1-18 of 18 results for subject:Software
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To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the impact of software licences that restrict specific uses of that software, such as customisation of capabilities, on the digital transformation programmes set out in the Spending Review 2025 (CP1336).
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the impact of software licences that restrict specific uses of that software, such as customisation of capabilities, on the digital transformation programmes set out in the Spending Review 2025 (CP1336).
The Digital Commercial Centre of Excellence is pursuing multiple strategies to improve value for money and outcomes in digital purchasing, including development of a digital sourcing strategy, central buying of commodity services, creation of technical enablers and joined up management of strategic digital suppliers.
Through our digital sourcing strategy and digital supplier management we will engage with suppliers to ensure appropriate licensing to achieve our digital transformation outcomes, as well as ensure we do not over customise capabilities risking them becoming legacy in the future.
To ask His Majesty's Government when they intend to deliver the full version of the new Gov.uk mobile app; and how they anticipate that it will help people access different government services.
To ask His Majesty's Government when they intend to deliver the full version of the new Gov.uk mobile app; and how they anticipate that it will help people access different government services.
The public beta of the GOV.UK app was launched on 1st July 2025, providing initial functionality to enhance access to government services.
The app will be developed iteratively, with new features such as the government’s generative AI chatbot – GOV.UK Chat, and GOV.UK Wallet introduced over time.
The app is designed to offer a personalised experience, proactively helping users to access and action central and local government services more easily and efficiently by understanding preferences and personal context.
To ask His Majesty's Government, in the light of reports that Microsoft has withdrawn services from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, what steps they are taking to ensure that software services provided to public sector bodies by non-UK based companies cannot be unexpectedly withdrawn.
To ask His Majesty's Government, in the light of reports that Microsoft has withdrawn services from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, what steps they are taking to ensure that software services provided to public sector bodies by non-UK based companies cannot be unexpectedly withdrawn.
We are aware of media reports that Microsoft may have blocked the email account of Karim Khan, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in compliance with US sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. It is our understanding that Microsoft has strongly denied this action, it would therefore be in appropriate for us to comment further at this point in time, other than to note that we constantly keep our commercial relationships under review.
To ask His Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to ensure that software services provided to UK public sector bodies by companies based in the jurisdiction of hostile state actors cannot be accessed by those hostile state actors.
To ask His Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to ensure that software services provided to UK public sector bodies by companies based in the jurisdiction of hostile state actors cannot be accessed by those hostile state actors.
The government takes data security very seriously and has taken appropriate action to mitigate hostile state actors providing or accessing the software services being used by the public sector. The National Procurement Policy Statement (NPPS) requires public sector contracting authorities to mitigate any potential risk from hostile states by addressing national security risk in all procurements.
The Procurement Act 2023 introduces powers to exclude a supplier from a specific procurement, terminate a public contract with a supplier, or debar a supplier from all, or a range of, public contracts. Ministers may exercise this power should they deem there to be a threat to national security.
Contracting authorities should follow Government Security Group (GSG)’s guidance on Tackling Security Risk in Government Supply Chains, as well as supply chain guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and National Protective Security Authority (NPSA).
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to require their suppliers to use secure container images, in a manner comparable to the United States 2024 executive order on securing the software supply chains of federal government suppliers.
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to require their suppliers to use secure container images, in a manner comparable to the United States 2024 executive order on securing the software supply chains of federal government suppliers.
In February 2025 Cabinet Office published the updated National Procurement Policy Statement (NPPS). The statement requires all public sector contracting authorities in scope to mitigate supply chain and national security risks by ensuring appropriate controls are in place, such as the Cyber Essentials standard for cyber security. Contracting authorities should also follow government guidance on Tackling Security Risk in Government Supply Chains inclusive of software security risk.
