A 2024 Natural England risk review [see attached] concluded that there is a very high likelihood that captive-reared mallards will be exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 after release. Once exposed, there is a very high likelihood of widespread morbidity and mortality in wild birds. The review concludes that captive-reared juvenile mallards have potential to act as both a reservoir and amplifier of H5N1 and to play a major role in H5N1’s continued persistence and dissemination.

The release of captive-reared mallards is already prohibited in Protection Zones, Surveillance Zone and Captive Bird Monitoring Controlled Zones. Releases are also prohibited in Avian Influenza Prevention Zones with housing measures.

Defra is not aware that a habitats regulations assessment (HRA) has been carried out for the release of Mallards (for shooting) on Special Protection Areas (SPAs) and Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) in England.

This Government is considering the available evidence on the impacts of gamebird and mallard release and shooting in England, including Natural England’s report The risks from H5N1 to wild birds from captive-reared mallard, published on 24 June 2024. This Government will also engage with the sector and other stakeholder groups as this work progresses. This work is helping to inform consideration of whether further measures, including licensing, may be needed in relation to the release of captive-reared birds.

In the event of a confirmed case of notifiable avian disease in gamebirds, The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) makes an assessment of whether the gamebirds are considered for the purposes of disease control to be kept poultry or wild birds. Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. If there is uncertainty of their status this is escalated to Defra for a final decision. Under disease control legislation “wild game bird” means a wild bird which lives freely in the wild and is hunted for human consumption.

Please see costs for the Avian Flu outbreaks in the 2024–25 season (1 October 2024 – 30 September 2025).

Outbreak Year 2024 - 25

Note:

I. The costs to His Majesty's Government are for England total, as Devolved Governments recharged costs.

II. The figures do not include:

o the split between poultry and game because data is not disaggregated by these categories

o the split between disinfection and other costs because data is not disaggregated by these categories

III. It is possible that some of these costs will change as there may be late submissions of invoices and some data are subject to review and audit.

Defra, in conjunction with Welsh Government and Scottish Government, commissioned a risk assessment from the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), to further understand the impact game bird releases have on transmission of avian influenza in wild birds, and between wild birds and kept birds in periods of higher than usual levels of avian influenza. This risk assessment is published on gov.uk as part of the ‘Animal diseases: international and UK monitoring’ collection.

Furthermore, a risk assessment of the likely transmission of Avian Influenza from Livestock to Humans was undertaken by Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance (HAIRS) group, and concluded that the probability of infection in the UK population is considered very low.

This assessment has informed disease controls. During outbreaks, there are controls on the release of game birds in areas of known high risk. The release of game birds is not permitted in any avian influenza disease control zone, nor are game bird releases permitted while an avian influenza prevention zone, including mandatory housing measures, is in force.

The Avian Influenza Prevention Zone (AIPZ) currently in force throughout the whole of England was updated to include additional biosecurity measures for game bird operations on 26 August 2025. These measures reflect the specific disease risks associated with the game bird and shooting sector during the gamebird release season and are intended to protect both wild and captive bird populations.

Within the AIPZ, birds must not be put in a release pen if they show signs of avian influenza. Game birds kept in release pens must be checked daily and any birds showing clinical signs suggestive of avian influenza must receive immediate and appropriate attention, including discussing the clinical signs with a veterinary surgeon. Any suspicion of avian influenza must be reported to the Animal and Plant Health Agency immediately. Keepers must also conduct a daily search of the area within and up to a 50-metre radius surrounding the release pen(s) and feeding and watering stations, for carcases of dead game birds and/or dead wild birds. These should be reported to Defra using the online reporting service for dead wild birds. If carcases are not required for avian influenza surveillance, the carcases must be appropriately disposed of (see attached).

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) leads government action on animal disease control in Great Britain. APHA and its contractors utilise a range of culling methods to humanely remove birds on infected premises where highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) or other notifiable disease has been confirmed.

One of the Animal Welfare Committee’s key recommendations was that ventilation shutdown should not be used for the culling of any poultry in disease control procedures due to the unacceptable impact on bird welfare.

Whole house gassing represents a better option, and this approach is deployed as a priority. Operational plans for the deployment of whole house gassing and other approved culling methods take account of the epidemiological risk for each case.

