes available, and sufficient helicopters and helicopter hours are provided to meet essential operational commitments. We continue to review these operational requirements and do adjust as necessary.
| Helicopter type | Fit for purpose (Percentage) |
| Agusta A109 | 75 |
| Apache | 50 |
| Chinook 2/2a | 67 |
| Gazelle AMI | 81 |
| Lynx MK 3 and 8 | 69 |
| Lynx MK 7 and 9 | 57 |
| Merlin MK 1 | 41 |
| Merlin MK 3 | 50 |
| Puma | 64 |
| Sea King MK 3/3A | 64 |
| Sea King MK 4/6C | 52 |
| Sea King MK 5 | 54 |
| Sea King MK 7 | 44 |
Subjects
Deployment; Iraq; Helicopters; Peacekeeping operations
Date
29 October 2007
Reference
158358; 465 c971-2W
House
House of Commons
It is not envisaged that our troops will be confined to barracks, as it were, at any time. Operational decisions in relation to force protection are a matter for commanders. Invariably, such operations, which are known as layered, include attempts to interdict those who try to attack the base. I reassure my hon. Friend that no effort is spared to ensure that the best possible protection is provided to our forces deployed on operations. In the last year alone, we have invested millions of pounds in new equipment, including body armour and armoured vehicles. In relation to indirect fire—IDF—a number of kinetic and static capabilities have been deployed better to protect our personnel from such attacks. For reasons of operational security, I cannot elaborate on that or on the equipment employed. Unfortunately, however, the effects of indirect fire attacks can never be mitigated completely. We ought to expect those to continue in the current environment.
It is not envisaged that our troops will be confined to barracks, as it were, at any time. Operational decisions in relation to force protection are a matter for commanders. Invariably, such operations, which are known as layered, include attempts to interdict those who try to attack the base. I reassure my hon. Friend that no effort is spared to ensure that the best possible protection is provided to our forces deployed on operations. In the last year alone, we have invested millions of pounds in new equipment, including body armour and armoured vehicles. In relation to indirect fire—IDF—a number of kinetic and static capabilities have been deployed better to protect our personnel from such attacks. For reasons of operational security, I cannot elaborate on that or on the equipment employed. Unfortunately, however, the effects of indirect fire attacks can never be mitigated completely. We ought to expect those to continue in the current environment.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
David Kidney
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer. I welcome recent troop withdrawals and look forward to more soon. My question is about the safety of troops during withdrawal. Is a transitional period between active patrols and returning home envisaged, during which troops will be, as it were, confined to barracks? Will that be at the Basra air base? As I am sure he is aware, that base is subject to dozens of rocket attacks every day. If there must be such a transitional period, could our troops be safely elsewhere in the region but close enough to be on call if needed?
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c7
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
The hon. Gentleman invites me to intervene in domestic American politics and respond to decisions made in Congress. I do not intend to do that. Obviously such decisions are relevant to us, but our strategy remains the same. It cannot properly be defined as a strategy dependent solely on security; it is far from being that. I do not want to repeat my last answer in detail, but it described the path that we have taken.
Our strategy does not hang on the insurgents and on determination of the timetable. There has been an increase in the number of our casualties, but that is a function of the transition that we are undergoing. On almost every occasion we have deployed troops abroad, our casualty rate has risen when we have sought to emerge from combat and reduce the strength of our forces during a period of transition. In this instance, that is a function of a number of elements, not least the fact that the militia deployed in Basra city, supported by the Iranians, are determined to take the credit for driving us out of that city. I think that people who understand how insurgencies work would understand that that is the case. It is not the whole explanation for our casualty rate, but it is part of the explanation and people need to understand it.
The hon. Gentleman invites me to intervene in domestic American politics and respond to decisions made in Congress. I do not intend to do that. Obviously such decisions are relevant to us, but our strategy remains the same. It cannot properly be defined as a strategy dependent solely on security; it is far from being that. I do not want to repeat my last answer in detail, but it described the path that we have taken.
Our strategy does not hang on the insurgents and on determination of the timetable. There has been an increase in the number of our casualties, but that is a function of the transition that we are undergoing. On almost every occasion we have deployed troops abroad, our casualty rate has risen when we have sought to emerge from combat and reduce the strength of our forces during a period of transition. In this instance, that is a function of a number of elements, not least the fact that the militia deployed in Basra city, supported by the Iranians, are determined to take the credit for driving us out of that city. I think that people who understand how insurgencies work would understand that that is the case. It is not the whole explanation for our casualty rate, but it is part of the explanation and people need to understand it.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Nick Harvey
(Liberal Democrat)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
What does the Secretary of State make of the votes on withdrawal in both Houses of the American Congress? Is it still our policy that security will be the only consideration that determines the timetable for withdrawal? Given that this year is shaping up to be the bloodiest since 2003, is there not a risk that that could be a very long way off, and that the militias and insurgents will be given a say over the timetable?
