1-10 of 10 results for subject:Verification
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2000
Type
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Members' contributions (4)
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Oral answers to questions (2)
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Oral questions (2)
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Parliamentary committees (1)
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Written questions (4)
House
Session
Month
Department
Member
Primary member
Answering member
Legislative stage
Legislation
Subject
More
Publisher
Type
Select Committee reports (Government responses);
Command papers
Author
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Laid on
24 October 2000
Notes
Received 24.10.00
Subjects
Chemical weapons; Biological weapons; Arms control; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Chemical Weapons Convention; Firearms; Iraq; Export controls; Landmines; India; International Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear weapons; Pakistan; Proliferation; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Terrorism; Treaties; Weapons; Verification; USA; Russia; Foreign Affairs Committee; Iran; Middle East; North Korea; Guided weapons; UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission; Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Strategic nuclear weapons; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Commons Library location
CS 962
Date
24 October 2000
Reference
Cm 4884
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what proportion of his departmental budget is allocated for expenditure on (a) the verification of nuclear arms agreements, (b) the dismantling of redundant nuclear weapons stocks, (c) research on the safe storage and transport of nuclear weapons and (d) the development of...
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what proportion of his departmental budget is allocated for expenditure on (a) the verification of nuclear arms agreements, (b) the dismantling of redundant nuclear weapons stocks, (c) research on the safe storage and transport of nuclear weapons and (d) the development of...
Asked by
Llew Smith
(Labour)
Answered by
Geoffrey Hoon
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
12 July 2000
For answer on
24 July 2000
Answered on
24 July 2000
Mr. Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of his departmental budget is allocated for expenditure on
(a) the verification of nuclear arms agreements, (b) the dismantling of redundant nuclear weapons stocks, (c) research on the safe
storage and transport of nuclear weapons and (d) the development of a new nuclear warhead or delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads
(i) independently and (ii) in collaboration with the United States, using computer simulation facilities. [130846]
Mr. Hoon: The following sums are recorded as having been expended during 1999-2000:
(a) the verification of nuclear arms agreements--£4.2 million
(b) the dismantling of redundant nuclear weapons--£11.5 million
(c) work on the safe storage and transport of nuclear weapons makes use of information and capabilities gained in the various parts
of the wider research programme rather than as a discrete activity. This information could be provided only at disproportionate
cost.
(d) There are no current plans for any replacement for Trident, and as published in the Strategic Defence Review, we are maintaining
only the minimum capability to design and produce a successor should this prove necessary. There was therefore no expenditure on the
development of a new nuclear warhead or delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads, (i) independently or (ii) in collaboration with the
United States, using computer simulation facilities.
Subjects
Arms control; Expenditure; Nuclear weapons; Treaties; Transport; Storage; Safety; Research; Verification
Date
24 July 2000
Reference
354 c379W; 130846
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what assessment he has made of the conclusion of former UNSCOM officials that Iraq has been disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what assessment he has made of the conclusion of former UNSCOM officials that Iraq has been disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction.
Asked by
Julia Drown
(Labour)
Answered by
Lord Hain
(Labour)
Answering body
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
12 May 2000
For answer on
18 May 2000
Answered on
18 May 2000
Ms Drown: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the conclusion of former
UNSCOM officials that Iraq has been disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction. [122535]
Mr. Hain: Up until its withdrawal from Iraq in December 1998, UNSCOM consistently reported to the United Nations Security Council
that serious gaps remained in Iraq's declarations on chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. In March 1999, the
United Nations Disarmament Panel confirmed UNSCOM's analysis. We therefore believe it is essential that Iraq allows United Nations
weapons inspectors to resume their work.
Subjects
Chemical and biological warfare; Inspections; Iraq; Nuclear weapons; Monitoring; Verification; UN Special Commission on Iraq
Date
18 May 2000
Reference
122535; 350 c222W;350 c224W
House
House of Commons
Deposited by
Home Office
Type
Deposited papers
Author
Home Office
Committed on
17 May 2000
Originated on
1 May 2000
Received on
17 May 2000
Subjects
Candidates; Campaigns; Elections; Electorate; European Parliament; Electoral systems; Publicity; Voting methods; Verification; Ballot papers
Commons Library location
Dep 00/820;PCC 324.940859 May 2000,P
Date
17 May 2000
Reference
Dep 00/820
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what quantities of strategic nuclear material have been declared surplus to military requirements in the last 10 years; when, and in what form, the material was transferred to civilian facilities and in which locations; on what date the material was notified to...
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what quantities of strategic nuclear material have been declared surplus to military requirements in the last 10 years; when, and in what form, the material was transferred to civilian facilities and in which locations; on what date the material was notified to...