In May 2025 DSIT published a voluntary Software Security Code of Practice. The Code of Practice has been developed to improve the security and resilience of software that organisations and businesses rely on. This is not mandatory for government suppliers but we strongly encourage public sector organisations to use the Code of Practice in their commercial engagements.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether any departments or government agencies monitor the use of insecure or vulnerable container images within government IT systems; and, if so, whether they will publish the latest audit data on the number of container images in use that contain critical or high-severity vulnerabilities.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether any departments or government agencies monitor the use of insecure or vulnerable container images within government IT systems; and, if so, whether they will publish the latest audit data on the number of container images in use that contain critical or high-severity vulnerabilities.
All government departments and their Arms Length Bodies must meet the Government Cyber Security Standard, which specifies that organisations shall meet or exceed the security outcomes specified in the National Cyber Security Centre’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF). Principle B4 of the CAF on system security requires departments to manage vulnerabilities on their systems.
His Majesty’s Government does not hold a central view of departmental or agency vulnerabilities.
To ask His Majesty's Government what is their response to the recommendation by the Children's Commissioner for England to ban 'nudification' apps that enable users to generate sexually explicit images of real people.
To ask His Majesty's Government what is their response to the recommendation by the Children's Commissioner for England to ban 'nudification' apps that enable users to generate sexually explicit images of real people.
Government refuses to tolerate violence against women and girls. Sexually explicit deepfakes are degrading and harmful.
We are legislating to ban their creation in the Data (Use and Access) Bill and have introduced a further offence in the Crime and Policing Bill to criminalise the possession, creation or distribution of AI tools designed to generate child sexual abuse material.
Government is also actively looking at options to address ‘nudification’ tools themselves.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the Internet Watch Foundation’s Annual Data and Insights Report 2024, published on 23 April, particularly with regard to child sexual abuse material generated by artificial intelligence.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the Internet Watch Foundation’s Annual Data and Insights Report 2024, published on 23 April, particularly with regard to child sexual abuse material generated by artificial intelligence.
My Lords, I welcome my noble friend Lady Berger to her first Oral Question and thank her for it being on such an important issue that faces us today. The Internet Watch Foundation’s annual report highlights a harrowing increase in the amount of AI-generated child sexual abuse material online. The scale is shocking, with over 424,000 reports in 2024 suspected to contain child sex abuse imagery. The Government are deeply committed to tackling this crisis through the Online Safety Act and are specifically targeting AI CSAM threats in the Crime and Policing Bill. I pay tribute to the work of the IWF, which has been vital in helping us to identify and block such content.
My Lords, I welcome my noble friend Lady Berger to her first Oral Question and thank her for it being on such an important issue that faces us today. The Internet Watch Foundation’s annual report highlights a harrowing increase in the amount of AI-generated child sexual abuse material online. The scale is shocking, with over 424,000 reports in 2024 suspected to contain child sex abuse imagery. The Government are deeply committed to tackling this crisis through the Online Safety Act and are specifically targeting AI CSAM threats in the Crime and Policing Bill. I pay tribute to the work of the IWF, which has been vital in helping us to identify and block such content.
My Lords, I welcome my noble friend Lady Berger to her first Oral Question and thank her for it being on such an important issue that faces us today. The Internet Watch Foundation’s annual report highlights a harrowing increase in the amount of AI-generated child sexual abuse material online. The scale is shocking, with over 424,000 reports in 2024 suspected to contain child sex abuse imagery. The Government are deeply committed to tackling this crisis through the Online Safety Act and are specifically targeting AI CSAM threats in the Crime and Policing Bill. I pay tribute to the work of the IWF, which has been vital in helping us to identify and block such content.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the Internet Watch Foundation’s Annual Data and Insights Report 2024, published on 23 April, particularly with regard to child sexual abuse material generated by artificial intelligence.