We are continuing to consider whether there are additional humane culling methods, such as high expansion nitrogen foam for poultry, that could be utilised but there are currently no plans for research into in-feed or in-water medications.

The vaccination of poultry and captive birds, excluding those in licensed zoos in England, against avian influenza is not currently permitted. While vaccination is not a viable option at present, Defra continues to explore the potential for use of vaccination as a preventative measure for avian influenza through the work of the cross-Government and industry avian influenza vaccination task force. The task force published an interim statement on 7 March 2025 (copy attached), and will publish a more detailed report in summer 2025.

As part of this work, Defra and the Veterinary Medicines Directorate will continue to monitor the development and availability of vaccines for their utility in preventing and responding to avian influenza outbreaks as they are put forward for market authorisation by vaccine manufacturers.

Influenza of avian origin (H5N1) has been detected in a sheep in England, following routine surveillance of co-located livestock on a premises where highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 had been confirmed in other captive birds. To mitigate the risk of further disease spread the affected birds and the infected ewe have been humanely culled. Further official testing of the remaining flock of sheep was all negative for the presence of avian influenza virus. Surveillance in the disease control zones in force in the area surrounding these premises will be undertaken, and these zones will remain in force until all disease control and surveillance activities have been successfully completed.

While this is the first time avian influenza virus has been detected in a sheep, it is not the first time influenza of avian origin has been detected in livestock in other countries. Whist we remain vigilant for any changes in risk, there is no evidence to suggest an increased risk to the nation's livestock population.

In response to the unprecedented global outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in recent years, the UK's avian influenza national reference laboratory has increased its surveillance for avian influenza virus in mammals and genome analysis of the virus itself. The case definition for influenza of avian origin has been updated and provides guidance for animal keepers and veterinary professionals on how and when to report suspicion in mammals. Additional information on how we monitor influenza of avian origin in wild mammals and how the public can report suspicion is available via GOV.UK/birdflu.

Following this detection, the Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance group have carried out a risk assessment, and assessed the probability of infection with influenza of avian origin from lactating livestock as very low for the general population and low for individuals interacting with infected lactating livestock.

While risk levels remain low, keepers are encouraged to maintain strict biosecurity in order to protect the health and welfare of their animals.

Influenza of avian origin (H5N1) has been detected in a sheep in England, following routine surveillance of co-located livestock on a premises where highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 had been confirmed in other captive birds. To mitigate the risk of further disease spread the affected birds and the infected ewe have been humanely culled. Further official testing of the remaining flock of sheep was all negative for the presence of avian influenza virus. Surveillance in the disease control zones in force in the area surrounding these premises will be undertaken, and these zones will remain in force until all disease control and surveillance activities have been successfully completed.

While this is the first time avian influenza virus has been detected in a sheep, it is not the first time influenza of avian origin has been detected in livestock in other countries. Whist we remain vigilant for any changes in risk, there is no evidence to suggest an increased risk to the nation's livestock population.

In response to the unprecedented global outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in recent years, the UK's avian influenza national reference laboratory has increased its surveillance for avian influenza virus in mammals and genome analysis of the virus itself. The case definition for influenza of avian origin has been updated and provides guidance for animal keepers and veterinary professionals on how and when to report suspicion in mammals. Additional information on how we monitor influenza of avian origin in wild mammals and how the public can report suspicion is available via GOV.UK/birdflu.

Following this detection, the Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance group have carried out a risk assessment, and assessed the probability of infection with influenza of avian origin from lactating livestock as very low for the general population and low for individuals interacting with infected lactating livestock.

While risk levels remain low, keepers are encouraged to maintain strict biosecurity in order to protect the health and welfare of their animals.

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) has published on GOV.UK their assessment of the risk of catching up gamebirds and the transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. The need to update this risk assessment in response to new scientific evidence, veterinary advice or significant changes in the epidemiological situation is kept under review as part of the Government’s work to monitor and manage the risks of avian influenza.

Defra has also published guidance on GOV.UK specifically covering the avian influenza rules and best practice in disease prevention for gamebirds. Defra, together with APHA and Natural England, work closely with industry groups to ensure this vital information is distributed and utilised by the gamebird sector.

