We have had no discussions on the re-use of jam jars. The Food Standards Agency (FSA) lead on this issue.

The current regulations on food contact materials and the European Union hygiene rules apply mainly to food businesses, not to private individuals. They are intended to protect consumers from chemical migration of materials that may be used in the manufacture of containers used to store food or other microbiological risk.

For enforcement purposes, local authorities would need to decide whether an individual or organisation constituted a food business.

There is very small or no risk associated with the responsible re-use of clean jam jars. The FSA are not aware of any local authority taking action against an individual or organisation re-using jam jars for charitable purposes.

Work to assess the future required size of the Ministry of Defence storage capacity is ongoing. No decisions have yet been made regarding storage of material returning from either theatre in Operation Herrick or from Germany.

Work to assess the future required size of the Ministry of Defence storage capacity is ongoing. No decisions have yet been made regarding storage of material returning from either theatre in Operation Herrick or from Germany.

We are advised by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) that there is European Union legislation in place, that applies to food businesses, that are designed to protect consumers from the migration of materials that may be used in the manufacture of containers used to store food. These rules do not apply to subsequent re-use by individuals.

The FSA is not aware of any evidence that reusing jam jars presents a food safety concern for consumers in terms of materials which may migrate from jam jars into food. Separately, good hygiene needs to be observed in cleaning jars and food preparation.

It is for local authorities to decide how they enforce the rules with respect to charities and the like. The FSA's view is that the legislation needs to be applied with common sense and it is clear that local authorities are doing so. The FSA is not aware of any prosecutions for reusing glass jars for jam making since the legislation was introduced in 2004.

NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) activated its contingency plans on 24 September 2012 due to flooding at its site in Filton, near Bristol, following heavy rain affecting much of the country. Prompt activation of its plans allowed NHSBT to redirect blood stocks from Filton to other NHSBT sites at Manchester and Colindale, for testing and processing, and specialised services were also transferred to other sites where possible. Only a very small number of unvalidated units of fresh frozen plasma had to be destroyed.

In addition, NHSBT carried out short term media activity and local donor communications to help boost platelet, O negative and B negative blood collections which were impacted as the bad weather spread across the country. This meant that for the areas served by Filton, but also for the rest of England and North Wales, NHSBT was able to meet all hospital requirements for blood and patient care was not affected.

As a result of the commitment of NHSBT staff, both in Filton and across the organisation (which included staff temporarily relocating to other parts of the country to process the blood donations), operations recommenced in several departments at Filton within just few days of the flooding and the site was fully operational again by 4 October.

NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) activated its contingency plans on 24 September 2012 due to flooding at its site in Filton, near Bristol, following heavy rain affecting much of the country. Prompt activation of its plans allowed NHSBT to redirect blood stocks from Filton to other NHSBT sites at Manchester and Colindale, for testing and processing, and specialised services were also transferred to other sites where possible. Only a very small number of unvalidated units of fresh frozen plasma had to be destroyed.

In addition, NHSBT carried out short term media activity and local donor communications to help boost platelet, O negative and B negative blood collections which were impacted as the bad weather spread across the country. This meant that for the areas served by Filton, but also for the rest of England and North Wales, NHSBT was able to meet all hospital requirements for blood and patient care was not affected.

As a result of the commitment of NHSBT staff, both in Filton and across the organisation (which included staff temporarily relocating to other parts of the country to process the blood donations), operations recommenced in several departments at Filton within just few days of the flooding and the site was fully operational again by 4 October.

Over the last five years, NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) has been delivering an ambitious, but carefully managed, change programme which has included the removal of significant excess capacity within the blood supply chain. NHSBT has consolidated its processing and testing sites, with most of the sites in the south being consolidated to Filton. As part of this, NHSBT very thoroughly considered business continuity impacts and there are robust protocols for transferring testing to another centre during an emergency, as demonstrated by the recent flood at Filton.

When designing the Filton site, a flood analysis was carried out which calculated the maximum water level that would occur once in every 200 years. This was double the requirements of the original developer's planning application. An additional 20% was also added to the calculated water levels take into account the potential impact of climate change. As a result, the finished floor level was 50.5 million above ordnance datum (sea level).

NHSBT regularly assesses risks that may affect its operation on any site, including flooding and other natural events. When the risk is considered significant, resilience measures are put in place to mitigate risk and response measures put in place that enable NHSBT to continue to provide service to hospitals while managing the event.

During the flood, NHSBT continued to provide an uninterrupted service in which all hospital demands were met and the Filton site was fully operational within a fortnight of the flood. This clearly demonstrates that the contingency plans NHSBT has in place are robust and enable the organisation to maintain delivery of a vital national service in the most challenging circumstances.

NHSBT has established that the flooding was caused by recent work in the surrounding area outside of the Filton site. NHSBT is following this up with those involved: temporary measures are currently being put in place to mitigate the risk of a further flood, with a long term solution being designed.

NHSBT is. currently undertaking a ‘lessons learned’ review of the recent situation in order to identify any further actions that need to be taken to further reduce the risk of flooding and provide assurance on site protection.

In the very unlikely event of the complete, long term loss of a department or centre, a raft of other emergency plans would be activated including 24/7 operations. In addition there is a memorandum of understanding between the four UK blood services providing support in times of crisis.