My Lords, through the Crime and Policing Bill, the Government will introduce a new suite of measures to tackle the growing threat of AI. This includes criminalising AI models made or adapted to generate child sexual abuse imagery and extending the existing paedophile manuals offence to cover AI-generated child sexual abuse material. In addition, the Home Office will bolster the network of undercover online police officers to target online offenders and develop cutting-edge AI tools and other new capabilities to infiltrate live streams and chat rooms where children are groomed. The Home Office is developing options at pace on potential device operating system-level safety controls to prevent online exploitation and abuse of children. It is also vital that we tackle the widespread sharing of self-generated indecent imagery. The report shows that 91% of the images are self-generated. This is young people who are being groomed and often quite innocently sharing their material, not realising the purpose for
which it will be used. This is a huge and pressing issue, and my noble friend quite rightly raises that we need to take action now to tackle this scourge.
My Lords, through the Crime and Policing Bill, the Government will introduce a new suite of measures to tackle the growing threat of AI. This includes criminalising AI models made or adapted to generate child sexual abuse imagery and extending the existing paedophile manuals offence to cover AI-generated child sexual abuse material. In addition, the Home Office will bolster the network of undercover online police officers to target online offenders and develop cutting-edge AI tools and other new capabilities to infiltrate live streams and chat rooms where children are groomed. The Home Office is developing options at pace on potential device operating system-level safety controls to prevent online exploitation and abuse of children. It is also vital that we tackle the widespread sharing of self-generated indecent imagery. The report shows that 91% of the images are self-generated. This is young people who are being groomed and often quite innocently sharing their material, not realising the purpose for
which it will be used. This is a huge and pressing issue, and my noble friend quite rightly raises that we need to take action now to tackle this scourge.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. As she alluded to, the Internet Watch Foundation’s report points to hundreds of thousands of reports during the 2024 period. It is a record-breaking number of reports, which is driven partly by a number of new threats, including AI-generated child sexual abuse, sextortion and the malicious sharing of sexual imagery. The IWF says that under-18s are now facing a “crisis” of sexual exploitation and risk online. I heard what the Minister said and ask her what the Government intend to do to protect children in the UK and around the world now to ensure that, when the 2025 report comes out next year, we see a significant reduction in the number of these crimes.
The noble Baroness is quite right that we have to keep the technology up to date, and of course we are endeavouring to do that. I should say that UK law applies to AI-generated CSAM in the same way as to real child sexual abuse. Creating, possessing or distributing any child sex abuse images, including those generated by AI, is illegal. Generative AI child sexual abuse imagery is priority illegal content under the Online Safety Act in the same way as real content. However, she is quite right: we have to keep abreast of the technology. We are working at pace across government to make sure that we have the capacity to do that.
The noble Baroness is quite right that we have to keep the technology up to date, and of course we are endeavouring to do that. I should say that UK law applies to AI-generated CSAM in the same way as to real child sexual abuse. Creating, possessing or distributing any child sex abuse images, including those generated by AI, is illegal. Generative AI child sexual abuse imagery is priority illegal content under the Online Safety Act in the same way as real content. However, she is quite right: we have to keep abreast of the technology. We are working at pace across government to make sure that we have the capacity to do that.
My Lords, it is clear that, with the constant evolution of technology, we risk not being able to legislate rapidly enough to keep pace. How are the Government conducting their horizon scanning to ensure that we are always one step ahead of those who seek to abuse children in this way?
I thank the noble Lord for that question. The Government are actively looking at options to address nudification tools, and we hope to provide an update shortly. It is a matter that we take seriously. If such tools are used to create child sexual abuse material, UK law is clear that creating, possessing or distributing child sexual abuse images, including those generated using nudification tools, is already illegal, regardless of whether it depicts a real child or not.
I thank the noble Lord for that question. The Government are actively looking at options to address nudification tools, and we hope to provide an update shortly. It is a matter that we take seriously. If such tools are used to create child sexual abuse material, UK law is clear that creating, possessing or distributing child sexual abuse images, including those generated using nudification tools, is already illegal, regardless of whether it depicts a real child or not.