What does the Secretary of State make of the Iraq Commission report, and what does he think our role will be after we hand over Basra province? Is not the best idea the commission’s suggestion that we concentrate on training and advice, and set a date for an end to our active deployment?
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c8-9
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
Prime Minister al-Maliki said his assessment was that in about three months’ time the Iraqi security forces would be ready to take over responsibility for security in Basra. That was his assessment, and it is important, because it is part of the process of assessment that we will undergo, and have already undergone, in three of the four provinces from which we have withdrawn our troops and which we have allowed to be handed over to the security control of the Iraqis.
Since I took up my current post, I have consistently explained the precise strategy we are following, both from the Dispatch Box and elsewhere. We have never deviated from that strategy: we have not been forced to change by any set of circumstances, by votes in any other Parliament or by decisions of any other Government. I and my predecessor have explained the process; it is a logical one, and it is in the interests of the Iraqi people, towards whom we have a responsibility. It is also consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution, and it represents the international community’s will. Most importantly, it is the best and most sensible way to maintain our contribution to the Iraqi people and to protect our people—although they are, for reasons I have now twice explained this afternoon, under additional threat at present.
Prime Minister al-Maliki said his assessment was that in about three months’ time the Iraqi security forces would be ready to take over responsibility for security in Basra. That was his assessment, and it is important, because it is part of the process of assessment that we will undergo, and have already undergone, in three of the four provinces from which we have withdrawn our troops and which we have allowed to be handed over to the security control of the Iraqis.
Since I took up my current post, I have consistently explained the precise strategy we are following, both from the Dispatch Box and elsewhere. We have never deviated from that strategy: we have not been forced to change by any set of circumstances, by votes in any other Parliament or by decisions of any other Government. I and my predecessor have explained the process; it is a logical one, and it is in the interests of the Iraqi people, towards whom we have a responsibility. It is also consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution, and it represents the international community’s will. Most importantly, it is the best and most sensible way to maintain our contribution to the Iraqi people and to protect our people—although they are, for reasons I have now twice explained this afternoon, under additional threat at present.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Angus Robertson
(Scottish National Party)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
During the past week the United States Congress has voted, for the third time this year, to withdraw forces from Iraq. Moreover, Prime Minister al-Maliki has said that coalition troops can leave whenever they like. Why is it only neo-Conservative United States Republicans and this Government who are delaying the final withdrawal of our brave service men and women from Iraq?
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c9-10
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
I do not consider myself to be under pressure to declare a timeline. In fact, I consider myself to be under pressure not to declare one. The declaration of a timeline would exacerbate the dynamic that I have just explained.
It is obvious what is going on in southern Iraq, where at least 85 per cent. of the violence is directed against our forces. There are people there who want to claim credit for driving us out, in a process that we have already announced and on which we are partly embarked. If my hon. Friend cannot contain his patience and watch us progress in the orderly way in which we have progressed for months, that is a matter for him, but he will certainly not persuade me to put our troops in any more danger than they are in already.
I do not consider myself to be under pressure to declare a timeline. In fact, I consider myself to be under pressure not to declare one. The declaration of a timeline would exacerbate the dynamic that I have just explained.
It is obvious what is going on in southern Iraq, where at least 85 per cent. of the violence is directed against our forces. There are people there who want to claim credit for driving us out, in a process that we have already announced and on which we are partly embarked. If my hon. Friend cannot contain his patience and watch us progress in the orderly way in which we have progressed for months, that is a matter for him, but he will certainly not persuade me to put our troops in any more danger than they are in already.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Jeremy Corbyn
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
Since the United States is planning to withdraw, would it not be better if the British also set a date, or at least had a contingency plan, so that there is a clear timeline? I know the Secretary of State is reluctant to do that, but clearly the pressure is on for us to specify a point by which all the occupying forces will be out of Iraq and Iraq must decide its own future.