Over the last five years, NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) has been delivering an ambitious, but carefully managed, change programme which has included the removal of significant excess capacity within the blood supply chain. NHSBT has consolidated its processing and testing sites, with most of the sites in the south being consolidated to Filton. As part of this, NHSBT very thoroughly considered business continuity impacts and there are robust protocols for transferring testing to another centre during an emergency, as demonstrated by the recent flood at Filton.

When designing the Filton site, a flood analysis was carried out which calculated the maximum water level that would occur once in every 200 years. This was double the requirements of the original developer's planning application. An additional 20% was also added to the calculated water levels take into account the potential impact of climate change. As a result, the finished floor level was 50.5 million above ordnance datum (sea level).

NHSBT regularly assesses risks that may affect its operation on any site, including flooding and other natural events. When the risk is considered significant, resilience measures are put in place to mitigate risk and response measures put in place that enable NHSBT to continue to provide service to hospitals while managing the event.

During the flood, NHSBT continued to provide an uninterrupted service in which all hospital demands were met and the Filton site was fully operational within a fortnight of the flood. This clearly demonstrates that the contingency plans NHSBT has in place are robust and enable the organisation to maintain delivery of a vital national service in the most challenging circumstances.

NHSBT has established that the flooding was caused by recent work in the surrounding area outside of the Filton site. NHSBT is following this up with those involved: temporary measures are currently being put in place to mitigate the risk of a further flood, with a long term solution being designed.

NHSBT is. currently undertaking a ‘lessons learned’ review of the recent situation in order to identify any further actions that need to be taken to further reduce the risk of flooding and provide assurance on site protection.

In the very unlikely event of the complete, long term loss of a department or centre, a raft of other emergency plans would be activated including 24/7 operations. In addition there is a memorandum of understanding between the four UK blood services providing support in times of crisis.

Over the last five years, NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) has been delivering an ambitious, but carefully managed, change programme which has included the removal of significant excess capacity within the blood supply chain. NHSBT has consolidated its processing and testing sites, with most of the sites in the south being consolidated to Filton. As part of this, NHSBT very thoroughly considered business continuity impacts and there are robust protocols for transferring testing to another centre during an emergency, as demonstrated by the recent flood at Filton.

When designing the Filton site, a flood analysis was carried out which calculated the maximum water level that would occur once in every 200 years. This was double the requirements of the original developer's planning application. An additional 20% was also added to the calculated water levels take into account the potential impact of climate change. As a result, the finished floor level was 50.5 million above ordnance datum (sea level).

NHSBT regularly assesses risks that may affect its operation on any site, including flooding and other natural events. When the risk is considered significant, resilience measures are put in place to mitigate risk and response measures put in place that enable NHSBT to continue to provide service to hospitals while managing the event.

During the flood, NHSBT continued to provide an uninterrupted service in which all hospital demands were met and the Filton site was fully operational within a fortnight of the flood. This clearly demonstrates that the contingency plans NHSBT has in place are robust and enable the organisation to maintain delivery of a vital national service in the most challenging circumstances.

NHSBT has established that the flooding was caused by recent work in the surrounding area outside of the Filton site. NHSBT is following this up with those involved: temporary measures are currently being put in place to mitigate the risk of a further flood, with a long term solution being designed.

NHSBT is. currently undertaking a ‘lessons learned’ review of the recent situation in order to identify any further actions that need to be taken to further reduce the risk of flooding and provide assurance on site protection.

In the very unlikely event of the complete, long term loss of a department or centre, a raft of other emergency plans would be activated including 24/7 operations. In addition there is a memorandum of understanding between the four UK blood services providing support in times of crisis.

On 19 October 2012, DECC launched two new innovation support competitions for energy storage research and development. Both competitions (outlined as follows) are open to any type of energy storage technology—including liquid air energy storage—which could address grid-scale storage and balancing needs in the UK electricity transmission or distribution networks.

DECC's energy storage competitions have been launched in recognition of the potential role for energy storage in enabling low carbon technologies and supporting security of supply, as highlighted in the Electricity Network and Storage Technology Innovation Needs Assessment summary report published recently by the Low Carbon Innovation Co-ordination Group (LCICG).

The Energy Storage Technology Demonstration Competition, with a budget of up to £17 million, will offer organisations the opportunity to secure contracts to develop and demonstrate pre-commercial innovative

energy storage technologies which can address grid-scale storage needs for the UK electricity network in the run up to 2020 and beyond.

DECC's Energy Storage Component Research and Feasibility Study Competition, with a budget of up to £3 million, will offer grant funding, on a competitive basis, to develop components or materials used for energy storage systems or to develop feasibility studies to further explore how storage systems work and how they can be used in the UK electricity network.

Further details of the DECC energy storage competitions, including the key dates and eligibility and selection criteria, can be found at:

http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/funding/funding_ops/innovation/innov_fund/storage/storage.aspx

There is approximately two tonnes of plutonium in safe and secure storage at Dounreay. In February 2012 an NDA credible options paper was published which set out how this and other nuclear material at Dounreay could best be managed. The NDA will publish a preferred options paper, which will set out the chosen way forward for this material, in the coming months.

The estimated costs of storing plutonium at Sellafield have not been disclosed as a single line item in the Sellafield Plan, published on 1 August 2011, as they relate in part to commercial contracts with third parties. The Sellafield Plan (a link to the electronic document is included below) contains a section entitled ‘Safe Storage of Pu’ which provides information on this topic. http://www.sellafieldsites. com/publications/sellafieldplan/Sellafield Plan.pdf