My Lords, the Children’s Commissioner, Dame Rachel de Souza, and the IWF have both called for a total ban on apps which allow nudification, where photos of real people are edited by AI to make them appear naked. The commissioner has been particularly critical about the fact that such apps
“go unchecked with extreme real-world consequences”.
Will the Government act and ban these AI-enabled tools outright?
The noble Baroness makes a really important point about media literacy. It is again an issue that my department is taking very seriously, and it is an issue that Ofcom also has a statutory responsibility for, but she is right that schools have an essential part to play in this. The curriculum review which is currently taking place is identifying the need to give children more resilience and to give them the tools to identify what is safe and what is unsafe behaviour and to scrutinise the posts
that they see in a more informed way. That work is ongoing in the curriculum review and the interim report from the Department for Education has identified that it is a priority.
The noble Baroness makes a really important point about media literacy. It is again an issue that my department is taking very seriously, and it is an issue that Ofcom also has a statutory responsibility for, but she is right that schools have an essential part to play in this. The curriculum review which is currently taking place is identifying the need to give children more resilience and to give them the tools to identify what is safe and what is unsafe behaviour and to scrutinise the posts
that they see in a more informed way. That work is ongoing in the curriculum review and the interim report from the Department for Education has identified that it is a priority.
My Lords, the Minister mentioned that a rather high percentage of the material was generated by young people themselves, without being aware of the implications. What is she doing with the Department for Education to ensure that the risks and challenges of unsafe online behaviour are highlighted to children through schools?
My Lords, we are already taking steps to deal with this. We are committed to making sure that our laws tackle child sexual abuse materials and keep pace with technological developments. In the Crime and Policing Bill, we have introduced an offence to criminalise AI models that have been optimised to create child sexual abuse material. We have introduced an offence to criminalise those who maintain or moderate websites that use such services and use shared child sexual abuse imagery—whether it is real or fake, as the noble Lord says. In the Data (Use and Access) Bill, we have updated existing law that criminalises paedophile manuals to cover artificially generated CSAM. So there are a number of steps that we are already taking within the current legislation programme to deal with these incidents.
My Lords, we are already taking steps to deal with this. We are committed to making sure that our laws tackle child sexual abuse materials and keep pace with technological developments. In the Crime and Policing Bill, we have introduced an offence to criminalise AI models that have been optimised to create child sexual abuse material. We have introduced an offence to criminalise those who maintain or moderate websites that use such services and use shared child sexual abuse imagery—whether it is real or fake, as the noble Lord says. In the Data (Use and Access) Bill, we have updated existing law that criminalises paedophile manuals to cover artificially generated CSAM. So there are a number of steps that we are already taking within the current legislation programme to deal with these incidents.
My Lords, the rapidly increasing number of AI-generated images in circulation that depict child sexual abuse is deeply disturbing. The creation of such imagery uses the faces or bodies of real children, and much of it falls into category A material, depicting abuse of the most extreme kind. Will the Minister explain what the Government’s plans are to crack down on those who share information specifically on how to use text-to-image-based generative AI tools, a practice which leads to the creation of this appalling material?
It is important to recognise that the measures that Ofcom has set out in the illegal content codes of practice and, last week, in the child safety codes of practice are a landmark change to protect users online. They mark the first time that platforms in the UK are legally required to tackle illegal content and content that is harmful to children. Section 47 of the Online Safety Act requires Ofcom to keep these under review. Additionally, Section 178 requires the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of the regime two to five years after the legislation comes into force. The report on the outcome of that review must be laid before Parliament. I stress to my noble friend that the Act is not the end of the conversation; it is the foundation. We continue to look at how we can develop the legislation and how Ofcom can strengthen the codes in its own way. We are listening and debating, and we will not hesitate to take further action if it proves to be necessary.