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c9
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for sharing that impression, which has been left on all of us who have visited our troops in theatre, whether in Iraq or Afghanistan: there is no question but that they are the best of the best. For that reason, we have the responsibility to ensure that they are protected as well as possible in the dangerous tasks that we ask of them. The optimal number of troops is a matter for operational advice. The advice that I have received is that the troops currently there are configured in the right way to carry out the tasks that we ask of them, but we keep that matter constantly under review.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for sharing that impression, which has been left on all of us who have visited our troops in theatre, whether in Iraq or Afghanistan: there is no question but that they are the best of the best. For that reason, we have the responsibility to ensure that they are protected as well as possible in the dangerous tasks that we ask of them. The optimal number of troops is a matter for operational advice. The advice that I have received is that the troops currently there are configured in the right way to carry out the tasks that we ask of them, but we keep that matter constantly under review.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom
(Conservative)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
As the Secretary of State knows, the Defence Committee was in Iraq last week, and we were bowled over by the courage and enthusiasm of the men and women from the UK whom we met. Does he agree that there is a judgment to be made about the viability of our force there? Given what is happening there at the moment, does he agree that we are now close to the irreducible minimum?
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c8
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
General Shaw and the troops that he commands are doing an excellent job, and I shall pass on to him my hon. Friend’s comments. He speaks, as does the Chairman of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot), for all Select Committee members who have visited. My hon. Friend’s point is absolutely correct, and that is why I was pleased to see that the issue of security and the conditions for drawdown of troops were significantly addressed in the report of our own Iraq study group. This is a process of judging the security challenge, the Iraqi security forces’ ability to meet it, and our own ability to respond to any circumstances that may threaten to overwhelm them at some time in the future, in the overall context of the development of the politics of that part of Iraq. That judgment must be made before we can make decisions about our troops. It is not an exact science, and it certainly does not lend itself to arbitrary timetables that would only put our people more at risk than they are already during the current period of transition.
General Shaw and the troops that he commands are doing an excellent job, and I shall pass on to him my hon. Friend’s comments. He speaks, as does the Chairman of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot), for all Select Committee members who have visited. My hon. Friend’s point is absolutely correct, and that is why I was pleased to see that the issue of security and the conditions for drawdown of troops were significantly addressed in the report of our own Iraq study group. This is a process of judging the security challenge, the Iraqi security forces’ ability to meet it, and our own ability to respond to any circumstances that may threaten to overwhelm them at some time in the future, in the overall context of the development of the politics of that part of Iraq. That judgment must be made before we can make decisions about our troops. It is not an exact science, and it certainly does not lend itself to arbitrary timetables that would only put our people more at risk than they are already during the current period of transition.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Lord Beamish
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
Along with the right hon. Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot), I visited Basra last week. Major General Jonathan Shaw and the men and women under his command are doing a tremendous job, and we should be thankful that they are doing it. Does the Secretary of State agree that while the transfer of Bara to provincial Iraqi control will be welcome, setting artificial time lines for that decision would be a mistake and would possibly put our troops in further danger?
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c8
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
I can only suspect that the hon. Gentleman has only recently entered the Chamber as I spent some time, in answer to an earlier question, explaining our strategy—explaining the logic of it and why it involves assessments of the security situation, the Iraqis’ ability to respond, our ability to support them and the political support that the security forces are receiving from the Iraqis. The commission suggests that we are mistaken in thinking that the goal can be achieved by military means alone, but we have never suggested that the future of Iraq was dependent on military means alone. It is fundamentally dependent on the ability of the Iraqis themselves to stand up properly their organisations and the level of political support for those organisations in certain parts of the country. That is their challenge, and we can do only so much to help them. However, that analysis of the situation gives no support to the assertion that the hon. Gentleman has just made.
I can only suspect that the hon. Gentleman has only recently entered the Chamber as I spent some time, in answer to an earlier question, explaining our strategy—explaining the logic of it and why it involves assessments of the security situation, the Iraqis’ ability to respond, our ability to support them and the political support that the security forces are receiving from the Iraqis. The commission suggests that we are mistaken in thinking that the goal can be achieved by military means alone, but we have never suggested that the future of Iraq was dependent on military means alone. It is fundamentally dependent on the ability of the Iraqis themselves to stand up properly their organisations and the level of political support for those organisations in certain parts of the country. That is their challenge, and we can do only so much to help them. However, that analysis of the situation gives no support to the assertion that the hon. Gentleman has just made.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Edward Leigh
(Conservative)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
Is the Secretary of State aware of the recent comments of Lord Inge in the House of Lords that our involvement has been a strategic failure? The fact is that our troops are now dying at a greater rate than the Americans: they can expect to be attacked within 20 minutes of leaving base. After giving up the Basra palace, those gallant men will have to retreat to the airport. How can they effectively run a country or conduct peacekeeping operations from an airport? What is our strategy, apart from staying there just to prove that we have a strategy? We should get out and get out now.
