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To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 25 July 2023 to Question 194793 on Ministry of Defence: Correspondence, if he will make a statement to the House once the assessment on email traffic from his Department to .ML domains has been completed.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 25 July 2023 to Question 194793 on Ministry of Defence: Correspondence, if he will make a statement to the House once the assessment on email traffic from his Department to .ML domains has been completed.
The Ministry of Defence takes the security of our people, our information and our systems very seriously. While all sensitive information is shared on systems which would prevent such misdirection, policies are put in place on all email systems to minimise the risk of such mistakes. On OFFICIAL systems, data loss prevention tools will prompt users who seek to send OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE information outside of Government domains, drawing attention to, and allowing the correction of, errors such as mistyped domain names.
Investigations are still ongoing however to date, we have identified 55 emails that have been sent to the .ML top level domain since January 2022. Of these, it is assessed that 15 were misdirected emails, that were destined for a .MIL address. We are confident that this small number of emails did not contain any technical data or information that could compromise operational security. Seven of these were sent in 2022, and eight in 2023.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the comments made by a Departmental spokesperson on 27 July 2023, how many emails were sent from his Department to .ML domains in each year since 2010.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the comments made by a Departmental spokesperson on 27 July 2023, how many emails were sent from his Department to .ML domains in each year since 2010.
The Ministry of Defence takes the security of our people, our information and our systems very seriously. While all sensitive information is shared on systems which would prevent such misdirection, policies are put in place on all email systems to minimise the risk of such mistakes. On OFFICIAL systems, data loss prevention tools will prompt users who seek to send OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE information outside of Government domains, drawing attention to, and allowing the correction of, errors such as mistyped domain names.
Investigations are still ongoing however to date, we have identified 55 emails that have been sent to the .ML top level domain since January 2022. Of these, it is assessed that 15 were misdirected emails, that were destined for a .MIL address. We are confident that this small number of emails did not contain any technical data or information that could compromise operational security. Seven of these were sent in 2022, and eight in 2023.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the potential implications for its policies of reports that US military emails have been misdirected to Mali .ML domain addresses; and whether his Department is aware of any e-mails originating from his Department being sent,...
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the potential implications for its policies of reports that US military emails have been misdirected to Mali .ML domain addresses; and whether his Department is aware of any e-mails originating from his Department being sent,...
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is conducting an assessment of its email traffic with .ML domains. This involves understanding what emails were sent to .ML domains, and which of these might consist of any e-mails sent in error.
While all sensitive information is shared on systems which would prevent such misdirection, policies are put in place on all email systems to minimise the risk of such mistakes. On OFFICIAL systems, data loss prevention tools will prompt users who seek to send OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE information outside of Government domains, drawing attention to, and allowing the correction of, errors such as mistyped domain names.
Once the analysis of our email traffic is complete, we will consider what, if any, changes need to be made to MOD policies.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many veterans contacted the Veterans Gateway via email in each nation and region of the UK in each year since 2019.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many veterans contacted the Veterans Gateway via email in each nation and region of the UK in each year since 2019.
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave her on 6 June 2023 to Question 186791.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many veterans contacted the Veterans Gateway via email in each year since 2019.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many veterans contacted the Veterans Gateway via email in each year since 2019.
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 6 June to Question 186791.