Asked by
Llew Smith
(Labour)
Answered by
Lord Moonie
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
1 March 2000
For answer on
14 March 2000
Answered on
14 March 2000
Mr. Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what quantities of strategic nuclear material have been declared surplus
to military requirements in the last 10 years; when, and in what form, the material was transferred to civilian facilities and in
which locations; on what date the material was notified to Euratom and IAEA safeguards authorities as non-military; when the first
visits were paid by inspection teams from each body respectively to verify the notification; and what costs have been incurred to
date in the transfer of status of the nuclear material. [113285]
Dr. Moonie: Details of the defence nuclear materials which are now deemed to be surplus to our requirements are given in paragraph
26 of Supporting Essay 5 of the Strategic Defence Review (Cm 3999), copies of which are in the Library of the House.
During July and August 1998, the following material was brought into safeguards:
Approximately 4.1 tonnes of plutonium stored at the BNFL Sellafield facility; Approximately 9,000 tonnes of depleted natural and low
enriched uranium at the BNFL Capenhurst, Chapelcross, Sellafield and Springfields facilities and UKAEA Harwell.
Steps are being taken to move 0.3 tonnes of weapon grade plutonium (in the form of oxide) stored at AWE Aldermaston to Sellafield
when it too will be formally reported to Euratom and brought into safeguards. To date, some 73 kilograms of this material have been
transferred; the remainder will be moved as soon as is practicable.
In addition to the material referred to above, there have been a number of occasions over the last 10 years where material has been
brought into safeguards--notably in 1996 when the Calder Hall reactors and the fuel associated with them came into safeguards. The
Department for Trade and Industry are responsible for safeguards issues. However, they have advised that the detailed information
requested on the large numbers of these other transfers into safeguards and also inspections by the international safeguards
authorities is not collated centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Activities to verify nuclear material which has been brought into safeguards have been added to Euratom's ongoing schedule of
routine safeguards inspections at the facilities concerned. These routine inspections are such that there is essentially continuous
Euratom presence at Sellafield, weekly inspections at the Springfields location and less frequent inspection visits to the other
facilities concerned.
The costs to the Defence Budget of the transfers to date are £524,000 (including VAT) and include the costs of preparation,
transports, acceptance of the material at Sellafield and storage.
Subjects
Costs; Inspections; Nuclear weapons; Nuclear safeguards; Radioactive materials; Verification
Date
14 March 2000
Reference
346 c104-5W; 113285
House
House of Commons
What is their policy towards the Geneva negotiations for a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; and what is their assessment of the risks should such a protocol fail to be agreed. [HL 886].
What is their policy towards the Geneva negotiations for a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; and what is their assessment of the risks should such a protocol fail to be agreed. [HL 886].
Asked by
Lord Judd
(Labour)
Answered by
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
(Labour)
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
For answer on
14 February 2000
Answered on
14 February 2000
Subjects
Chemical weapons; Biological weapons; Arms control; Negotiations; Treaties; Verification; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Date
14 February 2000
Reference
HL 886; 609 c123WA
House
House of Lords
Answered by
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
(Labour)
Type
Oral answers to questions
Subjects
Chemical and biological warfare; Chemical weapons; Biological weapons; Arms control; Treaties; Verification; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Date
7 February 2000
Reference
609 c390
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
House
House of Lords
Answered by
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
(Labour)
Asked by
Lord Archer of Sandwell
(Labour)
Type
Oral answers to questions
How they intend to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on 27 March.
Subjects
Chemical and biological warfare; Chemical weapons; Biological weapons; Arms control; Treaties; Verification; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Date
7 February 2000
Reference
609 c390
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
House
House of Lords
How they intend to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on 27 March.
How they intend to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on 27 March.
Asked by
Lord Archer of Sandwell
(Labour)
Answered by
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
(Labour)
Oral questions - Lead
Status
Answered
For answer on
7 February 2000
Answered on
7 February 2000
Subjects
Chemical and biological warfare; Chemical weapons; Biological weapons; Arms control; Treaties; Verification; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Date
7 February 2000
Reference
609 c390
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
House
House of Lords
1st supplementary on the importance of an effective verification protocol of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
1st supplementary on the importance of an effective verification protocol of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Asked by
Lord Archer of Sandwell
(Labour)
Oral questions - 1st Supplementary
Status
Answered
Answered on
7 February 2000
Subjects
Chemical and biological warfare; Chemical weapons; Biological weapons; Arms control; Treaties; Verification; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Date
7 February 2000
Reference
609 c390
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
House
House of Lords