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c10-1
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
From a peak of about 45,000 personnel deployed to Iraq during major combat operations in 2003, we have drawn down progressively to 8,000 prior to handing over three of our four provinces. Since then, we have reduced in stages to 5,500. The commanders on the ground assess that that is the right number of troops to discharge our current responsibilities. As I have made clear, we expect to see further reductions as we hand over to the Iraqi security forces in Basra city.
From a peak of about 45,000 personnel deployed to Iraq during major combat operations in 2003, we have drawn down progressively to 8,000 prior to handing over three of our four provinces. Since then, we have reduced in stages to 5,500. The commanders on the ground assess that that is the right number of troops to discharge our current responsibilities. As I have made clear, we expect to see further reductions as we hand over to the Iraqi security forces in Basra city.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
David Kidney
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
What progress he has made in withdrawing troops from Iraq.
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c7
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
We cannot make any such assumption. The process of transition to Iraqi control has been ongoing for some time now. On 21 February, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stood at the Dispatch Box and explained exactly what we were going to do. We currently have 5,500 troops in Iraq. If, as we expect, we manage in a matter of weeks to hand over the Basra palace to Iraqi security control, we will be able to draw down a further 500. We will then be in a position of overwatch, which we discussed in respect of an earlier question. At that stage, we will assess the ability of the Iraqi security forces in consultation with our allies—and chiefly with our principal ally, the United States of America—and decide whether we can move on to withdrawing our forces. We will also at that stage explain our continuing support for the Iraqi Government—because I am sure that there will be continuing support.
Is the Secretary of State aware of the recent comments of Lord Inge in the House of Lords that our involvement has been a strategic failure? The fact is that our troops are now dying at a greater rate than the Americans: they can expect to be attacked within 20 minutes of leaving base. After giving up the Basra palace, those gallant men will have to retreat to the airport. How can they effectively run a country or conduct peacekeeping operations from an airport? What is our strategy, apart from staying there just to prove that we have a strategy? We should get out and get out now.
I can only suspect that the hon. Gentleman has only recently entered the Chamber as I spent some time, in answer to an earlier question, explaining our strategy—explaining the logic of it and why it involves assessments of the security situation, the Iraqis’ ability to respond, our ability to support them and the political support that the security forces are receiving from the Iraqis. The commission suggests that we are mistaken in thinking that the goal can be achieved by military means alone, but we have never suggested that the future of Iraq was dependent on military means alone. It is fundamentally dependent on the ability of the Iraqis themselves to stand up properly their organisations and the level of political support for those organisations in certain parts of the country. That is their challenge, and we can do only so much to help them. However, that analysis of the situation gives no support to the assertion that the hon. Gentleman has just made.
We cannot make any such assumption. The process of transition to Iraqi control has been ongoing for some time now. On 21 February, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stood at the Dispatch Box and explained exactly what we were going to do. We currently have 5,500 troops in Iraq. If, as we expect, we manage in a matter of weeks to hand over the Basra palace to Iraqi security control, we will be able to draw down a further 500. We will then be in a position of overwatch, which we discussed in respect of an earlier question. At that stage, we will assess the ability of the Iraqi security forces in consultation with our allies—and chiefly with our principal ally, the United States of America—and decide whether we can move on to withdrawing our forces. We will also at that stage explain our continuing support for the Iraqi Government—because I am sure that there will be continuing support.
Is the Secretary of State aware of the recent comments of Lord Inge in the House of Lords that our involvement has been a strategic failure? The fact is that our troops are now dying at a greater rate than the Americans: they can expect to be attacked within 20 minutes of leaving base. After giving up the Basra palace, those gallant men will have to retreat to the airport. How can they effectively run a country or conduct peacekeeping operations from an airport? What is our strategy, apart from staying there just to prove that we have a strategy? We should get out and get out now.