It is important to recognise that the measures that Ofcom has set out in the illegal content codes of practice and, last week, in the child safety codes of practice are a landmark change to protect users online. They mark the first time that platforms in the UK are legally required to tackle illegal content and content that is harmful to children. Section 47 of the Online Safety Act requires Ofcom to keep these under review. Additionally, Section 178 requires the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of the regime two to five years after the legislation comes into force. The report on the outcome of that review must be laid before Parliament. I stress to my noble friend that the Act is not the end of the conversation; it is the foundation. We continue to look at how we can develop the legislation and how Ofcom can strengthen the codes in its own way. We are listening and debating, and we will not hesitate to take further action if it proves to be necessary.
My Lords, a number of concerns have been raised about Ofcom’s recently released draft illegal content codes of practice. Can my noble friend the Minister say what plans the Government have to monitor the effectiveness of those codes of practice?
My noble friend raises a really important point, but I stress that if a service, including file-sharing and storage services, poses a material risk to users in the United Kingdom, it must abide by the Online Safety Act and the illegal content duties, no matter where it is based. Ofcom has recognised the importance of tackling this issue specifically and has identified it as an early priority for enforcement, opening up a programme to assess the measures being implemented by file-sharing and file-storage services to prevent those services being used. My noble friend is right that a lot of these incidents are happening on an international basis. We are working with our colleagues internationally to make sure that we share information and determine the source of some of these materials, because sometimes we need to take action on an international basis.
My noble friend raises a really important point, but I stress that if a service, including file-sharing and storage services, poses a material risk to users in the United Kingdom, it must abide by the Online Safety Act and the illegal content duties, no matter where it is based. Ofcom has recognised the importance of tackling this issue specifically and has identified it as an early priority for enforcement, opening up a programme to assess the measures being implemented by file-sharing and file-storage services to prevent those services being used. My noble friend is right that a lot of these incidents are happening on an international basis. We are working with our colleagues internationally to make sure that we share information and determine the source of some of these materials, because sometimes we need to take action on an international basis.
My Lords, as the wording of my noble friend Lady Berger’s original Question and her supplementary question rightly emphasises, the report pinpoints AI-generated child
sexual abuse images as a growing area of concern. Many of them were indistinguishable from real photographs, with the IWF suggesting that their growing number risks re-victimising persons who are previous victims of sexual abuse. Over 70% of AI-generated sexual abuse images are hosted on servers in Russia, Japan, the United States and the Netherlands. What is being done to solve the jurisdictional issues that allow perpetrators and disseminators of this appalling abuse to act with impunity?
To ask His Majesty's Government what actions they are taking to address restrictive software licensing practices by dominant cloud providers, as identified by the Competition and Markets Authority, to ensure fair competition in the cloud services market.
To ask His Majesty's Government what actions they are taking to address restrictive software licensing practices by dominant cloud providers, as identified by the Competition and Markets Authority, to ensure fair competition in the cloud services market.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has indicated in its provisional Cloud Services report that it will recommend to its Board prioritising Strategic Market Status (SMS) investigations into Amazon Web Services and Microsoft. Decisions on which SMS investigations to launch are for the CMA, as the UK's independent competition authority. The Government will consider any additional recommendations made by the CMA in its final report, which is not expected until Summer 2025.
To ask His Majesty's Government, following the finding in the Internet Matters report The new face of digital abuse: Children's experiences of nude deepfakes, published on 22 October, that nearly half a million children have encountered AI deepfake nudes online, what plans they have to ban apps that create deepfake nudes.
To ask His Majesty's Government, following the finding in the Internet Matters report The new face of digital abuse: Children's experiences of nude deepfakes, published on 22 October, that nearly half a million children have encountered AI deepfake nudes online, what plans they have to ban apps that create deepfake nudes.
Any child sexual abuse material, whether AI generated or not, is illegal in the UK. It is also illegal to share or threaten to share an AI-generated intimate image of an adult without consent. The government will take further action by delivering the manifesto commitment to ban the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes.
The Online Safety Act requires services in scope to proactively tackle child sexual abuse content and intimate image abuse content. The Act also requires services to use highly effective age assurance to prevent children from encountering pornography. These requirements apply to AI-generated content.