Stringent biosecurity is key to protecting the health and welfare of poultry and other captive birds and is critical to preventing disease spread during an avian influenza outbreak. Defra has published guidance and together with the Animal and Plant Health Agency provides support to bird keepers on how to implement strong biosecurity measures. Government will continue to work closely with industry to ensure good flock management and husbandry practices are implemented on all farms regardless of their size or type. The need to mandate enhanced biosecurity or other controls on bird keepers are kept under regular review as part of the government’s work to monitor and manage the risks of avian influenza.

At an international level, collaboration and knowledge exchange with international partners takes place regularly through the networks of international reference laboratories, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Quadripartite Organisations and allied projects, including through the joint World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Scientific Network on animal influenza OFFLU.

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) carries out year-round surveillance for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in dead wild birds, including wild gamebirds, in Great Britain and publishes results on GOV.UK. These can be explored through APHA’s interactive map and dashboard available at GOV.UK

To ensure our approach to disease control reflects any risk these activities pose, APHA has assessed the impact gamebird releases have on the likelihood of transmission of avian influenza to wild birds, and between wild birds and kept birds. The need to update this risk assessment in response to new scientific evidence or veterinary advice or significant changes in the epidemiological situation is kept under review as part of the government’s work to monitor and manage the risks of avian influenza.

Defra and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) have stood up their well-established outbreak structures to control and eradicate disease, restore normal trade, and assist local communities’ recovery as set out in the Contingency plan for exotic notifiable diseases of animals in England, Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain and the Mitigation Strategy for Avian Influenza in Wild Birds in England and Wales. This includes working closely to share information and manage incidents with the Department for Health and Social Care, the UK Health Security Agency and the Food Standards Agency.

In addition, international collaboration and knowledge exchange on the threat of avian influenza from across Government is coordinated by Defra and facilitated through discussions between the UK Chief Veterinary Officer and representatives from Defra policy teams and APHA’s avian influenza national and international reference laboratories, and their global counterparts through the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Quadripartite Organisations and allied projects. Including through the the joint World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Scientific Network on animal influenza OFFLU.

The prevention measures mandated through an Avian Influenza Prevention Zone (AIPZ) are introduced in a phased and escalating manner proportionate to the escalating risk to an area. An AIPZ mandating enhanced biosecurity was declared across the East Riding of Yorkshire, the City of Kingston upon Hull, Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk on the 13 November 2024 in response to cases in the area and an increase in both the wild bird and poultry avian influenza risk levels. The AIPZ was extended to include mandatory housing from the 23 December 2024 following a further increase in both the wild bird and poultry risk levels and an escalating number of cases in the area indicating further controls were required to stop the spread of disease. Decisions on when to introduce or vary controls are based on risk assessments of the latest scientific and ornithological evidence and veterinary advice.

Defra’s approach to avian influenza is set out in the Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain supported by the Mitigation Strategy for Avian Influenza in Wild Birds in England and Wales. Current policy reflects our experience of responding to past outbreaks of exotic animal disease and is in line with international standards of best practice for disease control.

All avian influenza disease control and prevention measures are kept under regular review as part of the government’s work to monitor and manage the risks of avian influenza, and all decisions regarding these measures are based on risk assessments containing the latest scientific and ornithological evidence and veterinary advice.

Figures include (i) compensation claims related to the avian influenza compensation scheme; and (ii) operational costs, which includes culling, disposal, and cleaning and disinfection at infected premises.

2023/24 Total costs of £13.1 million, made up of £2.9 million compensation claims and £10.2million of operational costs

2022/23 Total costs of £84.5 million, made up of £38.3 million compensation claims and £46.2 million of operational costs

2021/22 Total costs of £24.8 million, made up of £6.5 million compensation claims and £18.3 million of operational costs

2020/21 Total costs of £4.5 million, made up of £1.5 million compensation claims and £3.0 million of operational costs

2019/20 Total costs of £0.1 million, made up of £0.1 million in operational costs, there were no compensation claims.

Defra regularly assesses the local risk of HPAI to internationally protected birds on Special Protected Areas subject to the General licence 45. It has not been necessary to modify or revoke the licence as no gamebirds are being released at the times stated and the biosecurity conditions of GL45 were considered sufficiently precautionary.

In 2023 58 claims for compensation for avian influenza were paid. To date, in 2024 7 claims for compensation have been paid.