I can only suspect that the hon. Gentleman has only recently entered the Chamber as I spent some time, in answer to an earlier question, explaining our strategy—explaining the logic of it and why it involves assessments of the security situation, the Iraqis’ ability to respond, our ability to support them and the political support that the security forces are receiving from the Iraqis. The commission suggests that we are mistaken in thinking that the goal can be achieved by military means alone, but we have never suggested that the future of Iraq was dependent on military means alone. It is fundamentally dependent on the ability of the Iraqis themselves to stand up properly their organisations and the level of political support for those organisations in certain parts of the country. That is their challenge, and we can do only so much to help them. However, that analysis of the situation gives no support to the assertion that the hon. Gentleman has just made.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Dennis Skinner
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
Can we assume from the answers that the Secretary of State has given that the process of withdrawal, which I support and welcome, is purely a British one?
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c10
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
What progress he has made in withdrawing troops from Iraq.
What progress he has made in withdrawing troops from Iraq.
Asked by
David Kidney
(Labour)
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Oral questions - Lead
Status
Answered
Tabled on
10 July 2007
For answer on
16 July 2007
Answered on
16 July 2007
From a peak of about 45,000 personnel deployed to Iraq during major combat operations in 2003, we have drawn down progressively to 8,000 prior to handing over three of our four provinces. Since then, we have reduced in stages to 5,500. The commanders on the ground assess that that is the right number of troops to discharge our current responsibilities. As I have made clear, we expect to see further reductions as we hand over to the Iraqi security forces in Basra city.
Subjects
Armed forces; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations
Date
16 July 2007
Reference
463 c7; 149376
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
Lead member
Lord Hague of Richmond
Answering member
Lord Browne of Ladyton
Department
Ministry of Defence
Type
Urgent questions
Subjects
Armed forces; Armed conflict; Deployment; Iraq; Police; Peacekeeping operations; Politics and government; Terrorism
Date
12 December 2006
Reference
454 c725-6
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
I am satisfied that progress has been made. It would be complacent to suggest from the Dispatch Box that we could not do better in training Iraqi forces, because I believe that we could. However, the forces whom we have dedicated to the role do a magnificent job in training Iraqi forces and also in improving the Iraqi police service, especially as we move through Basra city in Operation Sinbad, as we have done in past months and as we will do in future months. The hon. Gentleman is correct to say that the ability of the Iraqi security forces to handle the security of that country is key to our ability to draw down. That is not lost on anybody with an understanding of Iraq.
I am satisfied that progress has been made. It would be complacent to suggest from the Dispatch Box that we could not do better in training Iraqi forces, because I believe that we could. However, the forces whom we have dedicated to the role do a magnificent job in training Iraqi forces and also in improving the Iraqi police service, especially as we move through Basra city in Operation Sinbad, as we have done in past months and as we will do in future months. The hon. Gentleman is correct to say that the ability of the Iraqi security forces to handle the security of that country is key to our ability to draw down. That is not lost on anybody with an understanding of Iraq.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Bob Spink
(Conservative)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
I am grateful for that answer. Is the Secretary of State satisfied that sufficient progress is being made in training Iraqi security forces? Does he agree that it is essential for the UK to put maximum pressure on the Iraqi Government to improve their capabilities, so that we can withdraw British troops when that is consistent with not creating a less stable situation in Iraq?
Subjects
Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Staff
Date
11 December 2006
Reference
454 c576-7
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
Some 7,100 members of the UK armed forces are serving on operations in Iraq.
Some 7,100 members of the UK armed forces are serving on operations in Iraq.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Bob Spink
(Conservative)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
How many service personnel are serving in Iraq.
Subjects
Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Staff
Date
11 December 2006
Reference
454 c576
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
How many service personnel are serving in Iraq.
How many service personnel are serving in Iraq.
Asked by
Bob Spink
(Conservative)
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Oral questions - Lead
Status
Answered
Tabled on
5 December 2006
For answer on
11 December 2006
Answered on
11 December 2006
Some 7,100 members of the UK armed forces are serving on operations in Iraq.
Subjects
Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Staff
Date
11 December 2006
Reference
454 c576; 105384
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
The requirement for a continuing coalition presence in Basra will persist until clearly defined conditions are achieved. As with all 18 Iraqi provinces, it is the achievement of those conditions that will ultimately determine when Iraqi security forces can take over responsibility for security.
The requirement for a continuing coalition presence in Basra will persist until clearly defined conditions are achieved. As with all 18 Iraqi provinces, it is the achievement of those conditions that will ultimately determine when Iraqi security forces can take over responsibility for security.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Harry Cohen
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
When he expects UK forces to leave Basra.
Subjects
Armed forces; Army; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Basra
Date
26 June 2006
Reference
448 c7-8
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his opening comments. I have already made my position clear to the House, so it is unnecessary to repeat it. I shall take into account the hon. Gentleman’s second point, although I am not aware of a level of risk immediately generated by the absence of capability that he suggests.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his opening comments. I have already made my position clear to the House, so it is unnecessary to repeat it. I shall take into account the hon. Gentleman’s second point, although I am not aware of a level of risk immediately generated by the absence of capability that he suggests.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Julian Brazier
(Conservative)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
Whatever the time scale for our armed forces in Basra, the Secretary of State’s earlier comments on possible replacements for the Snatch Land Rover in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq are welcome, provided they lead to early action. I urge the right hon. Gentleman to consider the grievous gap in our capability for clearing mines for light forces, which in practice means most of our forces in Iraq, and indeed in Afghanistan. Both those factors are putting lives at risk unnecessarily.
Subjects
Armed forces; Army; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Basra
Date
26 June 2006
Reference
448 c8
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
My hon. Friend’s position on the presence of British forces in Iraq is well known, as it has been over the years. The fact is that British forces in Basra have seen an improvement in a significant number of the services available to the people of Basra. There has been an increase in violence over the last few months, but that is entirely coincidental with the period between the election and the formation of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government are now in place and the Prime Minister, the new Defence Minister and the new Minister of the Interior have publicly stated that security in Basra is a priority. They have developed a plan that will be led by the Iraqi security forces themselves, in the form of the Iraqi army. There are significant difficulties; the Iraqi police have been significantly infiltrated by violent groups who are part of an outside process and there is a degree of corruption, but the plan addresses those issues. To suggest that the situation for the ordinary people of Basra is no better since British forces have been there is not true—it has improved for them.
My hon. Friend’s position on the presence of British forces in Iraq is well known, as it has been over the years. The fact is that British forces in Basra have seen an improvement in a significant number of the services available to the people of Basra. There has been an increase in violence over the last few months, but that is entirely coincidental with the period between the election and the formation of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government are now in place and the Prime Minister, the new Defence Minister and the new Minister of the Interior have publicly stated that security in Basra is a priority. They have developed a plan that will be led by the Iraqi security forces themselves, in the form of the Iraqi army. There are significant difficulties; the Iraqi police have been significantly infiltrated by violent groups who are part of an outside process and there is a degree of corruption, but the plan addresses those issues. To suggest that the situation for the ordinary people of Basra is no better since British forces have been there is not true—it has improved for them.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Harry Cohen
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
Is not the purpose of UK forces in Basra to maintain order and to ensure basic amenities? If so, why did a state of emergency have to be declared after a surge of killings, and why is Bill Neely, ITN’s international editor, reporting on limbs amputated for lack of basic medical supplies, children dying from preventable diseases, and no treatment for cancer patients for three years in Basra’s main hospital? Why are Ministers sleep-walking when they should be waking up to their responsibilities? If they say, ““Can’t do””, should not it be a case of ““Can’t stay””?
Subjects
Armed forces; Army; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Basra
Date
26 June 2006
Reference
448 c8
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
I, too, met General Latif and visited the 10th Division. At that stage, he was proudly showing off to me the equipment allocated to him. The indications were that if there had been a blockage in relation to the necessary equipment, the equipment was now forthcoming. The 10th Division was deploying forces in Basra city when I was there, giving security in the city a clear Iraqi face, which was welcome both to our troops and to the people of the city.
I, too, met General Latif and visited the 10th Division. At that stage, he was proudly showing off to me the equipment allocated to him. The indications were that if there had been a blockage in relation to the necessary equipment, the equipment was now forthcoming. The 10th Division was deploying forces in Basra city when I was there, giving security in the city a clear Iraqi face, which was welcome both to our troops and to the people of the city.
Answered by
Lord Browne of Ladyton
(Labour)
Asked by
Linda Gilroy
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Oral answers to questions
When the members of the Select Committee on Defence were in Iraq recently we met members of the 10th Division and General Latif. As well as giving the Iraqis support in training, did my right hon. Friend hold discussions with the Iraqi Government about how they can be resourced in terms of equipment and other things they need to do the job that they are eager and willing to take over in neighbouring states, as well as playing their part in bringing security to Basra?
Subjects
Armed forces; Army; Deployment; Iraq; Peacekeeping operations; Basra
Date
26 June 2006
Reference
448 c8-9
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons